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Articles
SAMUEL R. OLKEN*

Charles Evans Hughes and the
Blaisdell Decision: A Historical
Study of Contract Clause
Jurisprudence

O

N January 8, 1934, in the midst of a widespread economic
depression, the United States Supreme Court decided Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell.' By the margin of a single vote,
the Court upheld the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act2 as a
reasonable exercise of state police powers during an emergency.'
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, writing for the Court, rejected
the argument that the Act impaired the obligation of a private contract within the meaning of the Contract Clause of the United
States Constitution. In dissent, Justice George Sutherland asserted
the primacy of contract rights and their protection by constitutional
limitations of state authority.' The majority and dissenting opinions represented two distinct views of the Contract Clause, each of
which reflected divergent perspectives of the role of state governments within the federal system.6 At the core of this disagreement
*A.B. Harvard College, 1982; J.D. Emory University, 1985. Assistant Professor,
John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance and encouragement of Eric J. Emerson, Pamela Lambos and Timothy R.
Rabel during the preparation of this article. A generous research grant from the John
Marshall Law School and the faith of Associate Dean Robert G. Johnston contributed
significantly to the progress of this project.
1290 U.S. 398 (1934).
2 Ch. 339, 1933 Minn. Laws 514.
3
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444-47.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
5 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448-83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
6 As used in this article, the term federalism refers to the system of government estab-
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lay a recurring problem in federalism: the reconciliation of local
governmental authority with the freedom and security of private
property and contract rights.7
From its inception, the Contract Clause engendered dispute over
the extent to which state governments could regulate private contracts in the public interest. While it ostensibly prohibited all local
legislation that impaired the obligation of contracts, questions arose
about its scope and purpose. In the 145 years between the adoption
of the Constitution and the Blaisdell decision, the United States
Supreme Court articulated various inroads upon the Contract
Clause, recognizing the authority of states to control those aspects
lished by the Constitution in 1787. In essence, the Constitution allocated governmental
authority between a national, or federal, government and the states. In matters of paramount national concern such as interstate commerce, currency, and international relations, the Constitution limited the powers of the states and vested supreme, if not
altogether exclusive, authority in the federal government. Within the federal system
ultimate sovereign authority derived from the citizens of the United States and not from
the states in which they resided, a fundamental premise that distinguished the Constitution from its predecessor, the Articles of Confederation. In their sovereign capacity
citizens designated, by election or other means, governmental representatives at the
state and national levels as the country adapted the federal system to a democratic
republic. Though it identified distinct spheres of state and federal authority, the Constitution did not set forth in precise detail all aspects of government in the federal system.
Its framers merely intended to prescribe an enduring "blueprint for government." William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 23, 28
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 1-29 (1988). It is from this perspective one should therefore

assess issues of federalism and constitutional interpretation.
7 The early Contract Clause disputes revealed an inherent conflict within the political
theory of the republic over "the problem of legislative regulation of property rights."
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835,
at 601 (1988); see also BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION xvi-xvii (1938). G. Edward White has identified "two apparently con-

tradictory approaches ... one elevating property rights beyond legislative interference,
the other suggesting that all individual rights could yield to the goals of the commonwealth." WHITE, supra, at 601-02.
The first approach presupposed a "natural right to the acquisition and use of property" and perceived in a republican government a prime means of "secur[ing] individual
rights." Id. at 597. Therefore, legislative interference with private contracts underscored the tension between the public and private interests characteristic of the federal
system. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 294 (1827) (Thompson,
J., concurring) ("[T]his has rightly been considered a question relating to the division
. ..between the general and State governments."); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 717 (1984) ("[T]he protection
of private contracts against government regulation is inseparably entwined with two
elements of a distinctively political cast: individual freedom, of which freedom of contract is but one illustration, and the need to prevent legislative misbehavior, itself a
central concern of any constitutional arrangement.").
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of contract relations that affected the public interest. Through the
guise of interpretation, the Court sought to balance the mandatory
language of constitutional prohibition with the realities of economic
development and governmental power. It was within this context
that the Supreme Court addressed the Contract Clause issue
presented in Blaisdell.
Of the nearly five hundred opinions Charles Evans Hughes wrote
during his tenure on the Supreme Court, Blaisdell remains among
his most controversial and misunderstood. In part, its legacy of
confusion emanates from the complexity of the opinion itself. In
concluding the Minnesota Act did not violate the Contract Clause,
Hughes set forth an intricate balance of constitutional factors,
which included elements of just compensation, due process, and the
sometimes conflicting precedent of previous Contract Clause jurisprudence. The opinion established a compromise between antithetical views of the Contract Clause as it sought to reconcile the
sanctity of contract obligations with the increased recognition of local governmental police powers as a means of preserving the value
and collective security of contract rights.' Moreover, the opinion
also marked Hughes's attempt to compromise his own modest progressive views of the Contract Clause with those of Justices Harlan
Stone and Benjamin Cardozo, both of whom advanced a bolder
analysis.
Though ample scholarship exists about the Contract Clause,
analysis of the Blaisdell decision has often lacked historical perspective. Many scholars consider the case an aberration in Contract
Clause jurisprudence and contend its emphasis upon flexible constitutional interpretation and the wide latitude of state police powers
undermined the security of vested contract rights. These critics believe the decision subverted the original meaning of the clause by
introducing notions of equity and public policy into questions of
contract impairment. Thus, what was intended as a firm restriction
upon state authority has become uncertain and somewhat illusive.9
Unfortunately, these perceptions misconstrue both the language
of Hughes's opinion and the course of Contract Clause interpreta8 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442-44.
9 See Epstein, supra note 7, at 735-38; Douglas W. Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The
Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
525, 541-44 (1987). See generally Robert C. Palmer, Obligations of Contracts: Intent
and Distortion, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 631, 631-50, 672-73 (1987); Stewart E. Sterk,
The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contractsand the Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 647, 683-85 (1988).
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tion in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This Article
suggests Blaisdell did not eviscerate the constitutional protection of
contract rights. Instead, it proposes the case fit within traditional
inroads upon the Contract Clause that emanated in response to tensions within the federal system over the appropriate role of state
governments in regulating private interests. Local control of vested
contract rights comprised a particular focal point for this dispute.
Insofar as the Court sought to protect the security and performance
of contracts from the arbitrary interference of state legislatures, it
also recognized the importance of local government in maintaining
the value and security of these same agreements. It is from this
context one must ultimately assess the case, for its points about the
public interest in private contracts reflect an evolutionary process
and not distortion of constitutional intent.
In addition, it is necessary to analyze Blaisdell from the jurisprudential perspective of Hughes, a keen student of the practical
problems of federalism, whose opinion invariably reflected his own
understanding of the Constitution, governmental authority and the
federal system. Curiously, previous commentary has ignored this
vantage point and thus produced critical assessment of the decision
that is often sterile and incomplete.
This Article has four parts. Part I discusses the origins of ambiguity in the Contract Clause. Part II presents an overview of Contract Clause jurisprudence developed by the United States Supreme
Court in the years before Blaisdell. Part III analyzes the main facets of Charles Evans Hughes's jurisprudence. Part IV presents the
Blaisdell case as a classical problem in American federalism. It
then examines both the majority and dissenting opinions from the
dual perspectives of historical and legal precedent.
I
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE: GENESIS OF AMBIGUITY AND
FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT

The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution provides
that "[n]o State shall.., pass any... Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts." 1 Debate over the precise meaning and scope of this
10 The Contract Clause provides in full:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing
but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of AtHeinOnline -- 72 Or. L. Rev. 516 1993
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provision dominated Supreme Court jurisprudence throughout the
first three quarters of the nineteenth century." Thereafter, substantive due process and other theories eclipsed the primary importance
of Contract Clause issues. Nevertheless, fundamental questions
persisted about the scope of the Contract Clause well into the twentieth century as Blaisdell revealed the complex dimensions of this
long standing problem in constitutional law.
Ironically, the inclusion of the Contract Clause within the Constitution elicited sparse debate at either the Constitutional Convention of 1787 or the state ratifying conventions.' 2 Prior to the
Constitution, the Articles of Confederation established a tenuous
union in which individual states retained so much authority the national government became virtually powerless to deal with problems
of interstate commerce and the enormous post-Revolutionary War
debt that threatened to tear the country assunder. With capital
scarce and credit perilous, individual states issued currency and
emitted bills of credit. The effect was an unstable economy as the
value of money constantly fluctuated, rendering commerce uncertain and highly speculative.'" A plethora of debtor relief legislation
impaired the obligations of private contracts by altering the methods of payment in transactions between debtors and creditors. Stay
laws authorized moratoria on debt payments, while other laws permitted installment payments of outstanding debts.' 4 Many states
allowed payment with commodities of unstable value since gold and
silver, the most reliable items, were relatively scarce.' 5 Economic
and political chaos ensued and ultimately made imperative the creatainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or
grant any Title of Nobility.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
11 WRIGHT, supra note 7, at xiii.
12 LEVY, supra note 6, at 124-27; WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 12; Stuart Bruchey, The
Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the Legal System of the Early
American Republic, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1135, 1142-43 ("Silence indeed suggests the
possibility of indifference, but it also suggests the possibility of a consensus that required
no voice.").
13 Some disagreement exists about the connection between an unstable currency and
post-Revolutionary debtor relief laws. Benjamin Wright contends such legislation
emerged in response to an inadequate money supply. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 4-6. In
contrast, Stuart Bruchey argues the creation of paper money rendered currency unstable, and its use to pay debts impaired the obligation of contracts. Bruchey, supra note
12, at 1143.
14 See LEVY, supra note 6, at 124; WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 4-6; Bruchey, supra note
12, at 1143.
15 WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 5-6; Bruchey, supra note 12, at 1139-42.
HeinOnline -- 72 Or. L. Rev. 517 1993

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72, 1993)

tion of a strong federal government with more explicit limitations
upon state authority set forth in a written constitution.
Although James Madison and other delegates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 believed state interference with private
contracts demonstrated an inherent flaw in the confederate system
of government, 16 no pertinent discussion about this occurred until
six weeks after the Convention drafted the Northwest Ordinance.
The Ordinance prescribed governmental authority in the Northwest
Territories and provided in relevant part:
And in the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made, or have
force in the said territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts 17or engagements, bonafide
and without fraud previously formed.
This provision anticipated the Contract Clause.
Toward the end of the Convention, the delegates began work on
Article I, Section 10. First, they adopted a specific prohibition on
state power to coin money, give bills of credit, or accept as legal
tender for payment of debts anything other than gold or silver. Rufus King of Massachusetts then moved to further curtail state authority with a provision identical to that in the Northwest
Ordinance prohibiting legislative interference with private contracts. Initially rejected as overbroad,'8 it eventually received approval once John Rutledge of South Carolina suggested the
importance of a clause forbidding the states from enacting ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder. 9
16 LEVY, supra note 6, at 124-25; WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 5-7, 14; Bruchey, supra
note 12, at 1136-42.
17 Northwest Ordinance, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 51, 52 (1789).
18 For example, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania thought King's motion unwise
because many state laws affected contracts and he suggested instead the federal judiciary could protect private contract rights. Similarly, George Mason of Virginia believed
exigent circumstances might warrant state abridgement of private contract rights. In
addition, Roger Sherman of Connecticut considered it unnecessary to include a specific
provision prohibiting state impairment of the obligation of contracts because other constitutional provisions already limited states' powers to interefere with private rights.
See LEVY, supra note 6, at 125-26; WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 8.
19 In response to Sherman's concerns, James Wilson of Pennsylvania asserted the
proposed clause would only prohibit states from retrospective interference with private
contracts. Madison then noted the Constitution already forbade ex post facto laws, but
apparently this provision only applied to Congress. Rutledge then, with little explanation, proposed a substitute "motion that the states could pass neither bills of attainder
[n]or ex post facto laws." LEVY, supra note 6, at 126. Ultimately, the convention
adopted Rutledge's motion, which became part of Article I, Section 10, Clause I of the
Constitution. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 8-9.
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On September 12, 1787, shortly before the Convention ended, the
Committee on Style submitted a draft of Article I, Section 10 that
included a clause prohibiting the states from impairing the obligation of contracts.20 Records from the Convention do not explain
why the Committee inserted this clause, although it is possible that
James Madison and James Wilson, neither of whom necessarily rejected King's earlier proposal, may have, with King, prevailed on
other members of the Committee. 2'
Unlike its predecessor, the Contract Clause presumably included
public contracts and even agreements procured by fraud since its
language did not exclude them. It also differed from the Northwest
Ordinance in that it barred only state impairment of contract obligations; the Ordinance contained a broader prohibition against legislative interference with contracts.2 2 Once again, the Convention
records do not explain this substitution of phrases, or why the final
version of the Contract Clause omitted the words "altering or."'23
This absence of constitutional history highlights the inherent ambiguity of the Contract Clause. Intended as a limitation of state
authority to interfere with the enjoyment and security of private
contract and property rights, 24 its scope derives from the meaning

of its terms. Thus, how one defines contract obligation and impairment determines the reach of the clause.25 Made part of Article I,
20 LEVY, supra note 6, at 126. The members of the Committee were its chairman,
Gouverneur Morris, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Rufus King, and William
Johnson. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 9 n.18.
21 Apparently, the Committee deliberated in relative obscurity, and no records of its
private discussions about the Contract Clause are available. One historian suggests the
paucity of debate about the clause may derive from its chronology. When King first
proposed the clause on August 28, 1787, the convention delegates had toiled in the
Philadelphia heat and humidity for over three months. When the Committee of Style
presented its draft of the clause two weeks later, the already exhausted convention delegates may have had little patience or energy for thoughtful debate. LEVY, supra note 6,
at 126-27. Alternatively, consensus may have existed about the necessity for an express
limitation of state power to interfere with contracts. Such a consensus would have reflected concern for the protection of property rights from arbitrary legislative actions.
Bruchey, supra note 12, at 1143. In addition, John Dickinson may have convinced the
delegates the ex post facto clause only applied to criminal laws, thus leaving the Contract Clause as the sole express bar against civil laws that impaired the obligation of
preexisting contracts. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 9-10; Bruchey, supra note 12, at 1143.
22 LEVY, supra note 6, at 126.
23 WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 9; Epstein, supra note 7, at 709.
24 LEVY, supra note 6, at 124-36; WHITE, supra note 7, at 601; WRIGHT, supra note
7, at 5-16; Bruchey, supra note 12, at 1136-45; Epstein, supra note 7, at 705, 717.
25 Epstein, for example, notes:
On the one hand, the word "obligation" may be read as referring to a contractual burden; if so, the state may impose new burdens on contracting parties.
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Section 10 without the refinement of its terms by open debate at the
Convention, it has become susceptible to various interpretations, all
of which reflect, to some degree, divergent perspectives of federalism.2 6 Inasmuch as the clause limits state power, it also involves a
core problem of federalism: how to reconcile private rights with the
sovereign power of states to govern.
In the Virgina Ratifying Convention, Edmund Randolph explained to Patrick Henry that the objective behind the clause was to
prevent state interference with private contracts, 27 but omitted explanation of how much interference became impairment. Similarly,
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton justified the clause as a
"constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private
rights ' 2' and a "precautio[n] against.., those practices.., of State
governments, which have undermined the formatio[n] of property
29
and credit."

In contrast, Luther Martin of Maryland questioned whether the
Contract Clause unnecessarily curtailed the power of states to enact
debtor relief laws in times of extreme economic distress.3" Unlike
Madison and Hamilton, he believed such legislation necessary to
prevent the complete destruction of debtors at the hands of creditors. Martin also perceived that the Contract Clause potentially restricted local authority to regulate private economic affairs that
affected the public interest.
While others shared this concern, 3 relatively little discussion
but may not eliminate those already in place. On the other hand, "obligation," as it is found in the phrase "the law of obligations" and in standard
Roman and Civil law usage, refers to the entire relationship and not to just
one side of it, suggesting that any alteration in the private relationship is governed by the clause.
Epstein, supra note 7, at 709 & n. 17. For further discussion of the inherent ambiguity
of the term "obligation" see WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 10 & n.22, 11-12.
26 See Epstein, supra note 7, at 707 (positing that the framers probably did not have a
single or unifying theory of the Contract Clause and fully considered neither its logical
implications nor its precise scope).
27 WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 16.

28 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 291 (James Madison) (Robert B. Luce ed., 1976).
29 THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 568 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert B. Luce ed.,

1976); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert B. Luce
ed., 1976).
30 LEVY, supra note 6, at 127; WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 13 & n.28. Justice Suther-

land also referred to Martin's speech of November 29, 1787, before the Maryland House
of Delegates in his Blaisdell dissent. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 461-62 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (discussing original intent and the Contract Clause).
31 For example, George Mason thought Rufus King's proposal for a clause limiting
HeinOnline -- 72 Or. L. Rev. 520 1993
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about this facet of the clause occurred in the state ratifying conventions.32 Indeed, the concept of police powers did not really exist
when the Constitution was created.3 3 It emerged in rudimentary
form over half a century later as lawyers and jurists alike recognized a developing republic might, on occasion, best protect the security of private rights through legislation enacted by the states to
promote the public welfare. Though Luther Martin did not articulate this rationale in express terms, one would err in dismissing his
point as beyond the original intent of the constitutional framers and
so dispute the notion of a police powers limitation upon the scope of
the Contract Clause. For it would appear that in 1787 few perceived the Constitution sanctioned the complete emasculation of
state authority in all areas of property and contract rights. 34 Instate interference with contracts might prevent state governments from regulating contract rights that affected the public welfare. LEVY, supra note 6, at 126; WRIGHT, supra
note 7, at 8.
32 LEVY, supra note 6, at 127-29 ("[T]he contract clause inspired neither passionate
onslaughts from spokesmen for debtors' relief nor vigorous defenses from its proponents."). In fact, there was only cursory discussion of whether the clause applied to
both private and public grants and whether it operated both retrospectively and prospectively. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 12-16.
33 Clifford C. Hynning, Constitutionalityof Moratory Legislation, 12 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 182, 197 (1934); Sol Phillips Perlman, Mortgage Deficiency Judgments Duringan
Economic Depression, 20 VA. L. REV. 771, 780, 782 (1934).
34 In 1833 Joseph Story commented:
That the framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain the States in the
regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internal government, is admitted; and it has never been so construed. It has always been understood, that
the contracts spoken of in the Constitution were those, which respected property, or some other object of value, and which conferred rights capable of
being asserted in a court of justice.
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
258 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833); see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213, 258-59 (1827) (Washington, J., seriatim opinion) (suggesting that if the
term contract obligation really meant the universal or moral duty of men to perform
their contracts, states would have, in ratifying the Constitution, relinquished their sovereign authority to promote the public welfare since many laws enacted pursuant to
local police powers incidentally affect contracts). See generally GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 504, 517-64 (1969).
In Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall offered his own view of the Contract Clause's
origins:
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of interfering with contracts ... had been used to such an excess by the State legislatures, as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all
confidence between man and man. The mischief had become so great, so
alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and threaten the
existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith. To guard against the continuance of the evil was an object
of deep interest with all the truly wise, as well as the virtuous, of this great
HeinOnline -- 72 Or. L. Rev. 521 1993
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deed, the extent to which the public interest inhered in both private
and public contracts influenced the course of Contract Clause interpretation before the Supreme Court.
II
CONTRACT CLAUSE INTERPRETATION BY THE
SUPREME COURT BEFORE BLAISDELL

For nearly the next century and a half, the United States
Supreme Court developed three significant inroads upon the scope
of the Contract Clause. First, it distinguished between the rights
and remedies of contracts, allowing states to regulate only the remedies of public and private agreements. Thereafter, it invoked the
doctrine of state reserved powers and developed the theory of inalienable police powers, both of which acknowledged the authority of
states to modify contract rights in the public interest. Each of
these restrictions raised important questions about the origins and
nature of contract obligations. Essentially, two contrasting theories
emerged which reflected divergent perspectives of state power
within the federal system. One theory emphasized the sanctity of
vested contract rights and the necessity for strict constitutional interpretation of the Contract Clause. The other view stressed the
paramount importance of local governmental authority in the creation of contractual relationships. Although the Constitution protected the integrity of contract rights, it did not necessarily prevent
local governments from regulating those aspects of contract performance that affected the public interest. Logically extended, this
approach suggested that limited state interference with private contracts did not always constitute impairment of contract obligations
within the meaning of the Contract Clause. To some extent, each of
the foregoing tests attempted to establish a compromise between
these antithetical views. It is from this constitutional context that
Hughes crafted his decision in Blaisdell.
A.

The Rights/Remedies Distinction

The traditional distinction between the rights and remedies of a
contract emanated from the early decisions of the Marshall Court.
From the outset, a majority of the Court interpreted the Contract
Clause in an expansive manner, including both private and public
community, and was one of the important benefits expected from a reform of
the government.
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 354-55 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
HeinOnline -- 72 Or. L. Rev. 522 1993
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contracts within its ambit. Under the leadership of Chief Justice
John Marshall, the Court invoked the clause to protect land
grants, 35 corporate charters, 36 and other types of agreements.3 7 Primarily concerned with preserving the security of property and contract rights, Marshall used principles of natural law and staunch
federalism in his analysis of the Contract Clause. 38 He feared that
the unbridled authority of state governments would impair the
35 See, e.g., Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292 (1815) (invalidating Vermont's
repeal of prior land grants establishing houses of religious worship); Terrett v. Taylor,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815) (ruling Virginia could not rescind a previous legislative
land grant to the Episcopal church for a religious school); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810) (voiding the repeal by the Georgia legislature of a previous land
grant to speculators).
36 See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (holding that a royal charter created contract rights in a corporation that subsequent legislation could not divest without violating the Contract Clause); Terrett, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) at 55 (ruling that Virginia could not divest one corporation of its property in
favor of a successor corporation).
37 See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823) (ruling that the Kentucky
Occupying Claimants Laws impaired the obligation of contracts of Virginia citizens);
New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812) (holding that New Jersey could
not revoke a previous agreement under which the state legislature exempted certain
Indian lands from taxation).
38 For general discussions of Marshall's Contract Clause jurisprudence and, in particular, his reliance upon natural law, see WHITE, supra note 7, at 602-12, 624-28;
Bruchey, supra note 12, at 1145; Joseph M. Lynch, Fletcher v. Peck: The Nature of the
Contract Clause, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 11-19 (1982) (asserting Marshall used
principles of natural law and equity to decide this constitutional conflict).
Under general principles of natural law, individuals in a state of nature possess certain inalienable rights, which include the acquisition and possession of property. Without constraints one could potentially destroy another in the pursuit and defense of
property. The seventeenth-century British philospher John Locke posited that individuals enter society from a state of nature to protect their personal property from the
assault of others. In return for relinquishing absolute control, they expect government
to preserve their use and enjoyment of property. Legal authority exists to protect individual freedom and to make possible the relative security of personal rights in property.
See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 3-30 (J.W. Gough ed.,

1956) (6th ed. 1764).
Lawyers, jurists, and political statesmen applied natural law principles to republican
governmental theory during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. See WHITE,
supra note 7, at 48-61, 597-602; WOOD, supra note 34, at 53-65. For an example of the
use of natural law principles before Fletcher, see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386,
388 (1798) (Chase, J.,seriatim opinion) ("An act of the legislature .. .contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of
legislative authority."). Calder ruled that the Connecticut legislature's revocation of a
judicial decree concerning a will did not operate as an ex post facto law. See also Van
Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.). 304, 320 (1795) (Patterson, J., circuit court
opinion) (holding that Pennsylvania could not repeal a prior legislative land grant without impairing a contract obligation).
In 1796, Alexander Hamilton noted Georgia could not rescind a prior land grant
without violating the Contract Clause and natural law. Hamilton rendered this opinion
HeinOnline -- 72 Or. L. Rev. 523 1993
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value of these rights and so employed this clause as an affirmative
limitation on state power.
Not all members of the Court, however, shared Marshall's views.
Justice William Johnson authored a separate opinion in Fletcher v.
Peck 31 that openly questioned the meaning of the Contract Clause
and cautioned against its use as an open-ended limitation of state
power. While he believed Georgia had no legal authority to rescind
a prior legislative land grant, he refused to invoke the Contract
Clause as the principal basis of his decision. He perceived the
clause in equivocal terms, uncertain whether it prohibited only laws
that impaired the obligation of contracts or all laws that affected
contracts.'
He indicated that under Marshall's interpretation,
state laws prescribing both the enforcement and creation of contracts were void even though they did not necessarily impair the
obligation of contracts.4 '
Johnson found this untenable and noted that such laws were
"within the most correct limits of legislative powers, and most beneficially exercised." 4 2 Unlike Marshall he viewed private rights and
local government in a correlative sense; the laws of the latter created the rights and remedies of contracts and property.4 3 Natural
law, therefore, with its emphasis on the creation of rights anterior to
the existence of government, did not create contract and property
rights forever beyond the reach of governmental authority." Johnin connection with the Yazoo land controversy at issue in Fletcher. See WHITE, supra
note 7, at 603; WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 22; Lynch, supra, at 18 & n.68.
39 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (holding unconstitutional a Georgia law that revoked
a prior legislative grant of 35 million acres of western territorial land to private speculators). Under the influence of bribery, the 1795 Georgia legislature conveyed the Yazoo
territory to several speculators; the following year a reform legislature repealed the
grant. Without prior notice of this repeal, Fletcher purchased 15 thousand acres from
Peck, the successor in interest to Gunn, an original grantee. Fletcher sued Peck under a
covenant in the deed, asserting Georgia's right to convey the acreage in 1795. Id. at 8792. For a general discussion of this case, see WHITE, supra note 7, at 602-06; Lynch,
supra note 38, at 1-20.
4°Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 144-45 (Johnson, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 145. Marshall concluded that in its 1795 grant to private speculators, the
state of Georgia, through its legislature, created an implied contractual obligation not to
revoke its grant or to reassert its rights to the Yazoo land. He ignored the fraudulent
inducement of the original grant and noted that once executed, the grant created vested
contract rights. Id. at 135. To this extent he invoked the Contract Clause as a means
"to shield .. .property from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to which
men are exposed." Id. at 138.
42

Id. at 145.
43 See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 283 (1827).

44 Nevertheless, Johnson, like Marshall, readily thought that Georgia's repeal of its
prior land grant was void under natural law. Before he criticized the Contract Clause,
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son posited a more narrow scope for the constitutional prohibition
of state authority in which states had wide latitude over both the
formation of contracts and the enforcement of contract remedies.
He anticipated prospective analysis in this area by suggesting that a
distinction existed between contract rights and remedies.45
Insofar as subsequent decisions of the Marshall Court used the
Contract Clause to protect property and contract rights, they also
set forth its limitations. Thus, the Marshall Court both expanded
the scope of the Contract Clause and created its potential constraints. While general consensus existed among members of the
Court that the clause preserved private interests, disagreement over
its limitation of state authority to regulate private and public economic affairs gradually became apparent.4 6 In particular, Johnson's
opinion in Fletcher raised a significant theoretical dilemma for
those concerned with protecting private rights from state infringement. If Johnson was correct, the Contract Clause only forbade
state laws that impaired the obligation of contracts and not those
which merely affected the remedy. Implicit in this distinction was
the potential to limit the scope of the constitutional prohibition
upon state power.
Initial analysis of the rights/remedies distinction focused primarily on the constitutional objective of preserving contract obligations.
Marshall, and other justices such as Bushrod Washington, invoked
the distinction to emphasize the sanctity of these obligations. Invariably, they broadened the scope of contract rights within the ambit
of constitutional protection and explained the concept of contractual obligation.
In Fletcher, Marshall had defined a contract as an agreement, "in
which a party . . . [undertakes] to do, or not to do, a particular
thing." 47 Within this definition lay a paramount concern for securing the performance of contracts. For a majority of the Court, an
agreement to undertake or not to undertake a particular action signified a promise that created a legal duty of performance. Out of
he stated: "I do not hesitate to declare that a state does not possess the power of revoking its own grants. But I do it on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things
.... " Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 143.
45 Id. at 145. Johnson's concern for preserving the legitimate exercise of local power
over contracts in times of public necessity would ultimately form the theoretical basis of
the doctrines of reserved state powers and inalienable police powers.
46 See generally WHITE, supra note 7, at 595-673 (discussing the contours of the
Marshall Court's Contract Clause jurisprudence).
47 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136; see also Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
122, 197 (1819).
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this duty arose the obligation of contract. After Fletcher, most of
the Court equated the right to receive performance of a contractual
obligation with a contract right. Faced with the theoretical distinction between contract rights and remedies, the Court viewed contract rights and obligations synonomously. Thus, state legislation
that abridged the former, impaired the latter.
From this perspective, the Court invalidated a New York insolvency law that retroactively discharged a debtor from payment of
an antecedent debt.4" Counsel for the debtor argued that no constitutional impairment occurred because the parties made the contract
subject to the conditions of municipal law.49 Thus, the insolvency
law only affected the remedy for enforcing contract rights. 50 Marshall, however, narrowly construed the scope of state authority.
Writing for the Court, he stated: "Any law which releases a part of
this obligation, must, in the literal sense of the word, impair it." 5'
The New York law infringed upon the creditor's inalienable right to
receive full payment because it discharged the debtor from complete
performance. Had the law only released the person of the debtor
but not his property from continued liability for the outstanding
indebtedness, Marshall might have accepted the debtor's contention
the statute merely affected the remedy and not the performance of
the contract.5 2 Indeed, he acknowledged the limited circumstances
in which a state could modify a contract remedy so long as it left
intact the right of performance.5 3 However, he considered this dis48 Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122. While the Court ruled this particular law violated
the Contract Clause, it also noted that until Congress exercised its power to enact a
uniform bankruptcy law, individual states could pass bankruptcy legislation that did
not impair the obligation of contracts. Id. at 196-97. The absence of a federal bankruptcy law, therefore, made unnecessary the judicial determination of whether the New
York insolvency statute conflicted with Congress's power under Article I, Section 8,
Clause 4 of the Constitution, to establish uniform bankruptcy laws. Id. at 197. Marshall apparently did not perceive a distinction between bankruptcy and insolvency laws.
See id. at 194-95. Instead, he focused on the Contract Clause. For a brief overview of
the role of bankruptcy legislation in the unstable economy of the early nineteenth century, see WHITE, supra note 7, at 630-33 (asserting bankruptcy laws altered the significance of vested property and contract rights and reflected changing perceptions of
debt).
49
Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 155 ("Every contract must be subjected to, limited,
and interpreted, by the law of nature, which every where forms a part, and the best part,
of the municipal code .
50
1d. at 178.
51
Id. at 197.
52 Id. at 203. The New York law released both the person of the debtor and the debt.
53 d. at 200. For example, a state could elect not to imprison a bankrupt without
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tinction peripheral to the overrriding objective of the Contract
Clause: the protection of contract rights from meddlesome state
laws.
Justice Washington also thought the Contract Clause prohibited
any state infringement of contract performance regardless of the degree of impairment. Any law which permitted even the smallest
change in performance or prescribed conditions not expressed in the
contract automatically impaired the obligation of contract within
the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. 4 He used this rationale to find that the Kentucky Occupying Claimants Laws unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of a preexisting agreement
by Kentucky to honor all private rights and interests created under
Virginia law to land within Kentucky's borders. 5 By exempting
local occupants from liability for waste, rents, and profits, the Kentucky laws devalued the property interests of Virginians who held
legal title to the realty and thus interfered with their contract rights.
Justice Washington insisted Kentucky could not avoid its contract
obligation for reasons of inconvenience or impracticability. 6
Justice Johnson concurred with the majority for technical reasons, but disagreed with its use of the Contract Clause as a blanket
prohibition on state authority. He noted that vast social and economic changes in Kentucky pursuant to its territorial agreement
tract Clause. Id. at 200-01. Also, a statute of limitations only affected a contract remedy.
While there were no published dissents or concurring opinions, it appears Sturges
was a compromise decision that left unanswered more questions than it resolved. See
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 272-73 (1827) (Johnson, J., seriatim opinion); WHITE, supra note 7, at 636-39 (claiming Marshall sought a unanimous decision
in part to lessen hostile criticism of the Court given the intense public interest in bankruptcy legislation).
54 Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 84-85 (1823). Four years later in Ogden,
Washington seemingly qualified his sweeping statements. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 257-69
(arguing that municipal law in effect when the parties create a contract inheres within
the contract obligation and controls the parties' rights and duties).
55 Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 76-92. Pursuant to the formation of Kentucky as a
separate state from Virginia, the two executed a 1789 compact under which Kentucky
agreed to honor under Virginia law all titles to Kentucky land granted under patents
from Virginia before Kentucky's statehood. The Kentucky laws of 1797 and 1812 created procedural barriers that interfered with property rights derived from Virginia law.
Given the vast number of claimants and the amount of acreage, the laws created myriad
political, economic, and social problems.
56 Id. at 84, 89. However, his opinion avoided resolution of the underlying issue
about the extent to which "solicitude for vested property rights could retard the use and
enjoyment of other property rights." WHITE, supra note 7, at 648. Alternatively,
Washington could have ruled the compact supreme over state laws under the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution. Id. at 646.
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with Virginia necessitated deviation from the precise terms of the
compact. Strict, technical compliance with the provisions applying
Virginia law to Kentucky land disputes made little sense and unduly abridged the legitimate exercise of Kentucky's sovereign au7
thority to enact legislation for the public welfare.1
A South Carolina Republican appointed to the Supreme Court in
1804 by Thomas Jefferson, Johnson generally advocated a strong
national government and a vigorous federal judiciary. 8 Yet, his interpretation of the Contract Clause revealed deep concern for maintaining the intrinsic power of states to govern their own affairs to
the widest extent possible under the federal system set forth by the
Constitution. In this respect, his analysis of Contract Clause cases
sometimes differed from both Federalist and other Republican
members of the Court. Johnson steadfastly maintained the concomitant importance of state authority to prescribe laws in response to
economic and social necessities notwithstanding their incidental effects on contract obligations.
Indeed, his Green opinion suggested the per se prohibition of
state power to regulate property and contract interests might jeopardize the security of private rights by preventing local officials
from prescribing rules for their use and enjoyment consonant with
the needs of the public.59 For Johnson, a functional, flexible application of the Contract Clause made possible the recognition of local
governmental authority as an integral means of sustaining economic
and social stability."
Johnson refined his theory of the Contract Clause in Ogden v.
Saunders,6 1 a pivotal case which confined the Contract Clause prohibition to state laws that impaired preexisting contractual obligations.6 2 Analysis of the arguments before the Court reveals how
57 Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 96-104 (Johnson, J., concurring). Johnson did not
specifically address the Contract Clause issue. Instead, he focused on Kentucky's ability to enact legislation pertaining to property. Nevertheless, his observations paralleled
his subsequent views in Ogden.
58 For an overview of Johnson's judicial career, see DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE
WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE FIRST DISSENTER (1954).
59 Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 104.
60 Years later, Charles Evans Hughes reiterated this notion in Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
61 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
62 Ogden was not the first case before the Supreme Court that presented the issue of
prospective state legislation as an impairment of the obligation of private contracts. In
McMillan v. McNeill, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209 (1819), a unanimous Court, per Chief
Justice Marshall, concluded that a Louisiana debtor relief law did not have any prospective legal effect on the obligation of a private contract made outside the state by South
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the theoretical dichotomy between contract rights and remedies reflected an underlying dilemma about the appropriate limits of state
authority. Several justices wrote opinions, all of which examined
the implications of this case on the delicate balance between the
affirmative exercise of state regulatory authority and the nullification of such power through an expansive reading of the Contract
Clause.
In Ogden, a divided Court sustained the constitutionality of an
1801 New York insolvency statute that prospectively affected an
1806 bill of exchange executed in New York between Ogden, a
debtor from New York, and Jordan, a Kentucky creditor who
thereafter assigned his interest in the contract to Saunders. 63 As a
defense, Ogden asserted that the statute discharged his obligation of
full payment and exempted his future acquisition of property from
satisfaction of any outstanding indebtedness.
Specifically, he argued that the parties executed the bill of exchange subject to an implied condition of partial payment created
by the preexisting New York insolvency law.' The law's prospective nature presumably put the parties on notice of this condition;
thus, the law became part of the contract and helped define its
rights and remedies. No impairment occurred because New York
prescribed conditions to which the parties impliedly assented.6 5
Moreover, the statute merely affected the contract remedy and protected the rights of all by making the debtor relinquish his present
(but not future) property for the creditor's benefit.6 6
Carolina citizens. The debtor invoked the law as a defense and contended that the legal
duty of contract performance was subject to the preexisting operation of the statute.
Marshall himself suggested why McMillan did not necessarily dispose of the prospectivity issue before the Court:
[I]t is a general rule ...that the positive authority of a decision is coextensive
only with the facts on which it is made ... in [McMillan] the contract, though
subsequent to the passage of the Act, was made in a different State ... and,
consequently, without any view to the law, the benefit of which was claimed
by the debtor.
Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 333.
63 The Supreme Court heard the case on appeal from Louisiana, where Ogden had
moved from New York and where Saunders sued him in assumpsit. However, the
Court refused on jurisdictional grounds to apply the New York law against a creditor
from Kentucky. Id. at 358 (Johnson, J., disposing of the case). In addition, the Court
held that the power of Congress to establish a uniform bankruptcy law did not preclude
New York from enacting its own bankruptcy statute in the absence of a federal one. Id.
at 274-79.
64Id. at 231-32.
65 Id. at 233, 235-36.
66
d. at 235.
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Daniel Webster, counsel for the creditor, implicitly recognized
the ramifications of this dispute on federalism and stressed the constitutional limits on New York's power to regulate private contracts'. In his argument that the Contract Clause prohibited both
retroactive and prospective state laws that impaired the obligation
of contracts, Webster emphasized that the debtor's legal duty of
payment arose from agreement of the parties. Otherwise, if New
York law defined the contractual obligation, the state could impair
67
it and make insecure the rights of the creditor.
Justice Johnson disagreed vehemently. He believed the obligation of a contract emanated primarily from the laws of local government and not, as Marshall and Webster thought, from the will of
the parties.6" While moral concerns and those of natural law might
temper the legal duty of performance, Johnson thought the positive
laws of government set the parameters of contract rights. State law
in existence at the time of the contract therefore became part of the
agreement insofar as it affected both the rights and remedies of the
contract. 69

Reluctant to void state legislation that he perceived essential to
maintaining the collective security of society during a period of potential economic chaos, Johnson espoused a pragmatic construction
of the Contract Clause that reconciled the sanctity of private rights
with the overriding power of the state to govern. 70 Under the Constitution, all contracts "receive a relative, and not a positive interpretation; for the rights of all must be held and enjoyed in
67

1d. at 240-41, 246-54.
68 Id. at 282-83 (Johnson, J., seriatim opinion).
69 Id. at 283. Johnson asserted laws of society govern the construction and enforcement of contracts. He considered the remedy distinct from the underlying contract
obligation of the debtor. As such, the remedy could vary in accord with public exigency
whereas the obligation could not. To construe the remedy as part of the contract obligation would restrict state authority over the enforcement and conditions of contract
performance. Id.
70 Id. at 286-92. In particular, Johnson rejected a narrow, limited interpretation of
contract impairment. "Societies exercise a positive control as well over the inception,
construction, and fulfilment [sic] of contracts, as over the form and measure of the
remedy to enforce them." Id. at 286. He emphasized that the Constitution was not a
document pertaining to man in a state of nature, but one for men in a state of society.
From this perpsective, literal interpretation of the Contract Clause prohibition was improbable, as it ignored a principal objective of government-the promotion of the public
welfare. Id. at 290. Insofar as the clause restricted state legislation that arbitrarily
interfered with existing personal and property rights, it did not, Johnson thought, function as a per se limitation of state authority. Id. at 286; see also Robert L. Hale, The
Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: 111, 57 HARV. L. REV. 852, 876-80 (1944).
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subserviency to the good of the whole.""' The creditor had neither
an absolute nor an unlimited contract right to a particular remedy.
Instead, the parties entered into their agreement subject to the preexisting authority of local government to prescribe changes in either
the enforcement or performance of contract obligations.7 2 Insofar
as the insolvency law altered the creditor's remedy, it recognized
both the creditor's and debtor's rights but prevented the creditor's
interests from "overrid[ing] entirely the general interests of society"
and the debtor.7 3 Since the New York act preserved the value of
performance in a relative sense and helped conserve a measure of
economic stability, it fulfilled an important objective of governmental authority and did not necessarily impair the contract within the
meaning of the Contract Clause.7 4
The manner in which the Court construed the seminal concepts
of contract obligation and impairment reflected disagreement between the justices over the "division of power between the general
and State governments." 7 As a whole, the majority interpreted the
Contract Clause as permitting states to regulate certain aspects of
the contractual relationship that affected the general welfare. 76 Indeed, Justice Thompson urged judicial deference to state legislatures prescribing "[t]he mode, and manner, and the extent to which
property may be taken in satisfaction of debts." 7 7 He reasoned expediency and concern for the public good compelled their passage
and ultimately governed their efficacy. 78 From this perspective, the
majority narrowly construed the meanings of contract obligation
and impairment to afford New York wide latitude in maintaining
71 Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 282.
72 Id. at 287-89. Johnson also distinguished between state tender laws barred under
Article I of the Constitution and insolvency laws enacted to help debtors unable to
perform their contractual duties. Rather than discharging the obligation of contracts,
insolvency laws merely limited contract rights. In Johnson's view, the Contract Clause
did not expressly prohibit such limitations. Id. at 288-89. Conversely, Article I, Section 10, Clause I of the Constitution expressly prohibited the states from making specie
other than gold or silver legal tender for the payment of debts. Id.
73 Id. at 291. In this sense, Johnson's opinion seemingly endorsed the power of states
to enact debtor relief legislation that also affected preexisting contracts. However, in a
previous segment he indicated New York lacked the authority to modify contracts of
citizens from other states. Id. at 288; see also WHITE, supra note 7, at 652.
74
Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 292.
75 Id. at 294 (Thompson, J., seriatim opinion).
76 Id. at 322 (Trimble, J., seriatim opinion) (discussing the Contract Clause as a special rather than general limitation on state power); see also id. at 256-60 (Washington,
J., seriatim opinion).
77 Id. at 309 (Thompson, J., seriatim opinion).
78 Id
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the correlative security of private property within its sovereign borders.7 9 In contrast, the Marshall dissent rejected these assumptions
and analyzed the Contract Clause in an abstract and expansive
manner, devoid of public policy and economic considerations inconsistent with the principles of natural law." °
Sixteen years after Ogden, the Court curtailed the utility of the
rights/remedies distinction as a limitation on the scope of the Contract Clause."1 In Bronson v. Kinzie,82 Chief Justice Roger B. Ta79 Although Justice Washington reiterated his view that any law which modifies the
contract obligation impairs it, id. at 256-57, he rejected Webster's argument that universal, or natural law, formed the exclusive basis of the contract obligation, id. at 258.
Instead, he suggested "the municipal law of the State," id. at 259, creates the contract
obligation and affects its "validity, construction, or discharge," id. at 257. The local
law of the contract is paramount to natural law with respect to matters of contract
performance. Id. at 259. Therefore, the law in effect when parties enter into a contract
cannot impair the contract obligation because it inheres in the underlying rights and
duties of the contract. Id. at 260-61. Thus, a prospective law cannot impair the obligation of contracts. Id. at 267. While Washington remained doubtful about the validity
of state bankruptcy powers, id. at 264, he nevertheless recognized the authority of states
to regulate the validity, discharge, construction, performance, evidence, and remedies of
contracts, id. at 259. He rejected natural law as the exclusive source of contract obligation, believing that within Webster's argument existed the potential to construe the impairment of contract obligations in ways inconsistent with the practical powers of states
in the federal system. Id. at 258-59.
8°Id. at 332-58 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). Marshall argued that the Contract
Clause prohibits both retroactive and prospective laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Relying upon the distinction between contract rights and remedies, he asserted
that the New York law affected a contract obligation. He emphasized that parties make
contracts with the expectation of literal performance and are able to provide for changes
in performance through the terms of the contract if they anticipate the possibility of
nonperformance. Id. at 343. Unlike Johnson, Marshall believed that the obligation of
contracts derived entirely from agreement of the parties and rejected the role of positive
law or local government in the creation of contract rights. Id. at 346-50. Marshall
insisted once the parties formed a contract, its terms became inviolable. Id. at 354.
Interestingly, the Court accorded prime importance to the manner in which the underlying purpose of the insolvency legislation advanced an important governmental interest. In so doing, the justices anticipated a chief component of Hughes's rationale in
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium case, Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398 (1934). See Hale, supra note 70, at 880-83. Similarly, the dissent presaged
Justice Sutherland's insistence in Blaisdell that the Contract Clause mandated strict
enforcement of and respect for the obligations of private contracts. See Blaisdell, 290
U.S. at 449 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
81 Prior to Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843), the Court continued to
apply the distinction between contract rights and remedies. Between 1827 and 1835 the
Marshall Court sustained several state laws that only affected contract remedies. See
Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 329 (1835) (upholding an Ohio law that freed from
incarceration penurious debtors); Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88 (1834) (sustaining a Pennsylvania law that removed technical flaws in land grants from married
women); Livingston's Lessee v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833) (ruling that a Pennsylvania law that retrospectively altered the procedure for selling land escheated to the
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ney articulated that an abridgement of a contract remedy impaired
a contract right when it so modified the right that it became worthless. Taney used this rule to invalidate an Illinois law that gave a
mortgagor twelve months to redeem his property from foreclosure
upon default of an antecedent mortgage. Under this provision, the
mortgagor obtained an equitable estate in the premises nonexistent
under state law at the time the parties executed the mortgage. The
state act further circumscribed the effectiveness of the mortgagee's
remedies by preventing the sale of the property by judicial decree
for less than two-thirds of its appraisal value.
While Taney acknowledged the authority of Illinois to enact prospective mortgage legislation, he noted that the state could not impair retroactively the mortgagee's contract rights "by burdening the
[foreclosure] proceedings with new conditions and restrictions, so as
to make the remedy hardly worth pursuing. '"" Thus, he disregarded the authority of Illinois to prescribe legislation for the
avowed purpose of regulating land values during an economic recession. 4 He also ignored Johnson's suggestion in Ogden that a mortgage represented the type of agreement over which a state should
exercise maximum regulatory authority.8 5
To the extent Taney maintained that state law prescribed remedies to enforce contract obligations, he collapsed the distinction between contract rights and remedies and implicitly rejected the
state in satisfaction of decedents' debts only affected contract remedies); Hawkins v.
Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457 (1831) (upholding a similar Kentucky law as a
remedial measure); Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829) (holding that a
state law creating a contract between Pennsylvania claimants and out-of-state claimants
did not impair contract obligations); Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370 (1827)
(allowing Rhode Island to abolish imprisonment for debt). For general discussion of
these cases, see WHITE, supra note 7, at 657-60 (asserting that the Marshall Court distinguished between vested contract rights and antecedent property rights and protected
the former but not necessarily the latter).
8242 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).
83Id. at 317. The law in effect when the parties executed the mortgage allowed a
foreclosed premises to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder. Moreover, it did
not create an equity of redemption period.
84 The Panic of 1837 precipitated a cycle of financial depression and instability that
underscored the inflated value of real estate and the relative scarcity of reliable capital.
The Illinois laws at issue in Bronson represented typical state debtor relief legislation
enacted to alleviate the consequences of this panic. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 376 (1922). By 1843 the effects of the
Panic of 1837 had largely subsided, thus lessening the sense of urgency about such
debtor relief legislation. See Perlman, supra note 33, at 780.
85 Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 286 (Johnson, J., seriatim opinion) (suggesting a
mortgage as an example of the type of contract whose terms courts should not always
interpret literally).
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theoretical basis of Ogden .86 Instead of comprising a distinct contract component, remedies became part of the underlying legal duty
of performance. A state could not withdraw or otherwise make
substantial changes in the contract remedy that affected the integrity and value of the contract obligation.17 In this respect, Taney's
opinion bore more resemblance to those of Marshall in its emphasis
on the sanctity of private contract rights than to his own opinions in
favor of state power to regulate public contracts.
In dissent, Justice McLean explained the necessity for state
power to modify the enforcement of mortgages during an economic
recession. If the rights and remedies of a mortgage became merged,
then a state could not attempt to offset a recession by altering enforcement of the mortgage without violating the constitutional prohibition."8 However, since the mortgagee's remedy existed
independently of the contract obligation,8 9 a state possessed broad
authority to prescribe mortgage conditions for the benefit of the
public interest in maintaining stable land values.
After Bronson, the distinction between contract rights and remedies became somewhat illusory,9 ° as the Court invalidated a series
of state laws that retrospectively affected mortgages and other types
of contracts executed between private parties. The more substantial
the change in contract conditions, the more likely the Court found
86 Indeed, Taney cautioned against the creation of a distinction between contract
rights and remedies that "would render [the Contract Clause] illusive and nugatory;
mere words of form, affording no protection [of contracts], and producing no practical
result." Bronson, 42 U.S. (I How.) at 318. While he generally believed states possessed
the authority to enact prospective debtor relief legislation, id. at 321, and that laws
extant at the time of a contract's creation became an implied part of the contract's
terms, he focused on the retrospective aspects of the Illinois laws and noted how substantial modifications of mortgagees' remedies diminished the value of their contract
rights, id. at 318-20. It is from this perspective that Taney made his broad assertions
about contract rights and remedies.
871d. at 318-20.
88 Id. at 327-31 (McLean, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 328-29. In particular, McLean asserted the mortgagees had no vested right
to a specific remedy. Id. at 331. Moreover, because the remedy of a contract differed
from its underlying obligation, a state could enact a retroactive law affecting the contract remedy without violating the Contract Clause. Id. at 332.
A minority approach in 1841, McLean's assertion that the Contract Clause did not
prohibit all retroactive mortgage legislation eventually resurfaced in slightly different
form as one of the lynchpins of Hughes's majority opinion in Blaisdell.
90
See, e.g., W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935) (asserting dividing line between contract rights and remedies obscure); Von Hoffman v. City of
Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 552 (1866) (Swayne, J.) ("The ideas of validity and
remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation, which is guaranteed by the
Constitution against invasion.").
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impairment of a contract right.9" Legislation that either created an
equitable redemption period where none existed at the execution of
the mortgage or extended this period in an unreasonable manner
violated the Contract Clause.92 Similarly, laws that imposed minimum prices for the sale of foreclosed land unconstitutionally diminished the mortgagee's rights by hampering the mortgagee's
remedies upon the mortgagor's default.9 3 The Court also voided
state attempts to readjust the balance of power in commercial transactions by divesting creditors of remedies in existence at the formation of otherwise valid contracts.94 The potential widespread
redistributive effects of the foregoing legislation thus diverted use of
the rights/remedies distinction away from a means of maintaining
state power within the federal system to a method of preserving the
91 Epstein, supra note 7, at 746.
92 See Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118 (1896) (invalidating a Kansas statute giving a
mortgagor an eighteen-month redemption period during which the mortgagor was exempt from even paying the rental value of the premises); Howard v. Bugbee, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 461 (1860) (holding that a two-year redemption period unconstitutionally
impaired the obligation of a contract).
93 See Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U.S. 1 (1904) (invalidating an Illinois law that prescribed minimum foreclosure bids); Gantly's Lessee v. Ewing, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 707
(1845) (ruling unconstitutional an Indiana law prescribing one-half market value of the
premises as a prerequisite for sale by foreclosure); McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 608 (1844) (holding unconstitutional Illinois' requirement of a two-thirds appraisal value of the property for a foreclosure bid).
94
See Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U.S. 415 (1880) (invalidating a Virginia stay of unlimited duration on civil executions of debts and judicial sales); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96
U.S. 595 (1877) (ruling that a North Carolina one thousand dollar homestead exemption from an execution sale impaired the obligation of a preexisting contract); Walker v.
Whitehead, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 314 (1872) (holding unconstitutional a Georgia law requiring a creditor to file an affidavit of tax payment as a prerequisite to bringing suit for
collection of the debt); Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1872) (invalidating a
Georgia constitutional provision that took away a lien as a creditor's remedy under a
preexisting contract); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866)
(holding Illinois could not repeal laws extant at the time of a municipal bond issue that
specified the amount of tax payable on the interest and principal value of the bonds).
Often counsel did not argue as an alternative theory that the state laws comprised a
legitimate exercise of police powers for the general welfare. In part, this is explained by
the Court's reluctance, until the first decade of the twentieth century., to place the concept of economic welfare within the purview of the public good. In Kearzey, counsel for
North Carolina argued, in part, that the postmortgage creation by the state legislature
of the homestead exemption was a legitimate use of local police power. The Court,
however, rejected this: "No community can have any higher public interest than in the
faithful performance of contracts .... 'Policy and humanity' are dangerous guides in the
discussion of a legal proposition ....
The prohibition contains no qualification, and we
have no judicial authority to interpolate any. Our duty is simply to execute it." Kearzey, 96 U.S. at 603-04 (emphasis added). Justice Sutherland quoted from this passage in
his Blaisdell dissent. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 470
(1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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value of contract performance.9"
B.

The Doctrine of Reserved State Powers

The reservation of state powers comprised another significant
limitation upon the scope of the Contract Clause. Applicable only
to contracts executed between a state and a private party, this theory emerged by the 1830s as a prime method of maintaining local
control over corporate enterprise and economic development. 9 6 As
states chartered private corporations to facilitate various modes of
transportation and commerce for the public, they often retained
powers of taxation, eminent domain, and general supervision over
the quasi-public activities of corporate entities. Sometimes these
grants contained specific reservation clauses; however, on many oc95 For example, in Planter's Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301, 327 (1847), the
Court stated:
One of the tests that a contract has been impaired is that its value has by
legislation been diminished. It is not, by the Constitution, to be impaired at
all. This is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in
any respect on its obligation, dispensing with any part of its force.
Thus, it would appear Sharp and its progeny applied Justice Washington's rule in
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 84-85 (1823).
On the other hand, the dichotomy remained useful where states merely imposed practical limitations on contract rights without impeding their intrinsic value. See Conley v.
Barton, 260 U.S. 677 (1923) (sustaining a retroactive application of a Massachusetts law
that required a mortgagee to record a factual affidavit within three months after foreclosure); Hooker v. Burr, 194 U.S. 415 (1904) (sustaining a retroactive application of a
California law extending the redemption period by six months and reducing the
monthly interest by one percent); Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902) (upholding a
statute modifying the amount of ground rent in a lease); Red River Valley Bank v.
Craig, 181 U.S. 548 (1901) (sustaining an amendment of a mechanics lien law); Vance v.
Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1883) (upholding the retroactive application of a Louisiana constitutional provision requiring owners of tacit mortgages to record them for bona fide
purchasers); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U.S. 51 (1883)(sustaining
an Illinois law that reduced by two percent the interest a mortgagor had to pay to
redeem foreclosed property); Curtis v. Whitney, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 68 (1871) (upholding a law that required the mortgagor or occupant of foreclosed land to receive written
notice of sale by foreclosure as a prerequisite to the purchaser receiving the deed).
96 For general discussions of state corporate charters, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 177-202 (1985); KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 115-17 (1991); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 63-139 (1977) (viewing the modification of state charters as an indirect way to subsidize developing industries in a bur-

geoning market economy); WHITE, supra note 7, at 598-99; Stephen A. Siegel,
Understandingthe Nineteenth Century Contract Clause.- The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 29-40
(1986) (discussing the initial judicial pattern of consensus and controversy that marked
judicial strict construction of state grants and charters to corporations in the early nineteenth century).
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casions either no such clause existed or the clause contained ambiguous terms. These ambiguities and omissions spawned litigation
over the extent to which states could regulate the corporations they
chartered. Invariably, the corporations asserted that the Contract
Clause prohibited state action that impaired or otherwise diminished the value of rights vested under their charters.9 7
Unlike the often ambiguous and abstract distinction between contract rights and remedies, the reservation doctrine did not obscure
inquiry about the permissible boundaries of state regulatory power
within the federal system. Instead, it presented in rather stark
terms the difficulty of reconciling such authority with the objective
of preserving the sanctity of vested rights under a contract. Though
recognized as a limitation upon the scope of the Contract Clause by
Joseph Story in his Dartmouth College v. Woodward concurrence9 8
97 For example, counsel for the Charles River Bridge Company argued that Massachusetts severely diminished the value of the company's implied exclusive franchise to
operate a toll bridge across the Charles River when the state subsequently authorized a
competing toll-free bridge. Viewing the collection of tolls as within the constitutional
protection of property rights, counsel characterized Massachusetts' charter of the Warren Bridge as an attempt to confiscate property that jeopardized the security of the
investment interests of the Charles River Bridge proprietors. By diverting income from
the bridge, the state impaired the contract rights of its proprietors. See Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 442-58 (1837). Similarly, co-counsel
Daniel Webster emphasized that Massachusetts destroyed an integral part of the
franchise when it created a rival toll-free bridge. Id. at 531. Webster thought impairment of contracts was "fatal to the confidence of the governed in those who govern; and
would destroy the security of all property, and all rights derived under it." Id. at 515.
In dissent, Justice Joseph Story noted that the legislature could not destroy the value
of the Charles River Bridge franchise through either direct or indirect means. Id. at
617 (Story, J., dissenting). He opposed strict construction of the Charles River Bridge
grant, believing this judicial method impaired the investment interests of those who
risked their capital for the progress of public improvements. Id. at 637-38.
In West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, Daniel Webster reiterated the notion that the Contract Clause prohibited state interference with the value of a corporate franchise created
by a public charter. Accordingly, he asserted that Vermont could not replace a toll
bridge with a free public highway without impairing the charter's contract obligation.
47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 516-19 (1848).
98 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 675 (1819) (Story, J., concurring) (noting that the vested
rights of a corporation could not be retroactively controlled or destroyed by statute
unless a power for that purpose be reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation). In Dartmouth College, the Court held unconstitutional a series of New Hampshire acts that revoked the charter of a private, eleemosynary educational institution by
making the college a public university subject to state control. The acts transferred
property of the original college corporation to the new public university. Daniel Webster, counsel for the college, argued that the Contract Clause secured private rights from
legislative interference and contended that the New Hampshire laws unconstitutionally
impaired the contract obligation of the original college charter. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Marshall implicitly agreed and expressly ruled that the state
could not revoke Dartmouth's charter in contravention of the Contract Clause. Id. at
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and by the entire Court in ProvidenceBank v. Billings," it was not

until Roger B. Taney ascended the bench that the Court employed
the reservation doctrine as a way to narrow the spectrum of contract rights within the protection of the Contract Clause.
Through strict construction of corporate grants the Taney Court
applied the concept of state reserved powers to assert the primacy of
local government over private interests. In Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge, m° Chief Justice Taney, writing for the majority,
strictly interpreted the language of a toll bridge company charter as
not conferring upon its proprietors an exclusive franchise to operate
a pedestrian bridge across the Charles River."10 While he accepted
the premise that the charter constituted a contract, he rejected the
notion that, in the absence of express terms, it prohibited the state
from chartering a subsequent "free" bridge in the same location.' 0 2
To this extent, he concluded that in public grants to private corporations nothing passes by implication.'0 3 Massachusetts did not
cede forever control over economic and technological development
of a public waterway simply because it chartered a private entity to
653-54. Citing the absence of any reserved powers of modification in the college charter, Story concurred in the Court's decision.
Prior to this case, some state courts had invoked the reservation doctrine. See, e.g.,
Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143, 146 (1806). Beginning in the late eighteenth century,
states often put reservation clauses into corporate charters. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at
58-60; Siegel, supra note 96, at 33 n.153.
99 2 9 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830) (rejecting the presumption that Rhode Island relinquished its power to tax a bank in the absence of an express immunity conferred upon
the bank in its corporate charter); see also Mumma v. Potomac Co., 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 281
(1834) (upholding authority of state legislatures to dissolve corporations); Jackson v.
Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830) (strictly construing a land grant to Revolutionary
War veterans). For a discussion of these cases, see WHITE, supra note 7, at 660-62.
10 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
101 Id. at 548-49. At issue was whether the state impaired the obligation of contracts
when its subsequent charter of a toll-free bridge diminished the value of an implied
exclusive franchise the plaintiffs claimed was derived from the public charter of their
bridge in 1785. The proprietors of the Charles River Bridge (plaintiffs-appellants)
sought to enjoin the operation of the Warren Bridge, a rival toll-free bridge chartered by
Massachusetts in 1828. In 1785, the state granted a charter of incorporation to a group
of investors to build the Charles River Bridge over a preexisting ferry route between
Charlestown and Boston. By 1830, the Warren Bridge operated toll free within a few
feet of the older bridge. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the suit,
and the Supreme Court heard the case on a writ of error. The Court, per Taney, strictly
construed the language of the Charles River Bridge charter and ruled that Massachusetts did not impair the contract obligation therein when it created a competing bridge
enterprise.
102 Id. at 548-52.
1031d. at 545-46.
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operate and construct a bridge.l" Nor did its subsequent charter of
a competing bridge diminish the value of the plaintiffs' implied
rights of exclusive toll receipts so as to impair a contract obligation
under the Contract Clause.' °5
Notwithstanding the private property interest in tolls, the state
had paramount power over internal improvements and the public
way.'0 6 An implied contract promise not to modify or revoke a
charter involving a matter of substantial public interest would prevent the state from the continued promotion of new avenues of economic development and enterprise that inured to the benefit of
all.'0 7 To confer a monopoly upon one toll bridge company might,
in the long run, hamper industrial progress and the most efficient
uses of a public waterway.'
Conversion of a corporate charter
into a vested contract right to exclude others from improving the
course of internal improvements would allow a privileged elite to
operate in the public sphere virtually unchecked by local authority
without continued incentive to pursue objectives that would maximize resources and minimize economic waste.' 0 9
1o4 Taney denied that the 1785 charter contained an implied contract promise from
the state that it would not charter a competing bridge or otherwise diminish the proprietors' income. Id. at 552. Strictly construing the charter language, he noted its silence
about competition and the exclusivity of tolls. Id. at 548-52. "[Iln charters of this
description, no rights are taken from the public, or given to the corporation, beyond
those which the words of the charter, by their natural and proper construction, purport
to convey." Id. at 549.
105 Id. at 548-52. But see id. at 608-45 (Story, J., dissenting).
106 Taney drew an analogy between the taxing power of the state and its authority
over transportation and internal improvements. He observed:
And in a country like ours, free, active, and enterprising, continually advancing in numbers and wealth, new channels of communication are daily found
necessary, both for travel and trade, and are essential to the comfort, convenience, and prosperity of the people. A State ought never to be presumed to
surrender this power, because, like the taxing power, the whole community
have an interest in preserving it undiminished.
Id. at 547. Taney refused to presume that Massachusetts surrendered its power over
internal improvements in its grant to the Charles River Bridge proprietors. He believed
the public interest in transportation became affected by the 1785 grant of a public way
to a single corporation. Id. at 548.
107 Id. at 552-53.
1081d.; see also HORWITZ, supra note 96, at 130-39. See generally STANLEY I.
KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE

CASE (1971) (discussing how the Taney Court used the doctrine of strict construction to

promote local economic development consistent with changing conceptions of the private rights of contract and property and the public welfare).
1
O9 See Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 548. ("The continued existence of a
government would be of no great value, if, by implications and presumptions, it was
disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation, and the funcHeinOnline -- 72 Or. L. Rev. 539 1993

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72, 19931

A majority of the Court shared Taney's perception that a distinction existed between the acquisition of property rights under a contract and the creation of economic privileges and immunities in
potential conflict with the overriding objectives of local government. Insofar as states promoted corporate activity to improve society through special charters, they also retained the authority to
provide ample opportunity for new modes of development." 0 Strict
construction of grants for private development of public resources
therefore demonstrates the extent to which the Court eschewed an
overly technical interpretation of contract obligation in favor of an
affirmative exercise of state regulatory power. 11 '
In its application of the reservation doctrine, the Court acknowledged that within grants by states to private corporations for the
development of internal improvements existed a condition subjecting contract rights to the compelling interests of society. As Justice
Daniel explained in West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,1"2 states retained
over all contracts the power to modify those terms which conflicted
with "the right and the duty [inhering] in every political sovereign
tions it was designed to perform, transferred to the hands of privileged corporations.");
see also Siegel, supra note 96, at 55, 59, 72-75, 97-99, 105 (describing the pattern of
controversy in litigation before federal and state courts over strict construction of corporate grants).
Siegel suggests that the controversy over strict construction of corporate grants reflected a distinction in nineteenth-century political theory between property rights and
privileges. Proponents of strict construction sought to maintain traditional republican
notions of property that emphasized egalitarian opportunities for its acquisition. Insofar as these proponents respected the sanctity of private property, they generally feared
public grants to private individuals that exempted the recipients from the taxation and
police powers of local governments. Often, they believed these grants conferred special
privileges, apart from mere property rights, to an elite group who attained their largess
from the confluence of the quasi-public status of their corporate entities and their legislative exemptions. From this perspective, proprietors of corporations such as the
Charles River Bridge appeared to receive disproportionate economic, legal, and political
advantages over the more numerous class of relatively small property owners. Wealth
based on privilege threatened the economic and political liberty created by individual
property rights because it emanated from the concentration of power in an elite that
obtained special interests. It also hampered economic productivity. Id. at 64-66. Conversely, opponents of strict construction did not necessarily perceive a distinction between property and privilege. Accordingly, they contended for similar treatment of
public and private contracts and asserted that assets of corporations created by public
grants constituted private property not subject to regulation by state police powers. Id.
at 70-75.
110 See HORWITZ, supra note 96, at 130-39; Siegel, supra note 96, at 55-65.
111 See Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 552 (cautioning against literal interpretation of contract rights that would unduly restrict the exercise of state police powers as they affect the course of internal improvements).
112 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
HeinOnline -- 72 Or. L. Rev. 540 1993

Contract Clause Jurisprudence

community of guarding its own existence, and of protecting and
promoting the interests and welfare of the community at large."" 3
For this reason, the exercise of eminent domain and other essential
attributes of sovereignty did not impair the obligation of contracts,
but rather marked the fulfillment of contract conditions." 4 Indeed,
the Court adopted this rationale in sustaining Vermont's use of eminent domain to implement the replacement of a private toll bridge
with a public highway." 5
To the extent that the theory of state reserved powers protected
some aspects of local authority from Contract Clause prohibition, it
remained consistent with the observations of Justice Johnson and
others about the distinction between rights vested under a contract
and the powers of the state to prescribe their enforcement. The
doctrine also made clear what had been merely implicated in earlier
decisions: government existed to maintain the collective security of
private rights. However, the limited application of the theory to
public contracts and the eventual widespread adoption of general
incorporation laws somewhat diminished its practical utility by the
second half of the nineteenth century. 16 Nevertheless, it spawned
the emergence of other theories that created further inroads upon
the Contract Clause and expanded the scope of state power to regulate private and public economic affairs.
113 Id. at 531. Whereas Charles River Bridge did not go so far as to resolve the
potential conflict between eminent domain and the Contract Clause, this case suggested
that a state's power of eminent domain was "paramount to all private rights vested
under the government, and these ... are, by necessary implication, held in subordination to this power, and must yield in every instance to its proper exercise." Id. at 532.
Justice McLean perceived no conflict between eminent domain and the Contract
Clause, noting that the former involved the power of the state "to take private property
for public use," while the latter primarily involved contracts. Id. at 536 (McLean, J.,
concurring).
'14.d at 533-35.
115 In 1795, the Vermont legislature chartered a corporation to build and operate a
toll bridge over the West River, giving it an exclusive franchise for one hundred years.
An 1839 act authorized Vermont courts to exercise the power of eminent domain over
private property to facilitate the laying out of public highways. Under this act, courts
would assess the value of private property and compensate the owners. Three years
later, a petition to a local court requested the court to convert the plaintiffs-appellants'
toll bridge to a free one as part of a new public road. The Supreme Court heard this
case on a writ of error from the Vermont Supreme Court.
116 General incorporation laws supplanted special legislative grants as the principal
means of creating corporations. As a result, after the 1830s, a wide variety of people
formed corporations. In part, these laws simplified the process of incorporation and deemphasized the nexus between political access and corporate privilege. See FRIEDMAN,
supra note 96, at 194-96; HALL et al., supra note 96, at 141.
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The Doctrine of Inalienable Police Powers

Within the reservation doctrine lay the core of a more pervasive
limitation upon the reach of the Contract Clause. Insofar as the
Taney Court strictly construed the scope of vested rights under
public contracts and subjected them to the reserved regulatory authority of the state, it also advanced the burgeoning concept of a
police power limitation upon the clause." 7 For in sustaining the
authority of states to regulate public contract rights affecting the
course of internal improvements, the Court implicitly upheld the
exercise of state power to make laws for the public good. In part, it
invoked the reservation doctrine to preserve the fundamental ability
of states to govern and rejected an interpretation of the Contract
Clause that did not recognize local control over eminent domain
and internal improvements. "8 This broad recognition of state
power within the federal system over contracts eventually spawned
the theory of inalienable police powers.
Unlike its predecessor, the principle of inalienable police powers
operated directly upon the contract rights of private companies,
who received through state grants and charters the right to engage
in enterprising activities with considerable effects upon the public.
It did not derive its authority from language within the public grant
or charter reserving the power of amendment or revocation to the
state. Instead, it presupposed the paramount existence of certain
attributes of sovereign power to which all contracts became subject
regardless of whether they contained reservation clauses. This
characteristic ultimately made possible through judicial interpretation the abridgment of contract rights otherwise expressly created
by charters and grants. 1" 9 In contrast, under the reservation doctrine the terms of these agreements often limited the scope of state
117 In Ogden, Justice Washington referred to a general concept of state police powers
when he explained why broad construction of the term contract obligation would restrict the authority of local government to prescribe rules involving the public welfare.
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 258-59 (1827) (Washington, J., seriatim
opinion). Other Supreme Court antecedents include Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 331 (1855) (dicta recognizing the nascent concept of state police powers) and
Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163 (1850) (upholding under the reservation theory a state revocation of a lottery company charter while ackowledging the state's police
power to promote the public welfare). Moreover, state courts had recognized the concept of police powers from the late 1820s. See WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 196-99; Siegel,
supra note 96, at 43 n.211.
118 See, e.g., West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848); Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 420 (1837).
119 Siegel, supra note 96, at 41.
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regulation, as judges declined to uphold the exercise of local power
that either contradicted the express provisions of a contract or exceeded the reserve powers of the state. 120 Moreover, the concept of
inalienable police powers permitted the states some measure of control over those aspects of private contractual obligations that affected the public health, morals, and safety.
The theory of inalienable police powers rested upon two fundamental premises, each of which reflected the view that the sovereign
authority of the state resided in its people, who through their legislative agents made laws to protect the security of private rights and
to promote the public welfare. 12 1 First, government existed to preserve personal interests within the guise of a collective security.
Thus, to the extent individuals enjoyed the rights of property, contract, and personal freedom, they did so in a relative sense rather
than in an absolute manner. Proponents of inalienable police powers therefore used the theory to implement what they considered the
first postulate of governmental authority: "the preservation of the
public health and the public morals, and the protection of public
122
and private rights."'
A second basic premise of the theory viewed state government as
a sovereign trust in which citizens delegated much of their political
authority to legislative agents entrusted to make laws for the protec120 See, e.g., CharlesRiver Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420. For early twentieth-century
examples see Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932) (prohibiting California from repealing a state constitutional provision making corporate directors personally liable to corporate creditors for misappropriation of corporate funds) and City of Owensboro v.
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58 (1913) (invalidating a municipal ordinance
that repealed a telephone company's prior grant to erect telephone poles and wire near
city streets).
121 See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1880); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 331, 377-79 (1856) (Campbell, J., dissenting); Piqua Branch Bank v.
Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 399 (1853) (Catron, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
how the theory of inalienable police powers related to local governmental attempts "to
modify or revoke express grants of exemption," see Siegel, supra note 96, at 43 & n.218.
122 Stone, 101 U.S. at 820. Chief Justice Waite, who wrote the majority opinion,
recognized the difficulty of defining police powers. He remarked:
It is always easier to determine whether a particular case comes [from] within
the general scope of the power, than to give an abstract definition of the power
itself which will be in all respects accurate. No one denies, however, that it
extends to all matters affecting the public health or the public morals.
Id. at 818. Similarly, in Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877), Justice Bradley
noted that the police power "does extend to the protection of the lives, health, and
property of the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public morals."
Id. at 33; see also Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill U.S. 746, 750-51
(1884) (sustaining New Orleans's regulation of butchers as a legitimate exercise of inalienable police powers).
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tion of private rights and the benefit of the public.12 3 Consequently,
contractual agreements between the state and private parties that
relinquished public control over matters deemed within the essential attributes of governmental authority and political sovereignty
violated this public trust. Therein lay the theoretical basis of inalienability, and since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, conflict over its parameters has underscored an underlying tension
within the federal system about the exercise of state authority over
vested contract rights.
By the end of the 1870s, a series of Contract Clause disputes
arose wherein the private recipients of public grants for businesses
such as distilleries, lotteries, and fertilizer plants argued state regulations retroactively impaired the obligation of contracts. In each
case the state enacted measures to protect public health or morals
that either restricted the value of the grantee's rights under its contract with the state or altogether prohibited the grantee from operating its business. At first, the Court resolved these constitutional
challenges through the reservation doctrine, narrowly construing
the scope of the grantees' contract rights, while observing in dictum
that a state could not relinquish through a contract its authority to
prescribe regulations for the public health, morals, and welfare.' 2 4
However, in Stone v. Mississippi,'2 5 the Court unequivocally used
inalienable police powers as the principal basis of its decision to sustain a state constitutional provision that prohibited lotteries in contravention of a previous state charter to operate such a company.' 2 6
In so doing, the Court emphasized that the Contract Clause permitted individual states the latitude to regulate their civil institutions
Stone, 101 U.S. at 820; Siegel, supra note 96, at 43-44.
See Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667, 670 (1878) (narrowly interpreting the preexisting charter of a fertilizer company as a license so as to hold a municipal regulation enacted pursuant to local police powers did not impair a contract
obligation); Beer Co., 97 U.S. at 32-33 (holding that a Massachusetts liquor company's
grant to manufacture and sell liquor was subject to the state's reserved police powers);
Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U.S. 645, 650 (1876) (upholding Alabama's police powers prohibition of a lottery).
125 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
126 Id. at 820. Chief Justice Waite distinguished between contracts that conferred
property rights and ones that merely authorized private individuals to engage in entreprenurial activities (bridges, highways, lotteries) for the public's benefit. The Contract Clause protected the former, but not the latter. Thus, it did not prevent the state
from making illegal the operation of a lottery it previously authorized. The grant of a
lottery to private individuals was subject to the paramount police powers of the state to
regulate public morals. The Court held that the lottery's continued existence threatened
to "disturb the checks and balances of a well-ordered community." Id. at 821.
123

124
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insofar as they affected the health and moral interests of the
community.
While often upheld to preserve state control over the manufacture and distribution of liquor, 1 27 lottery tickets, 128 and public

health, 129 controversy existed over whether the concept of inalienable police powers comprised less consensual matters of public welfare such as taxation, public convenience,130 and economic
prosperity. Unlike legislation for the preservation of health and
moral welfare, most of which fit within a traditional notion of governmental responsibility, laws that sought to alter the allocation of
economic resources, or otherwise subject vested contract rights to
the exigencies of economic change, raised critical questions about
the permissible scope of state regulation under the Contract Clause.
In large part, this debate emanated from tensions within the federal system regarding the allocation of power to the states to regulate private and public economic affairs. Advances in technology
facilitated the course of internal improvements and helped produce
a complex economy that affected the disparate elements of a highly
interdependent society in unequal and sometimes unpredictable
ways.'
The Civil War and the ensuing period of Reconstruction,
127 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (holding that Kansas's prohibition of the manufacture and sale of liquor did not violate Fourteenth Amendment due
process); Beer Co., 97 U.S. at 32-33 (dictum that beer franchise is subject to the state's
reserved police powers).
128See, e.g., Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897) (holding that a lottery
franchise was merely a license subject to restriction by state police powers); Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814; Boyd, 94 U.S. at 650. Contra City of New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U.S. 265 (1886) (holding unconstitutional a municipal repeal of a lottery
monopoly).
129 See, e.g., Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667, 670 (1878) (dictum that the rights of a licensee
were subject to the reserved police powers of the state over public health and welfare).
130 For example, some members of the United States Supreme Court believed public
inconvenience was an invalid reason "to justify the revocation of express charter provisions." Siegel, supra note 96, at 52 & n.261 (referring to New Orleans Gas Co. v.
Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 668-72 (1885)).
131 See generally HORWITZ, supra note 96, at xvi, 63-139 (describing the legal system's support of economic growth and the complex pattern of socio-economic competition between 1780 and 1860). In a subsequent study of the post-Civil War era, Horwitz
commented:
The emergence of industrial society thus meant not only that redistributive
motives would inevitably be activated by the reality of an increasingly unequal
society. It also meant that the relatively fixed common law categories of
which police power doctrines had been erected would fall apart, as any categorical distinction between the health of a worker and the conditions of industrial life became ever more difficult to maintain ....
But once the problems
generated by industrial society undermined the ability of courts to continue to
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in many respects, altered the perceived role of states in the federal
union as changes in the structure of the federal and state constitutions both strengthened the theoretical constraints upon the states
and highlighted the necessity for state action in areas beyond the
practical scope of federal influence. 132 Insofar as these developments may have provided the rationale for upholding some state
modifications of contract rights, they also presented anew the recurring problem of exercising state powers to promote the public welfare in ways that did not diminish the value and integrity of
contract performance.
Even before it applied inalienability to preserve state regulation of
contracts in the interests of public health and morals, the Court
manifested some reluctance to uphold legislation whose prime objective was to relieve parties from the adverse economic consequences of their contracts. 133 Toward the end of the Taney era, the
Court reexamined the authority of states to repeal tax exemptions
contained within corporate charters and, by a narrow margin, held
offer traditional definitions of the category of health, safety and morals, the
inherently redistributive potential of the police power emerged with a
vengeance.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 30 (1992).
Throughout the last half of the nineteenth century railroads and public utilities occupied preeminent roles in economic development. They also spawned considerable litigation over local police powers, contract rights, and substantive due process. For a
general discussion, see MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 165-67 (1977) (briefly describing the subsidization
of railroads by local governments); id. at 289 (referring to the enormous magnitude of
industrial growth and its disproportionate social effects); id. at 340-42 (discussing the
regulation of public utilities). See also C. JOSEPH PUSATERI, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 199-226 (2d ed. 1988).
132 Kermit Hall, among others, asserts that the Civil War and Reconstruction precipitated fundamental shifts in perception about the relationship between governmental
authority on the national and state levels and individual rights. The addition to the
federal constitution of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments reflected
this ideological change, as did similar amendments to state constitutions prohibiting
governmental interference with individual civil rights. HALL et al., supra note 96, at
188. This period also underscored the importance of increased governmental regulation to implement economic and social progress. Id. at 353-56. Consequently, the burgeoning administrative and regulatory atmosphere produced legal and constitutional
issues involving state police powers, contract rights, and substantive due process. Id. at
367-68. For early examples of these conflicts before the Supreme Court, see Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (upholding state regulation of grain elevator rates under the
controversial "affected with a public interest" doctrine); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (upholding the creation of a New Orleans butchers' monopoly
as a permissible police power regulation).
133 See Sterk, supra note 9, at 679-83.
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that states could not tax the recipients of such public grants under a
theory of reserved powers without impairing the value of vested
contract rights.'I 4 Similarly, the Court refused to invoke either the
reservation doctrine or the inalienable police power doctrine in
cases involving state repudiation of financial obligations incurred
during the Civil War and Reconstruction. 3 5 It also rejected use of
the police powers principle as a rationale for state modification of
36
mortgage agreements between private parties.'
In contrast, by the turn of the century, the Court recognized the
theory of inalienable police powers as the principal means by which
states could regulate aspects of corporate activity that affected the
public in primarily noneconomic ways. In part, changes in social
attitudes about the public utility of lotteries, breweries, and nuisances may have influenced judicial willingness to uphold state laws
that sought to maintain the collective good of society by controlling
the production of its vices. 3' 7 Nevertheless, the Court did not per se
view the creation of business monopolies as so inimical to the public
welfare that their creation by public grant alone justified the exercise of residual police powers. However, the distinction between
permissible legislation enacted for public health and morals and unconstitutional legislation that subjected the rates of utility companies, public carriers, insurance companies, and banks to state
control at times became blurred.' 38 Moreover, several state laws
regulated the economic effects of certain businesses through the
guise of legislation enacted for the preservation of public health and
morals. 139
134 See, e.g., Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439 (1869); Ohio Life Ins.
& Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 415 (1853); Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 57
U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1853). In these cases a majority of the Court ruled that local
taxation of corporations previously granted tax exemptions impaired contract obligations. But see Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830) (refusing to
presume a tax exemption in absence of express language in charter). The dissents of
Justices Catron, Miller, and Daniel in the tax cases between 1853 and 1869 supported
the concept of inalienable tax powers. See Siegel, supra note 96, at 44, 49-50.
135 Sterk, supra note 9, at 679-83.
136 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1877) (ruling that North Carolina's one thousand dollar homestead exemption from an execution sale impaired the obligation of a
preexisting contract).
37
1 See KELLER, supra note 131, at 129-30; Sterk, supra note 9, at 678.
138 See, e.g., New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885); see
also WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 203-10; Siegel, supra note 96, at 52-53; Sterk, supra note
9, at 677 & nn.106-07.
139 See, e.g., Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., III U.S. 746 (1884). In
Butchers' Union, the Court sustained a New Orleans ordinance that prescribed competition among butchers as a legitimate police measure to maintain municipal health and
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Such conflicts in precedent demonstrate the sometimes Byzantine
treatment of state police powers under the Contract Clause in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Members of the
Court disagreed over the extent to which states could promote the
public welfare. Some justices denied the states much latitude to regulate contracts under the auspices of a general police power, while
others viewed the distinction between permissible and impermissible laws as one of degree, dependent in part upon the nature of the
business and the prevailing needs of society." 4
During the first two decades of the twentieth century the concept
of inalienable police powers broadened as Court personnel changed
and some of the more progressive justices included economic prosperity and progress as objectives within the sphere of public welfare.' 1 They expanded the basis upon which states could modify
contract rights and advanced an interpretation of the Contract
Clause that stressed judicial deference to local legislation enacted
for the protection of the economic and social interests of all segments of society.' 4 2 Thus, the Court often balanced the contract
rights of private parties against the collective needs of the public
and emphasized the limitations that states could exercise over cersafety. The city enacted its regulation pursuant to two state constitutional provisions,
one conferring municipalities with general police powers (LA. CONST. art. 248 (1879)),
and the other invalidating public grants of exclusive franchises (LA. CONST. art. 258
(1879)). See also New Orleans Gas Co., 115 U.S. 650 (rejecting Louisiana's assertion of
a general inalienable police power to modify the exclusive privileges of a publicly
chartered utility company).
14o Compare, for example, Justice Miller's majority opinion in Butchers' Union with
the concurrences of Justices Bradley and Field. See Siegel, supra note 96, at 52-54 &
n.260.
141 See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Illinois Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561
(1906) (recognizing economic prosperity and convenience within the concept of inalienable police powers); see also Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Though Justice Steven Field, writing for the majority, did not invoke the doctrine of
inalienable police powers, he narrowly construed Illinois's grant to a railway of land
submerged under Lake Michigan. Field concluded that the state did not impair the
grant when it subsequently revoked it to promote regional economic prosperity. See
Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudenceof Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, in AMERICAN
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 246, 258-59
(Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1978).
14 2
See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154-55 (1921); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U.S. 372, 377 (1919); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S.
104, 113 (1911); Manigualt v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480-81 (1905). For the limits of
judicial deference, see Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547 (1924) (court will
not defer to legislative declaration of emergency if the facts no longer indicate the existence of an emergency).
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tain kinds of agreements. 143
In particular, cases involving the imposition of safety standards
on public carriers presented a prime opportunity for expanding the
purview of inalienable police powers. While technological developments had vastly improved the quality of transportation and kept it
responsive to the myriad needs of the flourishing post-Civil War
economy, the proliferation of accidents and the magnitude of harm
necessitated increased local control over its means of operation.
Within this context, states and municipalities placed on rail companies a continuing duty to repair tracks and maintain facilities in
ways inconsistent with previous legislative requirements incorporated within the provisions of their state charters. While not directly enacted for reasons of public health or morals, the regulations
did promote the maintenance of safety; they also altered the contract rights of grantees by changing their legal duties of
performance.
Rather than view such measures as unconstitutional impairments
of contract obligations, the Supreme Court placed the concepts of
public safety and convenience within the scope of inalienable police
powers. From this broad perspective of public welfare, the Court
upheld laws that regulated the operation of trains, 1 4 required railways to change roadbed grading' 4 5 and the direction of a drainage
ditch, 46 and increased the financial responsibilities of carriers for
viaduct repairs. 147 As Justice Pitney observed, states within the federal system maintained the right to enact legislation that bore a reasonable relationship to legitimate governmental objectives in
securing the public good.' 4 8 Thus stated, the principle of inalienable police powers became a test of reasonableness by which the
Court sustained laws which abridged vested contract rights by
nonarbitrary means.
143 For examples of judicial balancing involving private contracts, see Union Dry
Goods, 248 U.S. 372; Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908); Manigault,
199 U.S. 473. For public contract examples, see St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St.
Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342 (1916);
Chicago & A.R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914); Haskell, 219 U.S. 104; Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57 (1898).
44
1 Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548.
145 Id.
146 Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67.
147 See, e.g., North Pac. Ry. v. Minnesota ex rel. Duluth, 208 U.S. 583 (1908); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57.
148 Tranbarger, 238 U.S. at 76-77.
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The Court also recognized the maintenance of economic prosperity as an essential attribute of state regulatory authority, and in Noble State Bank v. Haskell 149 ruled that Oklahoma did not violate
the Contract Clause when it required local banks to contribute to a
fund protecting their depositors' money.'5 ° Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes acknowledged the difficulty of ascertaining appropriate constitutional limitations upon state police powers,' 5 ' but
proclaimed such authority "extend[ed] to all the great public
needs."' 152 Passed in response to the Panic of 1907, the state laws
represented reasonable attempts to prevent widespread financial
chaos. Given these circumstances, Holmes believed the Court
should defer to the state legislature and sustain the measure
notwithstanding its incidental interference with private rights created by the bank's public charter.' 53
While Haskell did not involve a private contract, its rationale
derived from the notion that private rights must yield occasionally
to public exigencies. Moreover, it reflected the even more significant contemporaneous application of inalienable police powers to
contracts between private parties. In Manigault v. Springs,'5 4 for
example, a South Carolina law required an adjoining riparian owner
to construct a dam obstructing the flow of a navigable waterway to
the detriment of a neighbor and in conflict with a preexisting private agreement. Unpersuaded that the measure impaired a private
contractual obligation, the Court noted that the paramount public
interest in improving swampland legitimized the act on police
power grounds, notwithstanding its incidental effects on private
vested contract rights.' 5 5 For similar reasons laws that prohibited
149 219 U.S. 104, opinion amended, 219 U.S. 575 (1911).

150 Id. at 112-13.

151Id. at 110. Holmes primarily analyzed the case in terms of Fourteenth Amend-

ment due process. Nevertheless, his observation about state police powers also applied
to Contract Clause analysis. Moreover, his opinion illustrates the Court's willingness to
include the maintenance of economic prosperity within inalienable state police powers.
152 Id.

at I1l. Holmes seemingly tried to qualify his statement upon reargument of

the case: "The analysis of the police power ...

was intended to indicate an interpreta-

tion of what has taken place in the past, not to give a new or wider scope to the power."

Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 575, 580 (1911).
53

1

Haskell, 219 U.S. at 112-13.

154 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
155Id. at 480-81, 485-86.

The Court defined police power as "an exercise of the

sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and
general welfare of the people." Id. at 480. This was the first decision that expressly
held that the exercise of inalienable police powers did not impair the obligation of a
private contract.
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transportation of water across state lines' 5 6 and increased electricity
rates did not violate the Contract Clause even though they altered
substantially the terms of preexisting private contracts.' 57
In addition, a majority of the Court adopted this dynamic theory
of police powers' 5 8 to uphold temporary legislation in New York
and the District of Columbia that permitted tenants to remain in
possession of rental apartments upon the expiration of their
leases.' 5 9 Enacted to alleviate a critical housing shortage created by
the return of World War I veterans, the laws effectively deprived
landlords of immediate possession of their rental units so long as the
holdover tenants paid a reasonable monthly rent. For the dissenters, this legislation marked an intolerable local encroachment upon
private contract values; 6 0 the slim majority found the acts reasonable attempts to alleviate a bona fide emergency.' 6 ' Insofar as the
Rent Cases presented a relatively modern problem of contract impairment, they underscored a recurrent theme in Contract Clause
jurisprudence that would resurface in Blaisdell: the extent to which
states could regulate vested contract rights in the public interest.
In retrospect, the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of inalienable police powers anticipated Hughes's creative majority opinion in Blaisdell. 62 Long recognized as the case that articulated a
reasonable police power restriction upon the scope of the Contract
Clause prohibition, Blaisdell actually applied the rationale of the
156 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1908) (upholding New
Jersey's quasi-sovereign interest in preserving natural resources as paramount to private
contract rights).
157 Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U.S. 372, 374-75 (1919)
(holding that a private contract establishing rates between an electric company and its
consumers was subject to state police powers).
158 Judge Roscoe Pound used this term in People ex rel. Durham Realty Co. v. La
Fetra, 130 N.E. 601, 605 (N.Y.), writ of error dismissed sub nom. New York ex rel.
Brixton Operating Corp. v. La Fetra, 257 U.S. 665 (1921).
159 Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v.
Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
160 Chief Justice Taft and Associate Justices McKenna, McReynolds and Van Devanter dissented in Levy, Feldman, and Block on the grounds these laws diminished the
value of private property by impairing its use. They invoked both the Due Process and
Contract Clauses as limitations upon local authorities' regulation of the use and value of
private property and contract rights. They also urged adherence to these restrictions to
preserve the sanctity of private rights during changing economic conditions. See, e.g.,
Block, 256 U.S. at 160, 165. McReynolds and Van Devanter later joined in Sutherland's dissent in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934). By
1934, Taft and McKenna had left the Court.
161 See Feldman, 256 U.S. at 198; Block, 256 U.S. at 154-56.
162 Richard A. Maidment, Chief Justice Hughes and the Contract Clause: A Re-assessment. 8 J. LEGAL HIST. 316. 316-17 (1987).
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foregoing police power decisions to a more complex and pervasive
problem of a subsequent era in ways that emphasized both the jurisprudential tenets of Charles Evans Hughes and the dynamics of
federalism.
III
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES:

THE PRACTICAL

JURISPRUDENCE OF PROGRESSIVE
FEDERALISM

To assess the Contract Clause jurisprudence of Charles Evans
Hughes, one must first understand his conceptions of government,
federalism, and the Constitution. Hughes's Supreme Court opinions on contracts and state police powers invariably reflected his
abiding interest in the practical problems of federalism and revealed
his concern with social and economic progress. Over many years
Hughes devised a pragmatic jurisprudence that sought to maximize
the exercise of state authority in the federal system and strove to
balance the property and contract rights of individuals with the
public welfare. Although a detailed study of his theories exceeds
the scope of this Article, an introduction to them provides an essential perspective from which to examine his opinion in Blaisdell.
A.

Hughes's Conception of Governmental Authority

Throughout his public career Charles Evans Hughes developed a
conception of government based on a shrewd understanding of its
technical aspects and a keen perception of its underlying purpose
and limitations. He viewed governmental authority as a dynamic
agency derived from fundamental principles of social and political
behavior. As an attorney, politician, governor, and jurist, Hughes
attained intimate familiarity with both the problems and triumphs
of government. 163 Not surprisingly, he formed a theory of govern163 Charles Evans Hughes's public career spanned nearly 40 years. As an attorney,
he had a prominent role in governmental investigations of the coal, gas, and insurance
industries at the turn of the century. After Hughes served as New York's governor
from 1907 to 1910, he was appointed to the United States Supreme Court. He served as
an Associate Justice until 1916, when he ran unsuccessfully as the Republican candidate
for President. He was Secretary of State from 1921 to 1925 and then returned to private
practice, during which he was President of the American Bar Association and a justice
on the Permanent Court of International Justice. In 1930, he replaced William Howard
Taft as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court and remained in that position
until his resignation in 1941. For a comprehensive biographical discussion of Hughes,
see MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1951). See also BETTY GLAD,
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE ILLUSIONS OF INNOCENCE, A STUDY IN AMERI-
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ment imbued with his own notions of liberty, order, and fairness.
Yet, he also retained the perspective of a somewhat detached observer cognizant of the strife and conflict with which government
must contend from time to time.
He recognized that government reflected an implicit tension between personal liberty and collective security. Instead of thinking
in absolute terms, Hughes preferred to articulate a conception of
government based on the idea of an ordered liberty' 6 by which individual citizens retained a large measure of freedom consistent
with, and at times subsumed by, the paramount objectives of the
social order. Without order, Hughes feared that personal freedom
would become illusory and chaos would ensue. Relatively early in
public life he stressed the "preservation of law and the maintenance
of order": "once you abandon ... the desire to accord your neighbor [with] the right that you demand for yourself, you enter ... a

path that leads straight to anarchy."' 6 5
Hughes valued the law as a safeguard of liberty and a guideline
for effective government. As President of the American Bar Association he proclaimed: "Liberty and law-one and inseparable! The
noblest endeavor of democracy to safeguard the one by the intelligence in the other! ...Let us ...mak[e] secure the authority of law
as the servant of liberty wisely conceived . . .'"
".
In the same

address, Hughes explained the legal basis for democratic government: "[T]he supreme aim and justification of ... lawmaking ...
should ever be found.., in the purpose to secure the freedom of the
individual-an ordered freedom, but still freedom-subject only to
such restraints as a sound and tolerant judgment determines to be
essential to the mutuality of liberty."' 6 7 This comment demonstrates his view of law as an implement to protect and administer
the variants of liberty secured by a democratic society of free individuals. However, his philosophy did not shield him from reality,
CAN DIPLOMACY

(1966);

DEXTER PERKINS, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND AMERI-

(Oscar Handlin ed., 1956);

F. WESSER,
1905-1910 (1967).
See Charles Evans Hughes, Address at Faneuil Hall (June 17, 1925) (transcript
available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress) [hereinafter Address at Faneuil
Hall]; Charles Evans Hughes, Liberty and Law, American Bar Association Annual Address 5, 8-9 (Sept. 2, 1925) (transcript available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress) [hereinafter ABA Address].
165 Charles Evans Hughes, Gubernatorial Campaign Speech at Bethel A.M.E.
Church I (Nov. 4, 1906) (transcript available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress).
166 ABA Address, supra note 164, at 19.
67
1 Id. at 8.
CAN DEMOCRATIC STATESMANSHIP

ROBERT

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, POLITICS AND REFORM IN NEW YORK
164
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and throughout his public career Hughes sought to reconcile the
problems of governmental authority with his democratic ideals.
His own perception of government reflected less idealism than
pragmatism. In an early lecture at Yale University, then Governor
Hughes explained that "government is not something apart from us,
or above us, that it is we ourselves organized in a grand co-operative
effort to protect mutual rights to secure common opportunity and
improvement."' 68 Hughes's emphasis on the correlative relationship between private rights and the public interest contributed heavily to his understanding of government. He perceived the
fundamental paradox in the concept of an ordered liberty: "How to
protect the individual in his personal rights and at the same time
safeguard the community, is a problem not solved by forms of
words, even in written constitutions."' 6 9 This question did not have
an easy answer, as Hughes himself learned during his tenure on the
Supreme Court when cases involving the Contract Clause, substantive due process and state police powers highlighted the parameters
of the conflict between personal liberty and public interest. Nevertheless, he recognized this tension well before his years on the high
court and grappled with its nuances from the dual perspectives of
lawyer and governor.
Early in public life, Hughes acknowledged the implicit limitations the public welfare placed upon the exercise of private rights.
As Governor of New York he made the following observation in an
address at the University of Michigan:
But side by side with the tradition that we have of individualism,
side by side with the firm belief that we have in the importance of
maintaining opportunities for individual attainment,

. .

. is the

keener recognition that we have public rights with
reference to
17
which every individual right must be exercised. 1
Thus viewed, the relationship between private and public rights
functioned as a basic postulate of the social order. Unbridled individualism would imperil personal liberty and destroy society."'
168 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, CONDITIONS
ERNMENT

8 (1910)

(1908

OF PROGRESS IN DEMOCRATric Gov-

Yale lectures) [hereinafter

HUGHES,

CONDITIONS

OF

PROGRESS].

169 Charles Evans Hughes, Address at Harvard Law School 6 (Nov. 1, 1926) (transcript available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress) [hereinafter Harvard
Address].
170 Charles Evans Hughes, Washington's Birthday Address at the University of
Michigan Law School (Feb. 22, 1907), in 7 THE MICH. ALUMNUS 283 (1907) [hereinafter Washington's Birthday Address].
171

Id. at 285.
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The continued enjoyment of liberty, therefore, depended upon the
tacit acceptance by all that personal rights existed in relation to the
collective interests and needs of society and must, on occasion, yield
to them.' 72
Hughes assumed local government existed to meet the burgeoning needs of a complex and diverse society. To this extent, it
served as an arbiter of social, political, and economic tensions that
periodically threatened to upset the order by which citizens secured
their liberty. In his second inaugural address as New York Governor he characterized government as "an organ of the community to
secure a basis of peace and order essential to individual liberties and
opportunity, and.., to maintain the collective rights which cannot
otherwise be safeguarded."' 7 3 Moreover, he reposed considerable
trust and faith in the potential of local government institutions to
resolve the problems created by changes in demography, industry,
and social expectations.
As governor, Hughes manifested his enthusiasm for effective and
responsible government. In particular, his support of the Public
Services Commissions Act of 190714 demonstrated his conviction
that local government could help resolve the political and economic
tensions of an interdependent body politic. Enacted in response to
allegations of industrial corruption, the Act established a series of
commissions to prescribe, among other things, rate and safety regu172 See Charles Evans Hughes, Address Before the Republican Club of the City of
New York 8 (Jan. 31, 1908) (transcript available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress) [hereinafter Republican Club Address]; ABA Address, supra note 164, at 8-9;
Address at Faneuil Hall, supra note 164; see also HUGHES, CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS,
supra note 168, at 13, 20 (praising the supremacy of public rights over private ones to
preserve collective security). Similarly, Hughes recognized the importance of
"secur[ing] the benefits of collective effort while wisely safeguarding individual opportunity and initiative." Id. at 20.
173 Charles Evans Hughes, Second Gubernatorial Inaugural Address (Jan. 1, 1909)
(transcript available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress). He made a similar appeal in his first inaugural address. See CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 134-35 (David J. Danelski & Joseph
S. Tulchin eds., 1973) [hereinafter HUGHES, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES]; HUGHES,
CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS, supra note 171, at 17-20 (in which Hughes discusses the
importance of "protective measures" to alleviate social and economic problems such as
public health, education, housing, utility companies, insurance, and the excesses of
quasi-public entities); Republican Club Address, supra note 172, at 8 (wherein he described local government as "the organ of the popular will" ready to intervene "with
necessary restrictions and regulations not to curtail the liberty of the people, but to
protect it").
174 Ch. 429, 1907 N.Y. Laws. For general discussion of this law and its political
context, see WESSER, supra note 163, at 146-81.
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lations for public service corporations. While Hughes and other reformers endorsed it as a way to restore public trust and preserve
economic opportunities, 175 large utility companies and other corporations operating under broad legislative grants objected to such
regulation as "incompatible with the maintenance of the freedom of
' 176
management . . . incident to ...property rights."
The controversy over this Act merits attention because it underscored an implicit tension between governmental regulatory authority and the enjoyment of private property and contract rights
comparable to the problem presented by the Blaisdell case in 1934.
Hughes's defense of this Act emanated from his instrumental view
of government as the principal means of attaining social and economic reform. Review of business practices by government commissions would help maintain the delicate balance between the
freedom inherent in the ownership and control of private property
and the public interest in collective security and maximum opportunity. From this perspective, Hughes considered the Act a legitimate
exercise of state power to promote the public welfare. It was also
from this vantage point that his gubernatorial administration
prompted reform legislation in public education, the securities industry, gambling and the political process.' 7 7 Under his direction
the state legislature even passed two workers' compensation laws,
each of which bore his concern with balancing private opportunity
and the public interest. 178
In essence, Hughes expected government to provide the necessary
conditions for social and economic progress. Insofar as progress
was its underlying objective, it also served as the keystone of its
175 See Charles Evans Hughes, Speech at the Banquet of the Utica Chamber of Commerce (Apr. 1, 1907) (transcript available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress)
[hereinafter Utica Chamber of Commerce Speech] (asserting public service commissions
helped maintain guarantees of equality before the law). For commentary on this
speech, see Jacob Schurman, Governor Hughes, 1908 THE INDEPENDENT 1525, 1529-30
(available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress). Schurman, President of Cornell
University, taught law with Hughes at Cornell from 1891 to 1893.
176 Utica Chamber of Commerce Speech, supra note 175.
177 See 1 PUSEY, supra note 163, at 200-17; WESSER, supra note 163, at 124-82, 252340; S.P. Morris, Justice Hughes, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 27, 1910, microformed on
The Papers of Charles Evans Hughes, Reel 129 (Library of Congress) (praising Hughes
as a reformer whose legislative and administrative programs exemplified the application
of democratic ideals "to new industrial and commercial conditions").
178 One law provided for an elective system and another mandated compensation for
certain dangerous occupations. The compulsory scheme was ruled an unconstitutional
violation of due process under the New York constitution in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry.,
94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). Hughes obviously disagreed with this decision. See HUGHES,
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 173, at 153.
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conservation. 179 After all, if government existed to preserve an ordered liberty among the disparate individual components of society,
it must become susceptible to change or risk outlasting its utility.
Moreover, the absence of progress threatened to undermine the stability of society, for in Hughes's own words: "Human society cannot be stable unless it is progressive. That is because growth and
progress are the law of our nature."1 0 Nevertheless, Hughes advocated careful and deliberate change "for the remedy of some definite
evil . . . and not extended to unoffending members [of society] or
healthy functions."'' Otherwise, abrupt disruption of the social,
economic and political order would result and thus endanger the
essential equipoise between private rights and public welfare.
Attention to the nature of progress and to its role in the exercise
of governmental authority marked the public career of Charles Evans Hughes. He appreciated progressive government but realized
that ill-conceived change and inefficiency could undermine its objectives. While lauding its merits, he warned that "the best plans of
progress will be shattered if administration is faulty"' 82 and noted
that inefficiency prevents progress.' 83 Hughes associated efficiency
with thrift, intelligence, and reason-attributes upon which he
placed much reliance in his conception of government and its role
in a complex society.' 8 4 He viewed efficient government as the
linchpin of a society based upon the fair administration of laws and
the orderly progression of change. Inefficient government would
succumb eventually to the anarchy of self-interest produced by individuals acting alone or in disruptive factions.1 85 From this perspec179 See Schurman, supra note 175, at 1529.

18o Charles Evans Hughes, Address at Chautauqua, N.Y. (Aug. 24, 1907), in ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, 1906-1916, at 247 (2d ed. 1916).
181 Schurman, supra note 175, at 1529. Moreover, Hughes remarked: -[T]he course

of progress lies between the fanciful schemes of those who ignore the actual components
of society and its mixed qualities, and the let-alone policy supported alike by the indifferent, the cynical, and those who despair of improvement." HUGHES, CONDITIONS OF
PROGRESS, supra note 168, at 106; see also Charles Evans Hughes, Some Aspects of the
Development of American Law, Address before the New York State Bar Association
17-18 (Jan. 14, 1916) (available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress) [hereinafter
New York Bar Association Address].
182 HUGHES, CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS, supra note 168, at 40-41.
83
1 Id. at 39.
184 Washington's Birthday Address, supra note 170, at 287; HUGHES, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 173, at 134-35.
185 See HUGHES, CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS, supra note 168, at 40 (asserting that
inefficiency breeds waste of financial and social resources and creates disorder that disrupts social progress). Hughes generally did not tolerate wastefulness among public
officials or private citizens. Id.
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tive Hughes analyzed the problems of government, and so created a
theoretical framework from which he would assess constitutional
questions of state authority over social and economic affairs while
on the Supreme Court.
B.

Hughes's Conception of Federalism

A passionate advocate of state governmental authority in matters
of local concern, Hughes displayed equal fervor in maintaining the
federal system and its inherent limitations on state power. Through
the guise of a stable federal system, Hughes perceived a prime
means of attaining two fundamental objectives of governmental authority: "conserv[ation] of the interests of an ordered freedom"' 8 6
187
and "the security and expansion of American enterprise."'
Throughout his public career Hughes witnessed vast growth in the
country's population and improvements in its technology, factors
that increased the tension between individual interest and collective
security. 18 1 While economic and social diversity created new opportunities, it also produced disparities in wealth and other complex
problems that affected the maintenance of the ordered liberty he so
cherished. Within this context, Hughes considered a strong federal
system essential in preserving the critical balance between private
89
rights and public needs.'
186 ABA Address, supra note 164, at 8-9.
187 Charles Evans Hughes, Speech at Metropolitan Opera House 10 (Nov. 1, 1924)
(transcript available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress) [hereinafter Metropolitan Opera House Speech].
188 ABA Address, supra note 164, at 7.
There is the greater danger as the complexities of society increasingly demand
that the range of personal volition be limited by law in the interest of liberty
itself. We are compelled to lay stress on restraints in the view that the liberty
which permits freedom of action would be a barren privilege if it did not also
connote freedom from injurious action by others, and the security of life and
of individual opportunity lies in its immunities.
Id.; see also HUGHES, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 173, at 134; Republican
Club Address, supra note 172, at 10; Washington's Birthday Address, supra note 170,
at 187.
189

See CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

236-37 (Garden City Publishing 1936) (1928) (publication of six lectures Hughes delivered at Columbia University in 1927) [hereinafter HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT]

(discussing the Supreme Court and the balance of public and private rights); Address at
Faneuil Hall, supra note 164; Metropolitan Opera House Speech, supra note 187, at 10
(asserting that a stable federal system underlies "the security and expansion of American enterprise"); Washington's Birthday Address, supra note 170, at 283-87; Charles
Evans Hughes, Middlesex Club Lincoln Memorial Speech 2-4 (Feb. 12, 1907) (transcript available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress) [hereinafter Middlesex Club
Speech].
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Federalism intrigued Hughes because it featured the practical allocation of authority between the federal and state governments.
He once explained that "[o]ur system of government is a practical
adjustment to make possible the full exercise of national power to
meet national needs without sacrificing proper local authority to
meet local needs."' 9 ° Hughes thought a federal system created
"neither a confederation of States, nor a single centralized government, but a Nation-and yet a Union of States each autonomous in
its local concerns." 9 ' Alternatively, he described our country as "a
grand experiment ...[a] nation with a constitutional system suited
to local government-adapted to national needs."' 9 2
He believed that the distribution of governmental authority
among the national and state governments was essential for several
reasons. First, the interests of each mandated some division of
power. Otherwise, a single governmental unit with exclusive authority in all national and local affairs would become inept, as its
unwieldy central bureaucracy slowed to a halt the effective administration of laws and policies.' 93 Hughes feared that a central government without local branches might impede social progress by
making civic participation less critical. In a speech before the
American Bar Association he cautioned:
The intricacies of our interrelations which demand action in the
national sphere, as national concerns multiply, make attention to
the requirements of local self-government all the more important, so that the individual may have as direct a part as possible
in the government of his life, a part of which shall not be rendered relatively inconsequential by the centralization of
power. 194
In addition, local government could best handle affairs not within
the purview of national authority. Throughout his public career
Hughes stressed "the obvious importance of localizing administration so far as possible.., in light of the enormous burdens of centralized administration."' 9 5 To this extent, he believed that state
governments could more effectively exercise authority in areas of
190 Address at Faneuil Hall, supra note 164.
191 New York Bar Association Address, supra note 181, at 10.
192 Charles Evans Hughes, Presidential Campaign Speech at Fargo, N.D. 3 (Aug. 10,
1916) (transcript available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress).
193 ABA Address, supra note 164, at 8-9. For Hughes's views on administrative efficiency in government, see HUGHES, CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS, supra note 168, at 3845.
194 ABA Address, supra note 164, at 8.
195 Washington's Birthday Address, supra note 170, at 287.
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local concern and thus enable the federal government to resolve national problems such as interstate commerce and foreign policy.' 96
For Hughes, federalism signified a dual system of government
whereby "[federal powers and [s]tate powers are exercised in different spheres."'' 97 The Constitution defined in general terms the authority of each and prescribed their limitations. 98 In his view,
federalism did not signify competition for power between the state
and federal governments. 99 Rather, it fostered a partnership between the two borne of their complementary characteristics .2 °1 Preeminent within their respective spheres of influence, constitutional
limitations marked the boundaries of state and federal authority. 2° '
Where state power stopped, federal authority began. As Merlo Pusey observed in his biography of Hughes, the existence of a gulf
between state and federal power signified a paralysis of government
inimical to progress and the maintenance of an ordered freedom.2 °2
For this reason, Hughes often warned: "Federal control should not
obscure ...

the power and the correlative duty of the state govern-

196 Hughes explained that the allocation of power between the federal government
and individual states
will result from considerations of paramount public advantage. If it should
appear that the powers of the States are inadequate to deal with a subject
hitherto retained in their keeping, and that the interests of the people as a
whole imperatively demand the assumption of a power by the Federal Government, the people will provide the assumption of that power.
Charles Evans Hughes speech (published in New York Sun, Feb. 13, 1907), quoted in I
PUSEY, supra note 163, at 215.
197 Utica Chamber of Commerce Speech, supra note 175.
198 See Charles Evans Hughes, Coolidge Presidential Campaign Speech at Buffalo,
N.Y. 21 (Oct. 29, 1924) (transcript available in Hughes Papers at Library of Congress).
Hughes made this remark in response to Senator Robert LaFollette's proposal of a congressional veto of United States Supreme Court opinions that declared unconstitutional
laws of Congress. Hughes believed this veto authority would enable Congress to usurp
the power of individual states. He noted:
The distinctive feature of our system of government is that it is a Union of
States. The maintenance of State Governments depends upon our constitutional limitations and their enforcement. What is the protection of New York,
of Ohio, of Minnesota, of Kansas, of Iowa, for example, against the unconstitutional exercise of federal power to the ... reserved power of the States?
Id.; see also Metropolitan Opera House Speech, supra note 187.
199 Washington's Birthday Address, supra note 170, at 286.
2
00Id. at 283-87.
201 See SAMUEL P. HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT
9 (1951); see also HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 189, at 95-96 (discussing
judicial review and federalism).
202 1 PUSEY, supra note 163, at 308. Pusey actually uses the term "vacuum of
power." Hughes himself referred to "ordered freedom" in his ABA Address, supra
note 164, at 8-9.
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ment within its own borders."2 °3
Hughes's sensitivity to questions of interstate commerce and state
police powers revealed his conception of federalism. Early in public
life, he articulated a functional approach to the allocation of governmental authority in these areas. Recognition of the practical
limitations upon both state and federal authority augmented his
perception about the importance of fashioning rules consistent with
the actual needs of a highly complex and varied economy.2 "4 While
he emphasized the exclusive power of Congress over interstate commerce, he acknowledged that individual states retained primary authority to prescribe rules for "local or domestic commerce" over
some matters within their special interest and expertise that did not
conflict with the overriding objectives of the federal government.20 5
Essentially, Hughes reasoned that local government occupied a better position to regulate certain aspects of intrastate commerce that
incidentally affected interstate commerce. Later, as a justice on the
United States Supreme Court, he used this principle in several Commerce Clause cases.2 06
C. State Police Powers and ConstitutionalInterpretation
Similarly, Hughes expressed a willingness to afford individual
states wide latitude in the exercise of their police powers. Though
his tenure on the Supreme Court spanned two different eras, a variety of cases under both the Due Process and Contract Clauses allowed him ample opportunities to examine closely the
constitutional limitations upon the authority of states to make regulations for the public welfare. In implicit agreement with Justice
Holmes that states could assert their police powers over all essential
public needs,20 7 Hughes even asserted several years before Blaisdell
that changing economic and social conditions might warrant the
203 Middlesex Club Speech, supra note 189, at 4.
204 HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 189, at 142 (discussing the Com-

merce Clause); New York Bar Association Address, supra note 18 1, at 7 (discussing the
Commerce Clause and federalism); Republican Club Address, supra note 172, at 10.
2o5 Middlesex Club Speech, supra note 189, at 2-4.
206 See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) (sustaining a Florida law regulating sponge collecting by its citizens in extraterritorial waters); Kelly v. Washington,
302 U.S. 1 (1937) (sustaining Washington's regulation of unseaworthy vessels); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) (upholding Minnesota rail rates that adversely
affected the interstate rail system); Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187
(1912) (sustaining a California pilotage law that affected interstate and foreign
commerc5).
207 HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 189, at 155 (citing with approval
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911)).
HeinOnline -- 72 Or. L. Rev. 561 1993

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72, 19931

states' "novel exercise . . . to care for both social and individual
2
interests." 11
His was the perspective of a pragmatic and progressive proponent
of governmental authority employed within constitutional limitations. Cautious by nature, and ever mindful of precedent, Hughes
analyzed the exercise of state police powers by balancing private
rights with the public interest. 2 9 Rather than rely on abstruse theoretical doctrines, he viewed problems of state regulation as dilemmas in the allocation of power within the federal system. Of
necessity, this approach emphasized factual distinctions between
seemingly alike cases, as Hughes steadfastly applied a test of reasonableness in assessing state police powers.210
During his first stint on the Court he consistently upheld the
power of individual states and municipalities to limit the public contract rights of utility and rail companies. 2 11 The scope of reserved
state authority over such grants raised the issue of contract impairment under the Contract Clause in some of these cases; in others,
grantees challenged the laws on substantive due process grounds.
In either scenario, the Court employed a test of reasonableness. If a
particular measure bore a reasonable relationship to a legitimate
state objective, it usually withstood scrutiny under either the Contract Clause or substantive due process.2 12 To the extent Hughes
dissented from Court decisions invalidating local regulations, he
considered them reasonable methods of promoting the public welfare. 213 Like Justices Holmes and Pitney, he interpreted the con20

8 Id. at 195.

See id. at 53 ("Stability in judicial opinions is of no little importance in maintaining respect for the Court's work."); see also HENDEL, supra note 201, at 6, 65; G.
209

EDWARD

WHITE, THE AMERICAN

JUDICIAL TRADITION:

PROFILES OF

LEADING

213 (1976).
supra note 201, at 6; WHITE, supra note 209, at 213-14.
211 See, e.g., New York Elec. Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway Sys., 235 U.S. 179
(1914) (recognizing an implicit limitation on "use" in public franchise grants); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298 (1913) (upholding the authority of a state rail
commission to alter maximum rail rdtes); Southern Pac. Co. v. Campbell, 230 U.S. 537
(1913) (upholding the state regulation of rail transportation rates).
2 12
See Chicago & A.R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915) (sustaining a Missouri
law requiring railroads to maintain water outlets across rights of way); Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914) (sustaining municipal ordinances
regulating the operation of trains and track grades); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. McGuire,
219 U.S. 549 (1911) (sustaining an Iowa law prohibiting railways from limiting their
liability to injured workers); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (sustaining an
Oklahoma law subjecting banks to periodic assessments to assure minimym assets),
opinion amended, 219 U.S. 575 (1911).
213 Hughes dissented with no opinion in Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. City of South Bend,
AMERICAN JUDGES
2 10
See HENDEL,
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cept of public welfare broadly to include notions of public
convenience and economic prosperity.21 4 In contrast, legislation
was unconstitutional if it imposed unreasonable restrictions upon
public grantees or exceeded the states' reserved regulatory
powers.21 5
Hughes's most cogent analysis of state police powers arose in the
context of disputes over the extent to which the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment insulated private contracts from the
reach of state regulation to promote the public welfare. In response
to changes in technology, demography, and urbanization, states and
municipalities enacted laws that regulated the conditions of private
employment in various industries. Many of these measures reflected the reform impulse of the Progressive movement in the first
decades of the twentieth century. Private employers argued that
these laws violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment because they restricted the liberty of contract, a notion
implicit in substantive due process since the late nineteenth century."' They contended that a private employment agreement
arose from the freely given consent of both the employee and the
employer to the conditions of employment. In essence, this argument presupposed a fictional equality in the bargaining positions of
227 U.S. 544 (1913). In this case, the Court ruled that the repeal of a municipal ordinance under which a rail company laid double tracks impaired the obligation of contracts. The public grant created an irrevocable contract right. Id. at 555. Further, the
city unreasonably asserted its police power to prevent inconvenience to pedestrians. Id.
at 554. Similarly, Hughes, together with Justices McKenna and Pitney, joined in Justice Day's written dissent in City of Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 230
U.S. 58 (1913). In Owensboro, the Court invalidated a city's repeal of a prior grant to a
telephone company to erect poles and wires. The dissent invoked the reservation doctrine and noted the city's authority over its streets. Id. at 83.
214 Hughes was part of the majority in Tranbarger, Goldsboro, and Haskell, all cases
which expanded the concept of local police powers.
215 See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Conley, 236 U.S. 605 (1915) (finding that a West Virginia maximum intrastate rail passenger rate violated Fourteenth Amendment due process); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585 (1915) (finding unreasonable
North Dakota's maximum intrastate rate for coal transportation); Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914) (invalidating as unreasonable and arbitrary a state
regulation of rail rates).
216 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (voiding, on substantive due
process grounds, a statute that prescribed a maximum sixty hour work week for bakers). In Lochner, the Court reasoned that bakers could make their own contracts with
private employers without the benign intervention of the state. Id. at 57. In part, this
rationale explains the Court's reluctance to sustain the New York law as a reasonable
health regulation pursuant to local police powers. See also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 (1897) (recognizing a New York insurer's freedom to make marine insurance
contracts in Louisiana).
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the parties. It also reflected traditional laissez-faire conceptions
prevalent in the post-Civil War market economy.
Hughes wrote several opinions in support of state laws that regulated the conditions of private employment. Aware of the social
and economic importance of such legislation, 2 7 he subjected freedom of contract to an expansive notion of state police powers. Invariably, his resolution of the tension between private contract
rights and public welfare reflected his views on constitutional interpretation and the role of the Supreme Court in assessing the validity
of police power measures. Ultimately, he applied this constitutional
jurisprudence to the dilemma presented in Blaisdell over the scope
of the Contract Clause.
Hughes perceived that the controversy over freedom of contract
actually involved a more basic question of state power within the
federal system. The Constitution, with its limitations of state authority and protection of individual liberties, created a balance between the exercise of state power and personal freedom. 2 " He
thought the Court should preserve this equipoise without infringing
upon either the sanctity of private rights or the public interest. Deferential to legislative determinations of policy, Hughes limited his
inquiry to "the limits of legislative power ' '21 9 because a distinction
existed "between questions of mere wisdom or policy and those of
power."' 22' Further, he believed judges should never substitute their

personal notions of economic policy or social welfare for an objective analysis of constitutional limitations and the exercise of governmental power.2 2'
In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. McGuire,2 2 2 Hughes
flexibly interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to sustain an Iowa law that prohibited contracts by
which railway companies limited their liability for injuries sustained
by their employees. The railroad argued that the law infringed
upon its freedom of contract, a contention discarded by a majority
of the Court, which considered the legislation a reasonable manifes2 PUSEY, supra note 163, at 703.
See Charles Evans Hughes, Address to the Conference of Federal Judges of the
Fourth Circuit (June 9, 1932), in 2 PUSEY, supra note 163, at 692-93 [hereinafter
Fourth Circuit Address]; HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 189, at 1-2, 9596, 237.
219 HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 189, at 37.
22 0
d. at 38.
221 Fourth Circuit Address, supra note 218; HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT, supra
217
218

note 189, at 37-38.
222 219 U.S. 549 (1911).
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tation of Iowa's authority to promote the health, safety, and welfare
of its citizens. Indeed, Hughes's majority opinion emphasized the
inherent limitations of contractual freedom: "Liberty implies the
absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the
223
community.
Rather than assess the wisdom of Iowa's policy, Hughes focused
upon the question of state power. Judicial review of legislative policy, he reasoned, made no sense given the intimate familiarity of the
local legislature with conditions in Iowa. 224 Thus, he accorded the
state wide discretion in implementing regulations pursuant to its police powers so long as it did not interefere with private rights in an
arbitrary and unreasonable manner.2 2 5 Significantly, he observed
that this broad regulatory authority was not limited "to the form of
the contract, or the nature of the consideration, or the absolute or
conditional character of the engagement. 22 6 In this respect, he
foreshadowed his conclusion years later in Blaisdell that under certain conditions the reasonable exercise of state police powers may
circumscribe the literal terms of contractual performance.
Hughes understood the fundamental conflict between the constitutional protection of private rights and their restriction by governmental authority. Like others, he invoked a test of reasonableness
in assessing the parameters of state power over private interests. He
thus sought to maximize the potential for governmental action and
to minimize the risk of its paralysis within the federal system. Absolute liberty neither existed nor was possible in a complex society
with myriad economic, social, and political tensions. Increased interdependency among individuals sometimes required the intercession of local government to preserve not only the collective interests
of society, but also the relative value of personal rights in property
and contracts.22 7 From this perspective, Hughes readily subjected
liberty of contract to the reasonable exercise of state police powers
223Id. at 567; see also HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 189, at 205-07
(asserting that liberty of contract is not an absolute right but rather a right subject to
the reasonable exercise of state police powers).
22 4
McGuire, 219 U.S. at 569.
22 5
1d. at 570.
2261d. at 571.
227 HUGHES, CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS, supra note 168, at 13 (arguing that individual liberty may, at times, be restrained "by the demands of the common welfare").
Hughes also advocated the importance of state police power measures to alleviate some
of the more pervasive social and economic problems of the early twentieth century. Id.
at 17-20; see also ABA Address, supra note 164, at 7; Washington's Birthday Address,
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and upheld laws that prescribed maximum hours of employment for
women, 22 8 prohibited child labor, 2 29 and prevented discrimination
by employers against members of unions. 230 He also found similar
legislation constitutional in the minimum wage cases of the
1930s.231

In essence, Hughes construed substantive due process in ways
that permitted the reasonable exercise of state police powers to meet
important public social and economic needs. While he recognized
substantive due process as a limitation on state authority, he applied
its constraints sparingly, as he preferred to invoke it in cases where
local government acted arbitrarily or unreasonably.2 3 2 Yet, he did
not equate unreasonable legislation with that which was merely unwise or unfeasible. 23 3 The latter only signified an unsuccessful foray
in the public interest; the former meant an unnecessary breach of
supra note 170, at 284-85; Charles Evans Hughes, Gubernatorial Inaugural Address
(Jan. 1, 1907), in HUGHES, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 173, at 134.
228 See, e.g., Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) (upholding a California law
setting an eight hour maximum work day for nurses); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373
(1915) (California law prohibiting employment of women in hotels and other businesses
for more than eight hours a day or 48 hours a week bore a reasonable relationship to the
state's interest in protecting the health and welfare of women). Hughes also voted in
conference to sustain the constitutionality of Oregon's minimum wage act after the first
oral argument of Stettler v. O'Hara. HUGHES, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note
173, at 312. He left the Court before the case was reargued, but ultimately, the Court
sustained the law. Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917).
229 Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913) (sustaining Illinois's
child labor law as a reasonable exercise of police powers to protect unwary children).
230 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In Coppage, Hughes joined in dissent with
Justice Day to oppose the Court's invalidation of a Kansas law prohibiting the exclusion
of union members and the discouragement of union activity in the workplace. See also
HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 189, at 206 ("[L]iberty to contract is subject to the essential authority of government to maintain peace and security, and to
enact laws for the promotion of the well-being of those subject to its jurisdiction, that is,
in the exercise of what we call the police power.").
231 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937) (sustaining
Washington State's minimum wage law for women as a reasonable exercise of local
police powers in the public interest); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S.
587, 618-31 (1936) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that New York's minimum
wage law for women was a constitutional exercise of state police powers).
232 See, e.g., Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) (invalidating, on due process
grounds, the use of martial law by the Texas governor to suppress the overproduction of
oil in East Texas and to quell the concomitant popular unrest). For discussion of this
case, see HENDEL, supra note 201, at 121-22; 2 PUSEY, supra note 163, at 723.
233 See, e.g., Sproles v. Binford. 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932) ("To make scientific precision a criterion of constitutional power would be to subject the State to an intolerable
supervision hostile to the basic principles of our Government and wholly beyond the
protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
secure.").
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individual freedom. "[T]he legislature is not bound to provide an
ideal system. Changing social conditions require new remedies, the
novel exercise of the police power, to care for both social and individual interests."2'3 4 Consequently, the Constitution did not "make
improvement or rational experimentation [by the states]
impossible."2 3
For example, in Sproles v. Binford,236 he criticized a mechanical
interpretation of substantive due process that diminished local authority to implement the public good. Thus, a Texas law that restricted the net loads of trucks on Texas highways was "within the
broad range of legislative discretion"2'37 and did not infringe unduly
upon the private interests of truck owners. Given this pragmatic
conception of due process, economic and social conditions comprised matters over which states retained considerable primary authority.23 Thus, for Hughes the Constitution did not prescribe a
federal system wherein the essential attributes of state governmental
authority yielded to the absolute sanctity of private rights. Instead,
234 HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT,

supra note 189, at 195.

235 New York Bar Association Address, supra note 181, at 16 (discussing the Four-

teenth Amendment): But see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932)
(wherein Hughes joined in the Court's decision to invalidate, on due process grounds,
an Oklahoma law regulating the manufacture and distribution of ice). Hughes thought
the case a close one. 2 PUSEY, supra note 163, at 698. In dissent, Justice Brandeis
praised the legislation as an example of experimental democracy. He believed the law
represented a reasonable exercise of police powers. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311. Two
years later, Hughes adopted Brandeis's rationale in Blaisdell.
236 286 U.S. 374 (1932).
237 Id. at 388.
238 For other pre-Blaisdell cases in which Hughes wrote opinions in support of state
police powers, see Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931) (upholding an
Oklahoma law guaranteeing bank deposits); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930);
Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n v. Lowe, 281 U.S. 431 (1930) (upholding Oklahoma's cooperative licensing law); Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 281
U.S. 98 (1930) (upholding New York's workers' compensation statute); Ohio ex rel.
Wadsworth v. Zangerle, 281 U.S. 74 (1930) (upholding an Ohio law validating state
legislation if more than one Ohio Supreme Court justice dissents from an opinion invalidating it); Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192 (1912); Savage v. Jones. 225 U.S.
501 (1912) (sustaining Indiana law regulating food for livestock). Additionally, Hughes
joined in Justice McKenna's majority opinion in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis,
233 U. S. 388 (1914) (upholding a Kansas law regulating fire insurance rates). Perhaps,
the most important state police powers case in which Hughes joined in the majority
after Blaisdell was Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (sustaining the New York
minimum milk price statute). The most important post-Blaisdell state police powers
case in which Hughes wrote the majority opinion in support of state police powers was
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining Washington State's
minimum wage law for women).
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within the limits set forth by the Constitution, states maintained the
power to preserve the collective security of individual interests.
IV
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE BLAISDELL
DECISION: FEDERALISM AND PRAGMATIC
JURISPRUDENCE

In Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,23 9 several longstanding theoretical limitations upon the scope of the Contract Clause
converged, as the United States Supreme Court examined the authority of a state to alter the performance of a private mortgage
agreement during the Depression. No one theory explains fully the
Court's rationale for sustaining the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act 2 '

as a reasonable exercise of police powers during an

emergency. 241'

For several years the Court had, by various techniques, created significant inroads upon the constitutional prohibition of state power to modify contracts.24 2 Each arose in response
to a recurrent and fundamental problem within the federal system:
the reconciliation of governmental control over contracts with the
sanctity of private rights.
The economic effects of the Depression intensified this conflict
and underscored the tension between the constitutional protection
of vested contract rights and their regulation by states in the public
interest. Ultimately, this afforded the Court a prime opportunity to
reconsider the philosophical and practical tenets of its Contract
Clause jurisprudence. To understand the meaning of Blaisdell, one
must therefore realize it presented a classical problem in federalism
to which the respective authors of the majority and dissenting opinions, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice George Sutherland, responded in terms of their divergent perspectives of
federalism, governmental authority, and the Constitution.
239 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
240 Ch. 339, 1933 Minn. Laws 514.
241 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 415-48 (Hughes, C.J., majority opinion). Hughes drew
upon 1) the rights/remedies distinction, 2) the doctrines of state reserved and inalienable police powers, 3) the due process test of reasonableness, and 4) just compensation as
limitations upon the Contract Clause prohibition of state power to modify contract
rights.
242See supra notes 35-162 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
techniques.
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A.

Blaisdell as a Problem in Federalism: Context and
Controversy

On April 18, 1933, the Minnesota legislature unanimously passed
a mortgage moratorium law in response to the widespread foreclo24 3
sure sale of farms and other real estate during the Depression.
Approximately half of the state's population owned realty subject to
mortgages held by banks, savings and loan associations and insurance companies.'" The land itself secured this indebtedness, as
debtors mortgaged their property to the creditors who loaned them
money. The precipitous fall in agricultural and industrial prices
made it difficult, if not impossible, for citizens to make their periodic mortgage payments.2 45 Pursuant to these private contracts,
debtor-mortgagors incurred enormous indebtedness to creditormortgagees, who often obtained the real property upon the inability
of the mortgagors to retire their mortgage debts. Most mortgage
agreements contained a power of sale provision that enabled the
mortgagee to foreclose the property and sell it at a public auction.
Often the mortgagor had a limited period in which to pay off the
outstanding indebtedness and so redeem the property after its
sale.246
In times of relative economic prosperity, foreclosure rates remained relatively stable. Mortgagees sold foreclosed property for
market value and applied the proceeds to the outstanding indebted243 Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act, ch. 339, 1933 Minn. Laws 514; see also
William L. Prosser, The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium, 7 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 35356, 360 (1934) (describing the circumstances surrounding the passage of the law).
244 Prosser, supra note 243, at 353-54. Prosser, using 1930 figures compiled in 1932,
noted that "53.8% of the owner-operated farms in Minnesota were mortgaged." Id. at
354 n.10. For additional statistical discussion of Depression era mortgages on farms
throughout the country, see id. at 353-54 & nn.9-15; Comment, Recent Legislation for
the Relief of Mortgage Debtors, 42 YALE L.J. 1236, 1237 n.l (1933).
245 Prosser, supra note 243, at 354.
246 When the parties in Blaisdell executed their mortgage in 1928, section 9602 of the
Minnesota Statutes created a one year redemption period. Usually, the mortgagee
would be the purchaser at a foreclosure sale. Prosser, supra note 243, at 355. At the
end of the redemption period, the purchaser would then receive title to the property in
fee simple absolute and thus obtain complete ownership of the land.
Essentially, redemption enables the mortgagor "to preserve his equity in the property." Roland C. Amundson & Lewis J.Rotman, Depression JurisprudenceRevisited:
Minnesota's Moratorium on Mortgage Foreclosure, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 805,
815 (1984). There are two types of redemption, equitable and statutory. Equitable redemption arises once the mortgagor has defaulted and prior to a foreclosure sale. Statutory redemption occurs after the foreclosure sale and "provides the defaulting
mortgagor with a second opportunity to redeem the property." Id. at 816. Blaisdell
involved statutory redemption.
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ness. The Depression, however, with its high inflation and large
discrepancy between income and debt, produced an exponential increase in the number of foreclosure sales.247 Consequently, the
value of foreclosed realty depreciated considerably 24 8 as mortgagees
sold foreclosed property for prices much lower than the amounts of
indebtedness in order to recover portions of their loan investments.
By 1933, most property mortgaged in Minnesota was worth only
one quarter of its value before the advent of the Depression.2 4 9
Comparable conditions existed throughout the Midwest. In Minnesota and adjoining regions, mortgagors, many of whom were
farmers, rioted in protest of the foreclosure proliferation.25 ° In
some instances, mortgagors even used physical force to prevent
sheriffs from executing foreclosure sales. 25 ' From 1930 to 1933 several states enacted debtor relief laws to alleviate the harsh consequences of foreclosure.2 52 Oklahoma even vested in its judiciary
discretion to extend redemption periods during the Depression.2 53
Similarly, Wisconsin recognized the equitable powers of its judiciary to modify the liabilities of mortgage debtors faced with postforeclosure deficiency judgments.2 5 4
The constitutionality of this legislation remained unclear and
often depended upon the length of the delay in foreclosure or the
period of extension where redemption was in issue. 255a Moreover, a
247 Hynning, supra note 33, at 182; Prosser, supra note 243, at 354 & n.15; Comment. supra note 244, at 1236.
248 Hynning, supra note 33, at 182; Prosser, supra note 243, at 354-55; Comment,
supra note 244, at 1236-37.
249 Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 249 N.W. 334, 339 (Minn. 1933) (Olsen,
J., concurring).
250 Prosser, supra note 243, at 355. Rioting also occurred in Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Nebraska during January and February of 1933. A. H. Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1073 n.84 (1933).
251 Prosser, supra note 243, at 355.
252 For example, Wisconsin extended its one year redemption period to two years on
the condition the mortgagor pay all post-foreclosure taxes and insurance. No extension
could exceed January 1, 1936. Ch. 9, sec. 7, 1931-1932 Wis. Laws Spec. Sess. For
discussion of this and other laws, see Hynning, supra note 33, at 183-84 & nn.4-14;
Note, Constitutionality of Mortgage Relief Legislation: Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v.
Blaisdell, 47 HARV. L. REV. 660, 664-67; Comment, supra note 244, at 1238-39 & nn.717, 1243-44 & nn.40-43.
253 The Oklahoma Supreme Court sustained this measure in Oklahoma ex rel. Roth
v. Waterfield, 29 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1933). In November 1932, a Nebraska court proclaimed "a partial moratorium on farm mortgages." Feller, supra note 250, at 1065 n.32
(quoting Harvey Wienke, A Mortgage ForeclosureMoratorium, 27 ILL. L. REV. 799 n.2
(1933)).
254 Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N.W. 556 (Wis. 1933).
255 In general, mortgagor relief laws that indefinitely stayed remedies otherwise avail-
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critical question arose over the extent to which the laws deprived
mortgagees of their contractual remedies. Where they effectively
made worthless the remedy of foreclosure or otherwise infringed
upon mortgagees' rights without compensation, most courts ruled
that the measures unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of contracts.2 56 Conversely, a few cases sustained moratoria upon foreclosure sales and other creditors' remedies during times of
emergency. 25 7 Though the United States Supreme Court had consistently invalidated retroactive mortgagor relief legislation under
the Contract Clause,258 it had yet to assess the constitutionality of a
able to mortgagees during the foreclosure process rarely withstood judicial scrutiny.
Similarly, courts often invalidated unlimited extension of postforeclosure statutory redemption periods. Feller, supra note 250, at 1070-71, app. I at 1081-85; Hynning,
supra note 33, at 205-09; Note, supra note 252, at 661-65, 667; Comment, supra note
244, at 1239.
256 Feller, supra note 250, at 1069-70, app. 1 at 1081-85; Hynning, supra note 33, at
205-09; Perlman, supra note 33, at 802-03; Prosser, supra note 243, at 358-59; Comment, supra note 244, at 1239-41.
257 For a general discussion of valid examples of state moratory laws, see Feller,
supra note 250, at 1072-73, app. I at 1081-85; Hynning, supra note 33, at 208 & nn.9697; Note, supra note 252, at 665-67 & nn.38-40; Comment, supra note 244, at 1240 &
nn.26-29.
In the years preceeding Blaisdell two state supreme court decisions upheld, at least
partially, Depression era mortgage moratoria. See State ex rel. Lichtscheidl v. Moeller,
249 N.W. 330 (Minn. 1933) (sustaining a Minnesota law delaying foreclosure sales);
Oklahoma ex rel. Roth v. Waterfield, 29 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1933) (both sustaining discretionary judicial extension of redemption periods and invalidating a nine-month stay for
a mortgagor to file an answer in a foreclosure action).
Examples of nineteenth century cases that upheld the validity of various debtor relief
moratoria include: Breitenbach v. Bush, 44 Pa. 313 (1863) (upholding a Pennsylvania
stay law during a three-year Civil War enlistment period); Heyward v. Judd, 4 Minn.
483 (1863) (finding that a three-year redemption period did not impair the obligation of
contracts); Holloway v. Sherman, 12 Iowa 282 (1861) (holding an Iowa law permitting
a nine-month stay of mortgage foreclosures permissible remedial legislation); Stone v.
Bassett, 4 Minn. 298 (1860) (sustaining a one-year redemption period subsequent to
foreclosure); Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559 (1859) (holding that a six-month stay
of mortgage foreclosures and execution sales only affected the remedies and not the
obligation of contracts); Iverson v. Shorter, 9 Ala. 713 (1846) (sustaining a two-year
redemption of judicial foreclosure sales); Chadwick v. Moore, 8 Watts & Serg. 49 (Pa.
1844) (sustaining a one-year stay of a sheriff's sale of foreclosed realty for bids less than
two-thirds of the realty's appraisal value).
258 See Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U.S. 1 (1904) (holding unconstitutional an Illinois
law that presecribed a minimum foreclosure bid); Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118
(1896) (holding that Kansas's eighteen-month redemption period unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of contracts); Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U.S. 415 (1880) (invalidating a Virginia stay of unlimited duration); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1877)
(ruling that a North Carolina one thousand dollar homestead exemption from an execution sale impaired the obligation of a preexisting contract); Walker v. Whitehead, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 314 (1872) (holding unconstitutional a Georgia law requiring a creditor
to file an affidavit of tax payment as a prerequisite to bringing suit for collection of a
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moratorium law enacted during the Depression.
As social and economic tensions mounted, the Minnesota governor issued an executive order restraining sheriffs from foreclosing
mortgages during the pendency of a moratorium law. 25 9 The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act of 193 32' reflected the rationale
of the 1920s Rent Cases in which both the United States Supreme
Court and the New York Court of Appeals invoked the concept
that, in times of emergency, local government can interpose its police powers into private contractual relationships that affect the
public interest. 261 Thus, municipal ordinances that extended tenancy periods did not violate either the Due Process or Contract
Clauses even though they temporarily deprived landlords of immediate possession and control of their rental premises.26 2 While these
cases did not go so far as to explicitly rule the reasonable exercise of
police powers during an emergency sanctioned the impairment of
debt); Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1872) (invalidating a Georgia constitutional provision that prevented a creditor from exercising a lien remedy under a preexisting contract); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866) (holding
that Illinois could not repeal laws extant at the time of a municipal bond issue); Howard
v. Bugbee, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 461 (1860) (holding that a two-year Alabama redemption
period unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of a preexisting mortgage); Gantly's
Lessee v. Ewing, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 707 (1845) (invalidating an Indiana requirement of a
minimum pre-foreclosure sale bid of half the realty's appraisal value); McCracken v.
Hayward, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608 (1844) (invalidating an Illinois requirement of a foreclosure bid equal to two-thirds the appraisal value of the realty); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42
U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843) (holding unconstitutional a twelve-month redemption period).
But see Conley v. Barton, 260 U.S. 677 (1923) (sustaining a retroactive application of
Massachusetts law that required a mortgagee to record a factual affidavit within three
months after foreclosure); Hooker v. Burr, 194 U.S. 415 (1904) (holding that retroactive
application of California law extending the redemption period and reducing monthly
interest did not impair the obligation of contracts); Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1883)
(sustaining a retroactive application of a Louisiana constitutional provision that required owners of tacit mortgages to record them for bona fide purchasers); Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U.S. 51 (1883) (upholding an Illinois law that
reduced the required interest payment of a mortgagor for redeeming foreclosed property); Curtis v. Whitney, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 68 (1871) (sustaining a law that required the
mortgagor or the occupant of foreclosed land to receive written notice of sale by foreclosure as a prerequisite to the purchaser at such sale receiving the deed).
259 Prosser, supra note 243, at 355; see also Amundson & Rotman, supra note 246, at
823-24 & nn.101-03.
26 0
Ch. 339, 1933 Minn. Laws 514.
261 Prosser, supra note 243, at 360; see also Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242
(1922); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh,
256 U.S. 135 (1921); Guttag v. Shatzkin, 130 N.E. 929 (N.Y. 1921); People ex rel.
Durham Realty Co. v. La Fetra, 130 N.E. 601 (N.Y.), writ of error dismissed sub nom.
New York ex rel. Brixton Operating Corp. v. La Fetra, 257 U.S. 665 (1921).
262 The laws in question were: The Emergency Housing Laws of New York, ch. 942,
1920 N.Y. Laws 2477; District of Columbia Rents Act, ch. 80, 41 Stat. 297 (1919).
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contract obligations, they did advance the legal fiction that otherwise private rental agreements were subject to modification by state
and local government attempts to promote the public welfare.2 63
In particular, the preamble of the Minnesota Act expressed this
idea when it declared that the severity and duration of the economic
depression created an emergency that justified "legislation for the
extension of the time of redemption from mortgage foreclosure and
execution sales. '' 26 Pursuant to the Act, mortgagors could apply to
a district court for an extension of time in which to redeem their
foreclosed real properties after the properties were sold at a public
auction.2 65 Under preexisting law, the redemption period lasted no
longer than a year; 266 however, the new law extended this stay for
up to two years, until May 1, 1935.267
The law vested in the district court equitable discretion to grant
the extension provided that the mortgagor pay the mortgagee the
reasonable rental value of the property during the redemption pe263 Siegel, 258 U.S. at 245-49; Feldman, 256 U.S. at 198-99; Hirsh, 256 U.S. at 156;
La Fetra, 130 N.E. at 605-06.
264 Ch. 339, pmbl., 1933 Minn. Laws 514, 515. The Act expressly declared the existence of an emergency. Id. pt. 1,sec. 1, at 516.
265 Part 1, section 4 provided in relevant part:

Where any mortgage upon real property has been foreclosed and the period of
redemption has not yet expired, or where a sale is hereafter had, in the case of
real estate mortgage foreclosure proceedings, now pending, or which may
hereafter be instituted prior to the expiration of two years from and after the
passage of this Act, or upon the sale of any real property under any judgment
or execution where the period of redemption has not yet expired, or where
such sale is made hereafter within two years from and after the passage of this
Act, the period of redemption may be extended for such additional time as the
court may deem just and equitable but in no event beyond May 1st, 1935;
provided that the mortgagor, or the owner in possession of said property, in
the case of mortgage foreclosure proceedings, or the judgment debtor, in case
of sale under judgment, or execution, shall prior to the expiration of the period
of redemption, apply to the district court having jurisdiction of the matter, on
not less than 10 days' written notice to the mortgagee or judgment creditor, or
the attorney of either, as the case may be, for an order determining the reasonable value of the income on said property, or, if the property has no income,
then the reasonable rental value of the property involved in such sale, and
directing and requiring such mortgagor or judgment debtor, to pay all or a
reasonable part of such income or rental value, in or toward the payment of
taxes, insurance, interest, mortgage or judgment indebtedness at such times
and in such manner as shall be fixed and determined and ordered by the court;
and the court shall thereupon hear said application and after such hearing
shall make and file its order directing the payment by such mortgagor, or
judgment debtor, of such an amount at times and in such manner as to the
court shall, under all the circumstances, appear just and equitable.
266 MINN. STAT. § 9608 (Mason 1927).
267 Ch. 339, pt. 1, sec. 4, 1933 Minn. Laws 514, 518.
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riod.2 68 Payment would be applied toward the outstanding indebtedness, insurance, taxes, and interest.2 6 9 Moreover, the law
authorized the court to retain jurisdiction over the matter and to
make periodic adjustments warranted by changing economic conditions and the financial wherewithal of the parties. 270 No postponements or delays could occur during the temporary emergency if
they "would substantially diminish or impair the value of the contract or obligation of the person against whom relief is sought, without reasonable allowance to justify the exercise of the police
1
power."

27

Once the legislature enacted this law, mortgagors John and
Rosella Blaisdell petitioned the Hennepin County District Court to
extend their redemption period after a foreclosure sale.2 72 In August 1928, the Blaisdells had mortgaged residential real property in
Minneapolis to Home Building and Loan Association as security
for a $3800 loan. 273 The mortgage contained a standard provision
that permitted the mortgagee to foreclose on the property and sell it
at a public auction upon the default of the mortgagors.2 7 4 When the
parties executed the mortgage agreement, Minnesota law provided a
one-year period for the mortgagors to redeem their property after a
foreclosure sale.27 5 In 1932, the Blaisdells defaulted on their mortgage; on May 2, 1932, Home Building and Loan itself purchased the
foreclosed real property, for approximately $3700, the amount of
outstanding indebtedness including interest and taxes.2 7 6 Without
an extension the redemption period would have lapsed, and the
mortgagee would have received full title to the property on May 2,
Id.
Id.
Id. pt. 1, sec. 5, at 519.
271 Id. pt. 2, sec. 5, at 521.
272 The mortgagors petitioned the district court for relief between April 18, 1933, the
date the legislature passed the act with the governor's approval, and April 28, 1933.
Appellees' Brief at 1,Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (No.
370).
273 On August 1, 1928 the Blaisdells delivered a written mortgage on a fourteen room
boarding house together with a garage and the underlying land in Minneapolis to Home
Building & Loan as security for a $3800 loan. Transcript of Record at 45, 47, Blaisdell
(No. 370). The Blaisdells lived in three of the rooms and rented the other eleven to
boarders. Id. at 47.
274 This provision was a power of sale by advertisement. Appellant's Brief at 3, Blaisdell (No. 370).
275 MINN. STAT. § 9608 (Mason 1927).
276 The actual amount was $3700.98. Transcript of Record at 46, Blaisdell (No. 370).
In July 1933, the Hennepin County District Court found the market value of the premises to be $6000. Id. at 47.
268

269
27 0
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1933.277 The Blaisdells invoked the Act and petitioned the district
court to extend the redemption period.27
At first, the district court dismissed the petition on the grounds
that the relevant provisions of the law violated both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Contract
Clause.2 79 The Blaisdells appealed to the Minnesota Supreme
Court, which sustained the mortgage moratorium as a reasonable
exercise of police powers during an economic emergency. ° The
court reasoned that the state could impair temporarily the obligations of a private contract in a manner "no more than reasonably
necessary" because of the grave public crisis created by the Depression.2"' Accordingly, it reversed the initial determination and remanded the case to the lower court. After determining the
reasonable rental value of the property and the amount of the debt,
the district court extended the redemption period two years, until
May 1, 1935, on the condition that the Blaisdells pay $40 per month
rent to the mortgagee during this span.28 2 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. 2 3 Home Building and Loan then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari to decide the constitutionality of the statute.
The arguments before the Supreme Court underscored the conflict implicit in governmental regulation of vested contract rights.
In existence since the inception of the Contract Clause and reflected
in the ensuing pattern of jurisprudence, the conflict emanated from
a larger one inherent in the federal system concerning the constitutional limits of state power. To the extent counsel debated the permissible scope of Minnesota's police authority over private
agreements during an economic emergency, they drew upon traditional contrasting conceptions of contract rights and local police
powers. Therein lies the complexity of Blaisdell and its attraction
for any student of federalism.28 4
See MINN. STAT. § 9608.
Ch. 339, pt. 1, sec. 4, Minn. Laws 514, 518-19.
279 Transcript of Record at 7, Blaisdell (No. 370). In addition, the district court
ruled that the 1933 mortagage moratorium statute violated the Contract Clause of the
Minnesota Constitution, article I, section 2. Id.
280 Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 249 N.W. 334, 337 (Minn. 1933).
281 Id. at 338.
282 Transcript of Record at 49-50, Blaisdell (No. 370).
283 Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 249 N.W. 893, 894 (Minn. 1933) (per
curiam).
284 In addition, the mortgagees claimed that the Minnesota law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both parties com277
278
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While both parties agreed that the case involved the extent a state
could regulate a private mortgage agreement in the public interest,
sharp disagreement arose over whether an economic depression
comprised an appropriate emergency to justify the exercise of Minnesota's police powers in a manner disruptive to the literal provisions of the mortgage. As mortgagee, Home Building and Loan
argued that the Contract Clause protected the sanctity of vested
contract rights 285 and that the economic depression represented a
cyclical event of limited duration.2" 6 Essentially, the mortgagee
narrowly confined the concept of emergency to natural disasters
and construed public welfare in ways that excluded notions of public convenience and economic prosperity. Thus, the statute unreasonably and arbitrarily changed the terms of contract performance
when it extended the redemption period and delayed the mortgagee's complete control over realty purchased at the foreclosure sale
the previous year.28 7 Further, the moratorium law circumvented
the remedy of foreclosure sale by advertisement that the parties had
agreed upon in the original mortgage. 28 This, the mortgagee believed, made the remedy worthless and rendered the performance of
the contract entirely dependent upon a "court's conception of the
2 9
respective stations of the parties.

In contrast, the mortgagors claimed that rampant foreclosure
sales caused substantial depreciation in real estate values that probined their Due Process and Contract Clause arguments because of their "close
connection." Appellant's Brief at 23, Blaisdell (No. 370); Appellees' Brief at 4, Blaisdell (No. 370). The Equal Protection issue comprised a relatively insignificant part of
the case and is beyond the scope of this Article.
285 Appellant's Brief explains how the statute prevented title to the foreclosed property from absolutely vesting in the mortgagee on May 2, 1933, as contemplated by the
terms of the mortgage. Appellant's Brief at 26-27, Blaisdell (No. 370).
286 Id. at 28-29. The reference to the cyclical characteristics of the Depression actually comes from Justice Olsen of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Olsen stated that the
mortgagee claimed that "financial and business crises are recurring events and to be
anticipated" in contrast with a true emergency "arising from some extraordinary and
unexpected catastrophe, such as floods, earthquakes, and other disturbances in nature."
Blaisdell, 249 N.W. at 340 (Olsen, J., concurring).
287 Appellant's Brief at 7, 11-18, 26-27, Blaisdell (No. 370). The mortgagee-appellant argued before the United State's Supreme Court that the statute prevented it from
receiving title to the property in fee simple absolute on May 2, 1933. Instead, the mortgagee received "merely a defeasible title, subject to redemption at any time during the
additional two-year period by the mortgagors." Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 404. Moreover,
the statute delayed any suits for deficiency judgments. Appellant's Brief at 15, Blaisdell
(No. 370).
288 The appellant-mortgagee included this remedy within the underlying contract obligation. Appellant's Brief at 26, Blaisdell (No. 370).
28 9
Id. at 14.
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longed the financial depression and produced civil unrest. An economic and social emergency existed that authorized the state to
suspend the literal performance of mortgage agreements.2 9 While
the mortgagors conceded that the moratorium would violate the
Contract Clause in normal times, they argued that the parties executed the mortgage subject to an implied condition that Minnesota
could impair its obligation through the reasonable exercise of local
police powers during an emergency. 291 Extension of the redemption period was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable because it allowed the mortgagors to remain in possession of the realty until the
economy improved and the market value of the property increased.2 92 From this perspective, the mortgagors advanced a
broad conception of public welfare that permitted the state to use its
police powers to maintain "the general distribution . . . of a fair
proportion of the wealth."29' 3 Consequently, their argument drew
upon the line of Contract Clause cases that included promotion of
public comfort, convenience, and economic prosperity within the
ambit of inalienable state police powers.294
B.

The Blaisdell Decision

To best understand Blaisdell one should examine the decision in
light of its three component parts. At the core of Hughes's opinion
lay recognition of the close connection between the concepts of
emergency and constitutional limitations. From this level, he proceeded to articulate the notion of a public interest in private contracts. Consequently, he explained the rationale for permitting a
state to enact its police powers to alleviate the effects of an economic emergency. However, Hughes did not intend to craft a radical decision that seemingly jeopardized the sanctity of contract
obligations. 29 5 Therefore, he limited the more bold implications of
the case by invoking a test of reasonableness that compromised between contrasting theories of Contract Clause jurisprudence. Ultimately, this third component
highlighted the inherent
contradictions of Hughes's opinion. Yet, in retrospect it reveals the
importance of assessing questions of Contract Clause interpretation
Appellees' Brief at 5-8, 25 Blaisdell (No. 370).
Id. at 4, 11, 36.
292 Id. at 3, 8. The mortgagors-appellees claimed that the statute benefitted both the
mortgagors and the mortgagee.
293 Id. at 24.
294 See supra notes 144-59 and accompanying text.
295 See Maidment, supra note 162, at 324-25.
290
291
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within a larger context. Indeed, tensions within the federal system
over the appropriate boundaries of state regulation of contract performance invariably emerge in Contract Clause problems.
1. Emergency and ConstitutionalInterpretation
By the margin of a single vote, the United States Supreme Court
sustained the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act 296 as a reasonable exercise of police powers in an emergency.2 97 Unlike the court
below, the Justices who comprised the majority, did not expressly
rule that the Act impaired the obligation of a mortgage contract.2 9 s
Instead, they held that the parties executed their agreement subject
to Minnesota's reserved police powers to promote the public welfare
during an economic emergency. 299 For this reason, the moratorium
law did not violate the Contract Clause. Hughes infused the majority opinion with his own notions of governmental authority, federalism, and constitutional interpretation. However, Justices Stone and
Cardozo made significant contributions; their criticisms of earlier
drafts honed the final product's Contract Clause analysis and clarified its assertions about the public interest in private contracts. In
contrast, Justice Sutherland's dissent focused on the nature of constitutional limitations and the obligation of contracts. 3"
For Hughes the dispute really involved the extent to which states
could exercise their police powers in an emergency. While the Constitution did not address the concept of emergency, 30' the Supreme
Court had, on occasion, recognized the authority of local governments to employ their police powers during periods of crisis in ways
that would otherwise exceed their constitutional limitations.30 2 For
example, in the Rent Cases, a divided Court upheld municipal reguCh. 339, 1933 Minn. Laws 514.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444-48. The five justices in the majority were: Chief Justice
Hughes, Louis D. Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, Owen J. Roberts, and Harlan F. Stone.
In dissent were Pierce Butler, William McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis
VanDevanter.
298 See Blaisdell, 249 N.W. at 335, 338.
299 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444.
300 Id. at 448-83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
301 Perlman, supra note 33, at 780-81. The mortgage cases of the nineteenth century
did not discuss this point. Id. at 780.
302 A few years before Blaisdell, Hughes wrote:
The Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature may meet public emergencies by action that ordinarily would go beyond its constitutional authority.
This principle is not limited to military exigencies in the theater of war, or to
the extraordinary requirements of some great public calamity. Less grave, but
unusual and urgent conditions, may justify temporary expedients.
296
297
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lations that sought to alleviate the short term effects of housing
shortages by modifying the terms of residential apartment leases.
The majority sustained these laws as constitutional because landlords and tenants executed their rental agreements subject to the
reserved police powers of local governments during times of emergency.3 °3 In essence, crisis temporarily suspended the restrictions
of the Due Process and Contract Clauses upon local authority to
promote the public welfare.
Hughes endorsed this approach in Blaisdell and quickly concluded that widespread mortgage foreclosures and the depreciation
of real estate values comprised an emergency that compelled the
state to act on behalf of the public interest. The Minnesota law did
not conflict with the Contract Clause prohibition because it represented the exercise of reasonable police powers during an economic
emergency. 3°4 As Hughes understood the Rent Cases, the situation
in Minnesota permitted local authorities considerable latitude under
the Constitution. Once the crisis passed, the state could no longer
abridge private vested contract rights.3" 5 With the Contract Clause
in mind, he stated: "Emergency does not create power. Emergency
does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved." 3 6 However,
"emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.''3°7
HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 189, at 222-23.
Before the Rent Cases, the United States Supreme Court discussed the concept of
emergency peripherally: "It is the emergency that gives the right and the emergency
must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified." Mitchell v. Harmony, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134 (1851). Later, in the Legal Tender Cases, the Court stated: "If
•. .Congress has no constitutional power, under any circumstances, or in any emergency, to make treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of all debts ... the government is without those means of self-preservation which, all must admit, may, in certain
contingencies, become indispensable ...." The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457, 529 (1870).
303 See Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922); Marcus Brown Holding Co.
v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
304 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434-44. In fact, Hughes insisted that the Depression constituted the type of public calamity that mandated the reasonable exercise of local police
powers to alleviate its consequences. Under these circumstances no conflict existed between the Contract Clause and state action. Id. at 439.
305 Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547-48 (1923) (ruling that a court can
always inquire about the continued existence of an emergency); Wilson v. New, 243
U.S. 332, 348 (1917) (holding that Congress may establish temporary wage regulations
in the wake of a nationwide rail strike).
306 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 425.
307 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426. Compare with the statement of Judge Roscoe Pound
in the New York rent law case, People ex rel. Durham Realty Co. v. La Fetra, 130 N.E.
601, 606 (N.Y.) ("[An emergency may afford a reason for putting forth a latent governHeinOnline -- 72 Or. L. Rev. 579 1993
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Such statements manifest Hughes's primary concern of maintaining a balance between private contract rights and state authority
to advance the public interest.3" 8 While he realized constitutional
limitations existed to protect private contract and property rights,
he also acknowledged the importance of local government in making those same rights worthwhile and secure.30 9 Thus, the Contract
Clause did not necessarily prohibit all state action. In fact, Hughes
perceived the potential to reconcile state police powers with the
overriding objectives of a constitutional system that allocated governmental authority.3 10 Indeed, many of his earlier Due Process
opinions recognized the coexistence of local police powers and constitutional restrictions. 3 1 ' Not surpisingly, his conception of emergency reflected his conviction that the federal system encouraged
responsible activity by local governments within the parameters of
state and local constitutions. 3 12 All of the justices in the Blaisdell
majority interpreted the Constitution in a flexible and pragmatic
manner. In particular, the opinion bore the influence of Hughes's
constitutional views. Insofar as he sustained Minnesota's authority
to enact emergency relief for its mortgagors, he construed the Contract Clause prohibition narrowly and refused to ascribe meaning to
its text in ways inconsistent with the practical tenets of
federalism.3 13
mental power already enjoyed but not previously exercised."), writ of error dismissed
sub nom. New York ex rel. Brixton Operating Corp. v. La Fetra, 257 U.S. 665 (1921).
308 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 439. Hughes commented:
Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with the
fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserved power
cannot be construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be
construed to destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects. They must be
construed in harmony with each other.
For a discussion of Hughes's attempts to balance private rights and the public interest,
see HENDEL, supra note 201, at 6, 65; WHITE, supra note 209, at 208.
309 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 435 ("The policy of protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations
are worth while,-a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
and good order of society."); see also HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 189,
at 206.
310 1 PUSEY, supra note 163, at 308, 312; 2 PUSEY, supra note 163, at 703.
311 See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911) (sustaining
an Iowa law that prohibited contracts between railway companies and their employees
limiting the liability of the railways for injuries sustained in the course of workers'
employment).
312 See Address at Faneuil Hall, supra note 164; Washington's Birthday Address,
supra note 170, at 286-87; 1 PUSEY, supra note 163, at 308.
313 Ostensibly, Hughes sought to analyze the issues in this case from a neutral perspective, focusing only upon questions of power and not the particular wisdom of the
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Eighteen months before he wrote the majority opinion, Hughes
spoke about judicial review to members of the federal judiciary in
Asheville, North Carolina. In this speech he cautioned jurists about
the dangers of assessing constitutional provisions "in a narrow,
technical spirit" devoid of "recognition of appropriate State power
as well as Federal power." ' 4 Hughes believed the federal system
allowed states the freedom "to meet local needs" and made possible
"opportunities for experimentation and progress." 3 ' Constitutional limitations curtailed the exercise of "arbitrary power" and
helped preserve the series of balances extant between state and local
governments and between the public interest and private rights.3" 6
Accordingly, Hughes implored the judges to assess constitutional
issues in a manner consistent with the objectives of the federal
system:
We should be faithless to our supreme obligation if we interpreted the great generalities of the Constitution so as to forbid
flexibility in making adaptations to meet new conditions, and to
prevent the correction of new abuses incident to the complexity
of our life, or as crystallizing our own notions of policy, our personal views of
economics and our theories of moral or social
31 7
improvement.

Critical of rigid and sterile interpretation, he nevertheless urged his
audience to heed the fundamental purpose of constitutional limitations. In essence, he saw the Constitution as a dynamic instrument
that established guidelines for the structure of government and the
exercise of power. Extreme construction of its provisions, while
consistent with the political, economic, and social beliefs of the interpreter, jeopardized the fragile balance between private rights and
community interests that characterized the nature of the Constitution. Instead, the jurist's principal task lay in dispassionate, objective application of constitutional principles to the myriad problems
of an evolving and complex society.3 1 8
Minnesota law. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 425, 447-48. Hughes often articulated the view
that judges should interpret neither legal issues nor constitutional provisions in ways
that advanced their personal notions of economic and social policy. Fourth Circuit
Address, supra note 218. Yet, he admitted the difficulty of this task. Id. An argument
exists that he went too far in this case. Epstein, supra note 7, at 736-38.
314 Fourth Circuit Address, supra note 218.
315

Id.

316 Id.

Id.
318 Id.; cf. Harvard Address, supra note 169, at 6 ("How to protect the individual in
his personal rights and at the same time safeguard the community, is a problem not
solved by forms of words, even in written constitutions.").
317
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Insofar as Hughes's Asheville comments foreshadowed his constitutional methodology in Blaisdell, they paralleled his notions of
statutory construction. Deferential to the legislative process, he
characterized it as evolutionary and noted its gradual exclusion of
some ideas and incorporation of others in keeping with the changing needs of the body politic.3 1 9 Judicial review thus meant appraisal limited to questions of legislative power exclusive of
considerations concerning the wisdom or propriety of legislative
policy.3 2° Moreover, courts erred when they interpreted statutory
provisions "in a technical spirit.

.

. [that] ...

sacrifice[d] the grow-

32
ing substance of the law to a lifeless formalism."1 '
Consequently, Hughes thought the Minnesota mortgage moratorium did not necessarily violate the Contract Clause. Though he
noted that the clause specifically prevented states from coining
money, emitting credit, or passing ex post facto laws, he construed
its prohibition of state laws that impaired the obligation of contracts
differently. This provision, he insisted, must be viewed in the con-

text of "constitutional grants and limitations of power ...

set forth

in general clauses. "322 As such, the Contract Clause only prescribed a general limitation of state power over private agreements
and not "an absolute one ... to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula.

323

While entirely consistent with his own views and those of the
other justices in the majority, this mode of constitutional analysis
appalled the dissenters, all of whom believed in the sanctity of
vested contract rights and the immutability of constitutional limitations. Justice Sutherland opposed any "inroads" upon the scope of
the Contract Clause for fear that they signified "gradual but everadvancing encroachments upon the sanctity of private and public
contracts.

'3 24

Moreover, he noted the historical circumstances that

prompted the creation of a constitutional prohibition of state impairment of contract obligations: the proliferation of debtor relief
laws that jeopardized the nation's political, economic, and social
319 New York Bar Association Address, supra
320 Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S.
COURT, supra note 189, at 37-38; ABA Address,
321 New York Bar Association Address, supra
322 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426.
323

note 181, at 17-18.

549 (1911);

Id. at 428.

3241Id.

HUGHES, THE SUPREME

supra note 164, at 4.
note 181, at 19.

at 448 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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stability after the Revolution.3 2 5 Reluctant to acknowledge the potential of local government to regulate private rights in the public
interest, Sutherland insisted that the security of contract obligations
emanated from constitutional limitations on state power. From this
perspective he perceived the mortgage moratorium as a threat to
individual freedom and detrimental to vested contract rights. He
admonished that notwithstanding the severity of the Depression,
the Contract Clause could "not mean one thing at one time and an
entirely different thing at another."32' 6 Such disparate interpretations would diminish the value of contracts and imperil the federal
system.
Though Sutherland, like Hughes, refrained from assessing the
wisdom of the Minnesota law, he found no reason to uphold it as a
reasonable exercise of state police powers during an emergency. Its
extension of the mortgagors' redemption period impaired the underlying mortgage obligation. Neither the variants of public opinion
nor the vicissitudes of the economy sanctioned the lessening of limitations upon local government in wielding its authority over private
contract rights.3 27
Had Blaisdell come before the Court of William Howard Taft,
Hughes's predecessor as Chief Justice, a majority of the Court
would probably have accepted Sutherland's ideas about original intent and constitutional limitations. But during the 1930s the com325 Id. at 453-57, 465; cf. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354-56 (1827)
(Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
326 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 449 (wherein Sutherland stressed that it was precisely because of the similarity between the Depression and the historical circumstances surrounding the creation of the Contract Clause that the Court should not modify the
scope of its intended prohibition); see also id. at 483 ("If the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well be
abandoned.").
327 Id. at 449, 452-53. To this extent, Sutherland quoted Thomas Cooley's treatise:
"The meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not different at
any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass upon it." Id. at 452-53 (quoting
THOMAS COOLEY & WALTER CARRINGTON, I CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 124
(8th ed. 1927)). Cooley had been Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court in the
latter half of the nineteenth century. He also taught Sutherland law at the University of
Michigan. His constitutional philosophy influenced Sutherland and other conservative
jurists. See ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 362
(1956) (arguing that Sutherland viewed the Constitution as a set of limitations and not
as a grant of state powers); JOEL F. PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN
AGAINST THE STATE 16-20 (1951) (discussing Sutherland's constitutional philosphy
and Cooley's influence upon its development); Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late
Nineteenth-CenturyConstitutional Thought, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1431, 1502-10 (discussing Cooley's constitutional jurisprudence).
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position of the bench gradually changed as Hughes, Owen Roberts
and Benjamin Cardozo replaced some of the more conservative jurists.

3 28

Of the newcomers, Roberts had the least influential consti-

tutional views; however, both Hughes and Cardozo often applied
the meaning of constitutional provisions in ways consistent with
progressive notions of government. Together with Justices Stone
and Brandeis, and to a lesser extent, Roberts, Hughes and Cardozo
implicitly rejected an interpretation of the Contract Clause based
upon the natural law assumptions of its draftsmen.
In reviewing Hughes's draft of the Blaisdell majority opinion,
Stone in particular, emphasized the pitfalls of analyzing the clause
solely from the perspective of the constitutional framers, many of
whom he noted were men of considerable property who probably
sympathized with the plight of creditors during the post-Revolutionary era. 3 29 Thus, the framers created a provision that curtailed
328 Hughes replaced Taft as Chief Justice on February 1, 1930. Roberts replaced
Edward T. Sanford that same year. Cardozo replaced Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1932.
By 1934, Hughes, Roberts, and Cardozo formed a fairly solid voting block with the
more progressive holdover members of the Taft Court, Harlan F. Stone and Louis D.
Brandeis. The substitution of the energetic Cardozo for the ninety-one year old Holmes
helped shift the balance within the Court toward the more progressive jurisprudence of
Stone and Brandeis and away from the conservative philosphies of Taft holdovers such
as Sutherland and McReynolds. Though not liberal per se, the Court of the early 1930s
exhibited more tolerance than it had under Taft toward state economic regulation and
local police powers. One historian characterized the Court from 1930 to 1937 as an
"uneasy compromise between the laissez-faire and the social welfare conceptions of the
state." HENDEL, supra note 201, at 136.
329 Notes of Justice Harlan F. Stone on Blaisdell, para. 4 (1933) (available in Stone
Papers at Library of Congress). Paragraph 4 of the notes states, in part:
The framers of the Constitution undoubtedly had legislation of this type in
mind. But the framers represented a class, and the Constitution itself was
submitted only to conventions which were chosen by an electorate limited by
heavy property qualifications. Our ideas of interests worthy of protection, and
of the voice in government which various interests are to have, have undergone much change since 1789. It would be reducing the Constitution to the
state of a penal law or an ordinary statute to hold that the intent of a handful
of aristocrats in 1789 should be binding upon the society found in Minnesota
today.
See also Memorandum from Justice Harlan F. Stone to Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes 3 (Dec. 13, 1933) (available in Stone Papers at Library of Congress); cf.
CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 73-151 (Free Press 1986) (1913) (arguing that the constitutional framers comprised the creditor class and thus sought to create a governmental system that
protected their interests in property and contracts). A Columbia University history
professor, Beard was a former colleague of Stone when the latter taught at Columbia
Law School twenty years before Blaisdell. While on the Court, Stone occasionally corresponded with Beard about points of constitutional history. MASON, supra note 327,
at 410-11. Nevertheless, there is no evidence Stone conferred with Beard about this case
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the opportunities for states to abridge contract rights. Hughes
omitted this rationale from the final version of the majority opinion,
in all probability because of its radical overtones and his distaste for
controversy. 3 ° Yet, it appears he agreed with Stone given the opinion's emphasis upon governmental authority to promote the public
welfare during an emergency.
In Hughes's view, the critical question before the Court involved
the constitutional limitations placed upon a state's ability to preserve the prosperity and security of its citizens during a period of
acute financial, economic, and social crisis. Previous Supreme
Court decisions upheld governmental interference with contracts
that affected local health, morals, and safety on the basis that states
possessed inalienable police powers to promote the public welfare. 33 A few cases extended this concept of welfare to include notions of comfort, convenience, and economic prosperity, although
considerable disagreement arose over the legitimacy of these latter
objectives.33 2 Often, the debate reflected much larger concerns over
despite the striking similarity of their ideas. In any event, it would appear Beard's
conclusions about the constitutional framers influenced Stone.
Before the Court issued its decision in Blaisdell, Stone reviewed a draft of Hughes's
opinion with dismay. Critical of its structure and concerned that the Chief Justice inadequately explained the economic and constitutional dimensions of the mortgage problem, Stone wrote a memorandum to Hughes summarizing his perceptions of the
opinion's weaknesses and suggesting additional points to include. Apparently in preparation for this memorandum, and perhaps with the intention of writing a concurring
opinion, Stone with the assistance of his law clerk, Howard C. Westwood, compiled
some notes that discussed in more depth than Hughes's initial opinion the following: 1)
the economic basis of mortgage moratoria; 2) the fallacy of relying solely upon the
original intent of the constitutional framers to ascertain the meaning of the Contract
Clause and its application to the Depression; 3) the nature of legislation and; 4) the
growing importance of local police powers in the federal system. Notes of Justice Stone,
supra. For a general discussion of these notes and of Stone's misgivings about even the
final draft of Hughes's opinion, see MASON, supra note 327, at 365.
330
See WHITE, supra note 209, at 213. Hughes may also have seen the notes upon
which Stone relied in preparing his memorandum. However, it is also possible that
Stone raised this point in the Justices' conference about the case.
331 See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914); Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
332 See Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh,
256 U.S. 135 (1921); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U.S. 372
(1919); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911), Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
Justice Stone thought Blaisdell did not represent a fundamental departure from the
Rent Cases in its recognition of the reasonable exercise of state police powers as a limitation upon the scope of the Contract Clause. See Memorandum of Gertrude Jenkins,
Secretary to Justice Stone, regarding Blaisdell (1933) (available in Stone Papers at Library of Congress); Memorandum from Stone to Hughes, supra note 329, at 3; Notes of
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the appropriate role of state governments within the federal system
and the extent to which the Constitution protected rights of property and contracts from local regulation in the public interest.
2.

The Public Interest in Private Contracts

In Blaisdell, Hughes asserted: "The economic interests of the
State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding the interference with contracts." 3'33
Moreover, he flatly refused to invoke the Contract Clause as an instrument to "throttle the capacity" of Minnesota to protect its fundamental interests. 33
Consequently, his opinion recognized
economic prosperity as an integral part of public welfare and that
its protection lay within the fundamental attributes of Minnesota's
sovereign powers. Additionally, Hughes emphasized that within
private contracts inhered a significant public interest in the maintenance of optimal conditions for individual opportunity and the collective good.33 5 In this respect, the opinion revealed his
longstanding beliefs about government and the federal system.
However, the Chief Justice remained concerned about the sanctity of contract obligations. Insofar as his opinion construed the
Contract Clause "in harmony with the essential reserved power of
the States to protect the security of their peoples,"3'36 it also showed
his willingness to balance private rights and the public interest. One
cannot understand the rationale for upholding the constitutionality
of the mortgage moratorium without reference to his conviction
that "[t]he policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which conJustice Stone, supra note 329; see also MASON, supra note 327, at 365; WRIGHT, supra
note 7, at 112; Prosser, supra note 243, at 368.
333 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 437.
334 Id. at 444.
335 Id.
In fact, Hughes commented that "the question is no longer merely that of one
party to a contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard
the economic structure upon which the good of all depends." Id. at 442. In addition,
Hughes asserted: "Not only are exisiting laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order." Id. at 435; see also
id.at 439.
Before Blaisdell, other progressive legal thinkers had stated their belief that a public
interest exists in private contracts. See, e.g., MORRIS COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL
ORDER 78 (1933); Feller, supra note 250, at 1061 ("The complicated credit economy of
our day is built on a foundation of public confidence, the cement of which is the system
of legal rules relating to private rights.").
336 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 443: see also id. at 435.
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tractual relations are worth while,-a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of
society.,

3 7
1

Essentially, Hughes believed that without the occasional intercession of governmental authority, one person's rights would become
susceptible to encroachment by others, who by virtue of their absolute freedom might exercise their private interests in ways detrimental to some individuals and to the public at large. In a speech before
the American Bar Association nearly a decade earlier he remarked:
There is the greater danger as the complexities of society increasingly demand that the range of personal volition be limited
by law in the interest of liberty itself. We are compelled to lay
stress on restraints in the view that the liberty which permits
freedom of action would be a barren privilege if it did not also
connote freedom from injurious action by others .... 338
Through the exercise of police powers, state and municipal governments could enhance the collective security of private rights and
help maintain the concept of ordered liberty essential to "safeguard
individual opportunity and initiative.

' 339

To the extent regulations

existed, therefore, they did so "to prevent the liberty of some from
accomplishing the enthralldom of all.

'3 °

Hughes understood the creative potential of local authority to resolve the intricate social and economic problems of a diverse, interdependent society. The federal system, with its limitations upon
state power, did not necessarily restrict "the right of each community to be its own master" in the affairs which primarily affected
it. 34 ' Instead, it provided the opportunity for local action that
337
338

Id. at 435.
ABA Address, supra note 164, at 7.

supra note 168, at 20.
Id. at 13. But see The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553-54 (1871)
(upholding the validity of Legal Tender Acts that authorized paper money during the
Civil War and overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (Wall.) 603 (1870)). In relevant part, the concurrence remarked:
Is it worse for the creditor to lose a little by depreciation than everything by
the bankruptcy of his debtor? . . . All property and all rights, even those of
liberty and life, are held subject to the fundamental condition of being liable to
be impaired by providential calamities and national vicissitudes ....
There are
times when the exigencies of the state rightly absorb all subordinate considerations of private interest, convenience, or feeling ....
Instead of being a violation of such obligation, it merely subjects it to one of those conditions under
which it is held and enjoyed.
Id. at 564-65 (Bradley, J., concurring). This remark anticipated Hughes's own observations about the public interest in private contracts.
341 Address at Faneuil Hall, supra note 164. For the most part, Hughes believed that
339 HUGHES, CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS,
340
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would benefit the interests of all. In Minnesota, the national government had done relatively little to alleviate the severe financial
burdens placed upon mortgagors during the Depression, leaving
only the state and its municipalities as the logical authorities to resolve matters. Statutory extension of the Blaisdells' period in which
to redeem their property from the permanent possession of their
creditor, therefore, represented the responsible action of local government over the interests of all its citizens.
Unlike Sutherland, Hughes implicitly trusted local government
to protect the property and contract rights of individuals. Increasingly complex tensions within an interdependent modem society periodically necessitated the use of public authority to alleviate
economic and social problems that threatened to disrupt the fragile
balance between personal freedom and collective security. The
moratorium only suspended the operation of a mortgage provision
that transferred ownership of foreclosed realty involuntarily sold.
It did not discharge the underlying mortgage obligation. Further, it
protected the interests of both the mortgagor and mortgagee in a
depressed economy and helped maintain a semblance of order
within Minnesota.3 42
Months before the Blaisdell decision, Harvard law professor
A.H. Feller wrote an influential law review article in which he suggested the basis for holding mortgage moratoria legislation constitutional. One reason he gave was primarily historical: since ancient
Greece, governments had used moratoria to stay debts during periods of economic crisis and thus prevent the social and economic
unrest produced by strict performance of contract obligations.3 43
the Constitution created a federal system that accorded "ample power ... for the national and for state governments to carry out their functions in a changing world, with
no stultifying vacuum between them." 1 PUSEY, supra note 163, at 308. Indeed, on at
least one occasion Hughes dissented from a Court decision that he believed hindered the
ability of states to act for the public welfare in the absence of congressional action. See
Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587, 618-31 (1936) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that New York's minimum wage law for women should override freedom of contract as it represented the legitimate police power objectives of the state to promote fair
wages for women). One historian contends that Hughes dissented because he thought
the Court's decision invalidating this law "created a dangerous power vacuum" that
prohibited New York from acting to alleviate a serious economic problem that the federal government had not yet addressed. 2 PUSEY, supra note 163, at 701.
342 Blaisdell , 290 U.S. at 425, 444; see HENDEL, supra note 201, at 181 (referring to
Hughes's concern with the social chaos that precipitated the Minnesota law).
343 Feller, supra note 250, at 1061-65. Indeed, "[t]he purpose of a moratorium is not
to destroy rights altogether, but rather to postpone their enforcement until after the
emergency." Id. at 1070.
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By analogy, a similar situation occurred in Minnesota, where
months before the passage of the Mortgage Moratorium Act, mortgagors rioted and prevented county sheriffs from conducting foreclosure sales. Strict adherence to the foreclosure provisions of
mortgages threatened to hasten the collapse of the local economy,
much of which depended upon the availability of credit. 344 Hughes
could have used this rationale to explain more clearly that the Minnesota statute helped preserve the long term value of the mortgagee's contract rights and thus comprised a legitimate exercise of the
3 45
state's police powers to promote the public welfare.
. At the time of the Contract Clause's creation, the concept
of gov34
6
ernmental police powers remained inchoate.
Luther Martin's initial criticism of the clause suggested that its breadth might infringe
upon some residuum of state power.34 7 Later, this idea became the
basis for the theoretical distinction between contract rights and
remedies used by the Marshall Court in assessing questions of contract impairment. While somewhat illusory in application, this theory made clear that both the obligations and the remedies of
contracts emanated primarily from local law and not from the will
of the parties alone.3 41 Thereafter, the doctrines of reserved and
inalienable state police powers created significant additional inroads
344 Id. at 1061, 1074. In fact, Feller suggested several months before Blaisdell that
moratorium legislation of finite duration might provide flexibility and preserve the basic
economic structure during the Depression. Id. at 1074.
345 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444-46 & n.16; see also Memorandum from Stone to
Hughes, supra note 329, at 2-4. Stone realized more clearly than Hughes that most
mortgagees were wealthy, retired farmers primarily interested in a return on their investments. They did not want to repossess foreclosed property. Therefore, to the extent
the statute delayed their rights of repossession, it actually forced them to wait until the
market improved to regain possession of foreclosed realty. Hence, both mortgagors and
mortgagees benefitted, as the mortgagors received extended opportunities to retire their
debts while the mortgagees averted selling realty in a depressed market. At worst, the
mortgagees received in two years property more close in value to the amount of their
original investments. See Notes of Justice Stone, supra note 329, at paras. 1, 3, 7 (containing the agricultural department figures and other information upon which Hughes
apparently relied for his assertion about the characteristics of mortgagees in
Minnesota).
346 Perlman, supra note 33, at 780-82.
347 Hynning, supra note 33, at 190. See supra notes 30, 33-34 and accompanying
text.
348 See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 282-83 (1827) (Johnson, J.,
seriatim opinion). In W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1934), Justice
Cardozo characterized the rights/remedies distinction as obscure. Similarly, Stone believed the distinction "confusing and, to some extent obscures the point with which we
have to deal in the present case." Memorandum from Stone to Hughes, supra note 329,
at 2.

HeinOnline -- 72 Or. L. Rev. 589 1993

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72, 19931

upon the scope of the Contract Clause prohibition, as the Court
recognized the pervasive influence of local government upon the
formation and enforcement of contracts. In part, this emphasis
upon the public interest in contracts arose in response to the social
and economic changes produced by a diverse, interdependent economy. Had Hughes more carefully analyzed the Minnesota legislation from this constitutional context, he could have probably
clarified the ambiguities of his more sweeping statements about the
police powers.
The opinion's most bold points may actually have reflected the
views of other members of the majority besides the Chief Justice.
For example, in two different places Hughes referred to "a growing
recognition of public needs" in his discussion of the relationship
between the public interest and private contracts.3 4 9While this observation was certainly consistent with his own notions of government, it also was the phrase used by Justice Cardozo in his draft
concurring opinion, which Cardozo did not publish when Hughes
adopted his points about constitutional intepretation and the public
interest in private contracts.35 °
More outspoken than either Hughes or Cardozo was Justice
Harlan Stone, whose personal notes emphasized the reasons for in349 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442-44.

350 Id. at 442-43. Cardozo also anticipated Hughes's discussion of public interest
when he remarked nearly a dozen years earlier about the Court's growing appreciation
of public needs. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 82
(1921); Robert B. Shapiro, Recent Case, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 642 (1934); see also
Benjamin Cardozo, Draft of Blaisdell Concurring Opinion at 3 (1933) (available in Cardozo Papers at Library of Congress).
It is possible Hughes's discussion of state police powers may have been partially influenced by Brandeis's dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 302-04
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See F. H. Weitzel, Note, Mortgage Moratorium Statute Sustained by Supreme Court, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 486 (1934). In Liebmann,
Brandeis urged deference to Oklahoma legislation regulating the production and distribution of ice because of the state's broad police powers in matters pertaining to the
public interest. He also noted the state interest in preserving the availability of ice in
drought conditions. Stone joined in this dissent. Hughes, however, was part of the
majority, which, per Justice Sutherland, stressed the due process right to operate an
ordinary private business free from governmental restriction the objective of which was
to implement experimental social and economic policies. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 286.
"Hughes himself thought the case was near the border line." 2 PUSEY, supra note 163,
at 698. While generally supportive of local police powers and state economic regulation, Hughes was more moderate in his views than Brandeis, Cardozo and Stone. See
Robert H. Jackson, The JudicialCareerof Chief Justice Hughes, 27 A.B.A. J. 408 (July
1941); F.D.G. Ribble, The ConstitutionalDoctrines of ChiefJustice Hughes, 41 COLUM.
L. REV. 1190, 1206 (1941). Unlike Liebmann, Blaisdell presented a more urgent need
to sanction state police powers.
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creased local governmental regulation of private agreements. In
particular, he wrote: "the welfare of masses of individuals are subject to the economic control of fewer and fewer individuals through
the medium of contract ...the interest of the State in that medium

must necessarily be far greater than in days when that medium had
no such far reaching consequences." '' Hughes incorporated this
rationale into his own theory of police powers:
The settlement and consequent contraction of the public domain,
the pressure of a constantly increasing density of population, the
interrelation of the activities of our people and the complexity of
our economic interests, have inevitably led to an increased use of
the organization of society in order to protect the very bases of
individual opportunity.3 52
Thus, it would appear that much of the tone of Hughes's opinion,
and perhaps some of its substance, derived from the collaborative
efforts of the justices in the majority.
In retrospect, this is not surprising, given Hughes's penchant for
creating consensus on important constitutional questions, though
even he must have known that Sutherland and the other apostles of
strict constitutional limitation would dissent from any ruling that
seemingly constrained the reach of the Contract Clause prohibition.
This left the Chief Justice with Stone, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Roberts to support his general views of the case. In return for their
support, he fashioned an opinion that melded their ideas with his
own.
3.

The Limitation of Reasonableness

Despite its broad implications, the Blaisdell decision was actually
quite narrow. It limited in two significant ways the extent to which
state police powers could modify the terms of private agreements.
First, the Court explicitly restricted its expansive interpretation of
state police powers to emergency situations, and so did not proclaim
a general assault upon the Contract Clause protection of vested contract rights. Second, the Court imposed a standard of reasonableness upon state interference with the terms of private contracts.
Notwithstanding the existence of a bona fide emergency, the state
could only abridge vested contract rights through the reasonable
exercise of its police powers. Unreasonable assertions of local governmental authority impaired the performance of contracts within
351
352

Notes of Justice Stone, supra note 329, at para. 5.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442.
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the meaning of the Contract Clause and signified the type of arbitrary power detrimental to the security of individuals and society
alike.3 53 In part, this limitation reflected the pragmatic jurisprudence of Hughes, who crafted an opinion that sought to balance
private contract interests with those of the public in maintaining a
viable economic and social structure. However, it also derived from
the rationale of early Contract Clause cases that applied a test of
reasonableness in distinguishing between permissible state interference with contract remedies and impermissible abridgement of contract rights.3 54 Later cases also assessed the scope of state police
powers from a similar perspective, as the Court expanded the scope
of public welfare in disputes involving both the Due Process and
Contract Clauses.
Though neither Justices William Johnson nor John McLean,
early proponents of the rights/remedies distinction, expressly designated their approach as one of reasonableness, their recognition of
the close relationship between local governmental power and the
nature of contract obligations made possible a mode of Contract
Clause interpretation that balanced the public and private rights in
contracts. Once the Court adopted a functional analysis of questions of impairment,3 5 it began to examine both the quality and
quantity of state interference with the performance of contracts.
Thus, the rights/remedies distinction necessitated inquiry into the
nature and duration of such impairment. Where state laws modified the terms of public and private agreements for periods of infinite duration or in an arbitrary manner, the Court invariably
characterized the interference as one with contract rights in contravention of the Contract Clause. On the other hand, less intrusive
alterations of contract terms often withstood constitutional scrutiny
as mere changes in contract remedies.3 56
By the 1930s a series of decisions on state police powers addressed the relationship between legislative means and objectives.
The Court avoided direct inquiry into the wisdom of laws enacted
for the public welfare that affected contract provisions. Instead, it
353

See id. at 445-47.

354See, e.g., Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 775 (1882) ("In all such cases the

question becomes, therefore, one of reasonableness, and of that the legislature is primarily the judge.").
355 For a general discussion of the mechanics of Supreme Court Contract Clause
analysis, see Epstein, supra note 7; Note, A Process-OrientedApproach to the Contract
Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623 (1980).
356 See supra notes 95, 258 and accompanying text.
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examined the manner of local interference with vested contract
rights as it considered the nexus between public purpose and legislative methods. Hughes appreciated this subtle distinction and remarked in Blaisdell that "[t]he question is not whether the
legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end
and the7 measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that
35

end."

Given his views of the federal system and state police powers, the
Chief Justice concluded that a mortgage moratorium comprised a
reasonable means for the state to preserve the economic security of
all parties to a mortgage agreement. By implicitly recognizing the
inherent public interest in private contracts, Hughes could not assess the provisions of the Minnesota law without reference to the
circumstances that prompted its passage. For this reason he refused
to construe the contract rights of the mortgagee in the abstract.
The Minnesota law attempted to alleviate the harsh consequences of
real estate foreclosure in a depressed market. Strict compliance
with the terms of mortgage contracts would certainly harm mortgage debtors and jeopardize the stability of land values. Alternatively, legislation that merely delayed the mortgagees' remedies and
enabled mortgagors to redeem their debts would probably inure to
the benefit of all. Essentially, the Minnesota law was reasonable
because it protected the interests of both mortgagors and mortgagees during an economic crisis for a limited period of time. 5
Unlike the court below, Hughes insisted that the mortgage moratorium law did not impair the obligation of a private contract because it did not discharge the Blaisdells' underlying mortgage
debt.359 Under the act, the Blaisdells petitioned a state circuit court
for equitable relief prior to the expiration of the redemption period
provided in their mortgage agreement. The court only extended
their redemption period upon the condition that the Blaisdells pay
the mortgagee the reasonable rental value of the premises throughout the duration of the extension. According to Hughes, this helped
357 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 438.
358 Id. at 445-47. But see Epstein, supra note 7, at 737 (arguing no evidence exists to
demonstrate the mortgage moratoria of the Depression "neutralized the effects of ...
deflation, restoring the parties to the position ... they would have enjoyed without the
deflation"). Epstein suggests, in part, that the federal government's contraction of the
money supply actually produced the deflation that made it difficult for farmers who
sought to make mortgage payments during the Depression. Id.
359 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 425, 445.
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preserve the integity and value of the mortgagee's contract rights
without subjecting the mortgagors to immediate financial ruin. It
also compensated the mortgagee, who received money to defray tax
and insurance costs of the premises while it remained in possession
of the mortgagors.36 ° If the mortgagors failed to comply with the
conditions established by the court, the mortgagees would then obtain immediate possession of the realty. In any event, the statute
limited its operation to two years, or until May 1, 1935.
Hughes distinguished the Minnesota mortgage moratorium from
previous debtor relief legislation that altered private agreements for
indefinite periods of time or otherwise infringed upon the contract
rights of one party without compensation. Unlike the Minnesota
statute, these laws were unreasonable because they did not set forth
limitations upon the scope of local police powers.3 6 1 Subsequent
decisions underscored the emphasis Hughes and the other members
of the majority placed upon the reasonable control of local government over the enforcement of contracts. For example, in WB.
Worthen Co. v. Thomas,3 62 Hughes, once again writing for the majority, invalidated an Arkansas law that exempted life insurance
proceeds from seizure by judicial process for payment of debts.
This retroactive measure violated the Contract Clause because it
enabled debtors to enjoy unlimited exemptions for an indefinite period of time regardless of the continued existence of an economic
emergency. These characteristics made the law unreasonable as it
subjected the contract rights of creditors to uncertainty and rendered their remedies worthless.3 63
Similarly, a unanimous Court struck down other Arkansas laws
that prevented mortgagees from securing their contract rights to
benefit assessments on municipal bonds for nearly seven years.
Notwithstanding the legislature's declaration of an emergency, the
actions provided mortgage debtors with unconditional relief at the
expense of their creditors, who received neither installment payments upon the principal of outstanding loans nor rental payments
360
361

Id. at 445.
Id. at 431-34. In contrast with the economic crises which precipitated nineteenth

century debtor-relief legislation invalidated by the Supreme Court, the Depression
lasted for several years. The financial panics that occurred in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873,
and 1893 did not last very long. For example, the principal effects of the 1837 "crisis"
diminished considerably by the time the Court decided Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (I
How.) 311 (1843). See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 376 (1922); Perlman, supra note 33, at 780.
362 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
363 Id. at 432-34.
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during the stay of their contract remedies. 3"
As a whole, these cases demonstrate the perception of the Chief
Justice and other members of the Blaisdell majority about the limitations of their decision.3 65 Hughes, in particular, did not intend to
eviscerate the constitutional protection of vested contract rights.366
Rather, he interpreted the Contract Clause pragmatically, contending that its prohibition did not impede the exercise of local control
over those aspects of contract enforcement which affected the public
interest in collective security and economic stability. 367 To this extent, he invoked a test of reasonableness upon the operation of state
364 W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 61 (1934).
365 Indeed, a brief survey of post-Blaisdell cases involving debtor relief laws demonstrates the Court's moderation. See Wright v. Vinton Branch Bank, 300 U.S. 440
(1937) (upholding a revised Frazier-Lemke Act provision that limited the foreclosure
stay of real property of a bankrupt mortgagor to three years on the condition that the
mortgagors .who remained in possession continued to pay taxes, maintenance fees, and
rent on the premises and the mortgagee retained a bankruptcy lien); Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124 (1937) (ruling that a
North Carolina statutory defense in a deficiency action did not impair the obligation of
contracts when it allowed the mortgagor to assert that the bid of a mortgagee-purchaser
at a foreclosure sale was less than the actual property value or equal to the approximate
value of the debt); Triegle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936) (invalidating
under the Contract and Due Process Clauses a Louisiana law giving building and loan
directors sole discretion to determine the payments allocated to shareholders who withdraw their deposits); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02
(1935) (holding that paragraph 7 of the Frazier-Lemke Bankruptcy Act of 1934 violated
the Fifth Amendment due process rights of a mortgagee when it gave a bankrupt mortgagor continued possession of realty for five years unencumbered by a lien and without
any required compensation to the mortgagee regardless of the existence of an emerr
gency).
Moreover, in Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), Nortz v. United States, 294
U.S. 317 (1935), and Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), (the Gold
Clause Cases), a slim majority of the Court sustained the exlusive authority of Congress
to make and regulate currency notwithstanding the provisions in private contracts mandating payment of debts in currency prescribed by the gold standard. In Perry, the
Court ruled that the United States could not alter its obligation to redeem war bonds in
gold, yet because the bondholder failed to show actual damages, no liability accrued.
Nevertheless, the Court held that Congress could not interfere with the preexisting debt
obligations of the federal government by redeeming bonds in legal tender rather than in
gold. Perry, 294 U.S. at 350-51. In Norman, the Court held that the 1933 Joint Resolution of Congress invalidating gold clauses did not impair private contract rights for
redemption of railroad bonds. Norman, 294 U.S. at 297-311. In Nortz, the Court rejected the Fifth Amendment due process claim of one who upon redemption of gold
certificates issued by the United States government received payment in currency other
than gold coins. Nortz, 294 U.S. at 326-30.
366 See Maidment, supra note 162, at 324-25.
367 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 439 ("It cannot be maintained that the constitutional prohibition should be so construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions with
respect to the enforcement of contracts if made necessary by a great public calamity
such as fire, flood, or earthquake.").
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68

police powers.1
However, questions arise whether Hughes's approach in Blaisdell
created more problems of application than it resolved. His emphasis upon the compensatory facets of the mortgage moratorium law
belied his assertion that the Act's extension of the Blaisdells' redemption period did not impair the contract rights of the mortgagee. Much of his opinion characterized the statute as a legitimate
use of Minnesota's police powers to alleviate the long-term effects of
a widespread economic crisis. Once Hughes established this point,
he diminished its importance by trying to make a fine line distinction between legislative interference with contract rights and remedies.3 69 Hesitant to overturn precedent or even to make significant
departures from it, he relied upon this traditional dichotomy to explain the reasonableness of the state's interference with a private
mortgage agreement.3 7 ° Classifying the changes as within the remedies of the contract seemingly enabled Hughes to interpret the Contract Clause in a flexible manner; it actually may have highlighted
the weakest points in the opinion.
In dissent, Justice Sutherland contended that the Minnesota statute severely curtailed the efficacy of the mortgagee's remedies and
abridged its rights under the mortgage.3 7 1 But for the revised statutory redemption provision, the mortgagee would have received absolute possession of the mortgaged premises upon the expiration of
the original one-year redemption period. Under the Minnesota law
368 Hughes wrote approximately 350 opinions as Chief Justice, 39 of which involved
questions of state powers. He upheld the exercise of state powers 32 times, and most of
these cases involved police powers. 2 PUSEY, supra note 163, at 696, 703. Of the postBlaisdell cases, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 390-400 (1937), illustrates more clearly Hughes's recognition of the paramount importance of state police
powers in matters of public interest.
369 See Memorandum from Stone to Hughes, supra note 329, at 2. Perlman, supra
note 33, at 793, contends that Hughes weakened the notion of reasonable exercise of
police powers during an emergency with his additional point that the Minnesota law
compensated the mortgagee. Once the state exercises its police powers in a legitimate,
nonarbitrary manner, "there is no 'taking' of property for public use without just compensation, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, and the state is not required to
compensate anyone." Id. at 793-94 (footnote omitted).
However, the principle of compensation has been recognized as a limitation upon the
scope of the Contract Clause. See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507
(1848); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Epstein, supra
note 7, at 740-47; Siegel, supra note 96, at 76-108. In any event, Hughes's emphasis on
compensation made little sense, given his more farreaching observations about the public interest in private contracts and the nature of constitutional interpretation.
370

See WHITE, supra note 209, at 213.

371 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 478-82.
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the mortgagee obtained instead a defeasible interest subject to divestment in two years once the Blaisdells redeemed the mortgage
debt. More than simply changing the mortgagee's remedies upon
the Blaisdells' default, the mortgage moratorium essentially impaired the obligation of a private contract when it altered the redemption provision against the will of the mortgagee. This
comprised an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of state power
over the performance of a private mortgage agreement. Further,
monthly rental payments did not compensate the mortgagee because the act deprived it of the opportunity to sell the premises or
otherwise exercise complete dominion and control over the
2
37

realty.

Though technically correct that the Minnesota law affected both
the rights and the remedies of a private contract, Sutherland incorrectly interpreted the terms of the mortgage in a rigid, technical
fashion. Had the mortgagee received immediate and absolute possession of the premises upon the expiration of the initial one-year
redemption period, it appears unlikely the mortgagee would have
been able to sell the property for the amount of the outstanding
indebtedness in an already depressed real estate market. The mortgagee probably would not have recovered a deficiency judgment for
some time against the Blaisdells because of the continued duration
of the economic and financial crisis. Moreover, the mortgagee was
a financial institution whose investors were only interested in receiving at the very least a return on their capital investments and not
ownership of devalued property.3 73
Conversely, the Blaisdells retained a keen interest in maintaining
possession of their boarding house. Extension of the redemption
period would enable them to control the premises while they tried
to extinguish their debt. While this delayed the mortgagee's remedy, it may have actually preserved its underlying contract rights in
the long run. After all, the mortgagee primarily sought recovery of
the money it loaned the Blaisdells.37 4 Strict enforcement of the
372 Id. at 480-81. Moreover, fair rental value does not necessarily equal fair compensation. The Minnesota statute placed the mortgagee in a potentially untenable position,
for if land values decreased even more, the mortgagee might have eventually become
stuck with the property. Conversely, if the mortgagor redeemed the property while
land values increased, the mortgagee would lose the opportunity to sell the land in a
strong market. See Shapiro, supra note 350, at 642.
373 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 445-46; Memorandum from Stone to Hughes, supra note
329, at 2-3; Notes of Justice Stone, supra note 329, at paras. 1, 3, 7.
374 Memorandum from Stone to Hughes, supra note 329, at 2-3; Notes of Justice
Stone, supra note 329, at paras. 1, 3, 7.
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mortgage's foreclosure by sale provision would have vested the
mortgagee in 1933 with absolute title to a boarding house it neither
wanted to operate nor could sell for an amount equal to the Blaisdells' outstanding indebtedness. In contrast, the two-year mortgage
moratorium minimized the potential for property waste and, in fact,
encouraged the Blaisdells to make the maximum profitable use of
their land in order to retire their debt. If successful, they could pay
off their loan together with any interest they owed the mortgagee.
Given the economic and financial circumstances under which the
mortgagee foreclosed the realty in 1932, the mortgagee could not
realistically expect to otherwise recover its loan within less time.
On the other hand, if the Blaisdells failed to either make their
monthly rental payments or to redeem the property within the extended period, the mortgagee would obtain complete control of the
premises at perhaps a more advantageous time for selling it in satisfaction of the underlying debt.
Insofar as Hughes emphasized the public interest in private contracts in applying a standard of reasonableness to the Minnesota
mortgage moratorium, his opinion may have blurred the fine line
between enlightened jurisprudence and subjective decisionmaking.375 Sutherland's dissent implied this with its doleful observation
that the majority's decision to sustain the Minnesota law weakened
the Contract Clause as a limitation of state power to modify vested
contract rights.

37 6

Years later, others criticized the decision as a

conscious attempt to distort the original meaning of the Contract
Clause from an absolute prohibition upon state authority.37 7 The
Chief Justice erred in his broad construction of local police powers;
together with the other members of the Blaisdell majority he
manipulated precedent to sanction legislation the principal objective
of which was the involuntary redistribution of resources among par375 For example, by invoking a reasonableness standard, Hughes essentially sanctioned prospective Contract Clause analysis on a case by case basis. His opinion also
created the potential for imposition of judicial values in determinations of the limits of
legislative power. See HENDEL, supra note 201, at 181-82 (suggesting that reasonableness might lead to judicial subjectivity); Note, supra note 355, at 1643. As a practical
matter, it is almost impossible to divorce the judicial function from policy questions in
this area. After all, the Court must examine conceptions of governmental authority and
federalism and thus decide the appropriate limits of state regulation of contract rights.
In essence, the process involves a series of choices as demonstrated by the contrasting
opinions of Hughes and Sutherland and their divergent perspectives of history, economics, and public welfare.
376 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448, 483.
377 See generally Palmer, supra note 9.
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ties to a private agreement.37 From this perspective, these critics
argue that Blaisdell signified a conscious retreat from certainty in
the enforcement of contract obligations. Instead, it marked the ascendance of an untoward judicial activism that substituted the primacy of law and constitutional limitations with an admixture of
rules of convenience and public policy.3 7 9
Much of this criticism misconstrues the course of Contract
Clause interpretation prior to Blaisdell. It fails to consider the extent to which divergent perspectives of federalism created inroads
upon the constitutional limitation of state authority to regulate the
public interest in a variety of contractual arrangements. From the
outset, Supreme Court justices employed a wide range of judicial
sensibilities to problems of local interference with contracts which,
to one degree or another, reflected their particular notions of public
policy. Chief Justice Marshall viewed the Contract Clause as a
means of restricting state power;380 others such as William Johnson,
then later John McLean, William Daniel and, for the most part,
Chief Justice Roger Taney, displayed keen sensitivity toward the
importance of maintaining state regulatory power over the subject
matter of contracts.3 8 ' Subsequent recognition of inalienable police
powers resulted from increased judicial appreciation of the public
interest in private contracts; ultimately, it formed the context
through which a narrow majority of the Court sustained the reasonable exercise of state police powers in times of emergency. It is
within this tradition that Blaisdell fits, a product of both the confluence of previous inroads upon the Contract Clause and the jurisprudential tenets of the Chief Justice who deftly molded his views with
378 See Epstein, supra note 7, at 717 ("The contract clause is an explicit limitation
upon the power of the state to trench upon individual rights; rent-seeking by factions is
a persistent feature of our institutional life that in turn justifies the broad construction of
the basic provision."); Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 9, at 541-43; Sterk, supra note 9,
at 683-85 (arguing that Blaisdell marked a departure from previous police powers
cases).
379 See Epstein, supra note 7, at 735-38; Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 9, at 541-43.
380 See generally WHITE, supra note 7, at 595-673; Bruchey, supra note 12, at 1145;
Lynch, supra note 38, at 18-20.
381 See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 327-31 (1843) (McLean, J., dissenting) (distinguishing contract remedies from obligations affords states latitude in enforcing contracts, setting
land values, and in regulating economic affairs); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); see
also Hale, supra note 70, at 880 (asserting that Hughes's emphasis in Blaisdell on public
policy and his flexible interpretation of the Contract Clause reflected William Johnson's
approach a century earlier).
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those of Stone, Cardozo, Brandeis, and Roberts to form a powerful
majority.
Hughes did not change the meaning of the Contract Clause; he
subjected its application to the grim reality of an unprecedented financial depression whose duration and widespread effects seemingly
threatened the continued stability and economic structure of society. He perceived that rigid enforcement of contract obligations
would, quite possibly, undermine the long-term security of these
same contract rights and the effectiveness of the constitutional limitations set forth by Justice Sutherland's passionate dissent. In essence, his opinion forged a compromise between two fundamentally
different conceptions of the Contract Clause, each of which emanated from divergent responses to an inherent tension within the
federal system between private contract rights and their control by
local government. Like any compromise, it contained problems,
but it sought to preserve a semblance of the status quo while adapting the substance of contract relations to the complex changes of
the twentieth-century economy. In large part, Hughes succeeded in
attaining this objective and thus made clear the importance of governmental authority in the continued security of contract rights.
CONCLUSION

Within the federal system exists a fundamental tension between
the exercise of local governmental authority and the freedom of private rights. The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution
implicitly recognizes this conflict with its express prohibition of
state laws that impair the obligation of contracts. Despite this
seemingly unequivocal limitation of state power, two distinct
strands of Contract Clause jurisprudence developed in the near century and a half that preceded Blaisdell. In large part, each reflected
different perspectives of the appropriate role of states in the federal
system. One view, first expressed by Chief Justice John Marshall
and later endorsed by Justice George Sutherland, emphasized the
paramount importance of constitutional protection of vested contract rights. It also contended the obligation of contracts emanated
primarily from the will of the parties and not from the authority of
local government. In contrast was a less abstract and more functional approach toward contractual obligations that recognized the
public interest in private agreements and stressed the positive role
of local government in maintaining the relative worth of contract
relations.
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As the economy grew more diversified and interdependent, technological and financial changes created a series of complex
problems that invariably affected judicial perceptions of the value of
contract performance. Adherents to the absolute sanctity of contract obligations invoked the Contract Clause as a limitation of state
power essential to the preservation of contract rights. Conversely,
proponents of local governmental authority as the primary source
of contract obligations endorsed a liberal attitude towards state police power measures enacted for the ostensible purpose of securing
the collective good. By the 1930s the Supreme Court, albeit by a
slim majority, recognized the authority of states to adopt reasonable
methods for regulating the subject matter and performance of contracts that affected the public interest. It was within this tradition
that the Hughes Court decided Blaisdell.
Though somewhat controversial and occasionally misunderstood,
Blaisdell did not constitute an abrupt departure from the course of
previous Contract Clause jurisprudence. Instead, it marked the
confluence of several longstanding inroads upon the scope of the
constitutional prohibition of state authority to regulate contracts.
The majority's explicit recognition of the Depression as an economic emergency for which the state of Minnesota could enact a
temporary mortgage moratorium derived its rationale from earlier
Court decisions sustaining both the reserved and inalienable police
powers of states to promote the public welfare. Moreover, the
Court restricted the exercise of such police powers to a standard of
reasonableness comparable to that used in earlier disputes over the
authority of local governments to regulate conditions of employment, the conduct of businesses and other general ecomonic affairs
that affected the public. In short, Blaisdell was neither the first nor
the only Supreme Court case to require the exercise of reasonable
police powers.
In many respects the majority opinion reflected the pragmatic jurisprudence of its principal author, Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes, who inherently perceived the Minnesota mortgage moratorium as presenting the Court with a classic problem in federalism
over the limitations of state government. Together with Justices
Harlan Stone and Benjamin Cardozo he crafted an opinion imbued
with progressive notions of governmental authority and constitutional interpretation that essentially balanced the interests of individuals with the paramount objectives of the state in maintaining its
economic structure. Hughes understood that the relative value of
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contract obligations derived from the ability of local government to
exercise its sovereign powers in a reasonable manner during times of
economic emergency. Though his opinion narrowly construed the
Contract Clause, it neither jeopardized the constitutional protection
of contract rights nor sanctioned the widespread redistribution of
private resources. Instead, it recognized the inherent public interest
in private contracts and realized the potential within the federal system for local government to regulate the terms of such agreements.
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